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EXPERIMENT AND BIAS:  
THE CASE OF PARSIMONY IN COMPARATIVE COGNITION 
(Order No.          ) 
IRINA G. MEKETA 
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Major Professor: Alisa Bokulich, Associate Professor of Philosophy 
ABSTRACT 
Comparative cognition is the interdisciplinary field of animal cognition and 
behavior studies, which includes comparative psychology and branches of ethology, 
biology, and neuroscience. My dissertation shows that the quasi-epistemic value of 
parsimony plays a problematic role in the experimental setting of comparative cognition. 
More specifically, I argue that an idiosyncratic interpretation of the statistical hypothesis-
testing method, known as the Neyman-Pearson Method (NPM), embeds an Occamist 
parsimony preference into experimental methodology in comparative cognition, which 
results in an underattribution bias, or a bias in favor of allegedly simple cognitive 
ontologies. I trace this parsimony preference to the content of the null hypothesis within 
the NPM, and defend a strategy for modifying the NPM to guard against the 
underattribution bias. I recommend adopting an evidence-driven strategy for choosing the 
null hypothesis. Further, I suggest a role for non-empirical values, such as ethical 
concerns, in the weighting of Type I and Type II error-rates. I contend that statistical 
models are deeply embedded in experimental practice and are not value-free. These 
models provide an often overlooked door through which values, both epistemic and non-
epistemic, can enter scientific research. Since statistical models generally, and the NPM 
 
 
vii 
in particular, play a role in a wide variety of scientific disciplines, this dissertation can 
also be seen as a case study illustrating the importance of attending to the choice a 
particular statistical model. This conclusion suggests that various philosophical 
investigations of scientific practice – from inquiry into the nature of scientific evidence to 
analysis of the role of values in science – would be greatly enriched by increased 
attention to experimental methodology, including the choice and interpretation of 
statistical models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Comparative cognition is the broadly interdisciplinary field of animal cognition science, 
cutting across such disciplines as ethology, comparative psychology, cognitive science, 
biology, anthropology, philosophy, and more. Researchers in comparative cognition 
pursue a wide variety of research programs – some aimed at illuminating the evolutionary 
history of human cognitive traits, and others aimed at probing the varieties of nonhuman 
cognition and behavior. Given the diversity of disciplines converging on the questions 
about animal cognition, it should come as no surprise that comparative cognition employs 
a variety of investigative approaches. These include combinations of observational and 
experimental techniques in both laboratories and under natural or semi-natural field 
conditions, as well as computer simulations and modeling. Each of these approaches 
itself divides into myriad techniques, each one informed by the methodological traditions 
of the researchers‘ home disciplines. Comparative psychology, for instance, must 
renegotiate its historical preference for ecologically isolated study subjects, while 
ethology must grapple with uncontrolled variables in field conditions. Such negotiations 
have produced both tensions among research traditions and improved methodologies 
(Allen & Bekoff 1997). Nevertheless, some forty years after the cognitive revolution 
reoriented animal cognition science away from the search for behavioral laws and toward 
the identification of cognitive mechanisms, comparative cognition has emerged as a field 
in its own right.  
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As a growing interdisciplinary science, comparative cognition faces the challenge 
of defining its standards of practice as it expands to include new disciplines and broadens 
its explanatory scope. In the process of establishing shared epistemic commitments, 
comparative cognition scientists and theorists have raised challenges against some 
common assumptions, evaluating their biasing effects. I begin by looking at two well-
documented biases. The first bias comes in the form of an inflated worry over 
anthropomorphism, or the allegedly erroneous ascription of human traits to nonhuman 
animals (for examples of anti-anthropomorphism see: Blumberg 2007, Blumberg & 
Wasserman 1995, Budiansky 1998, Davies 1997, Kennedy 1992, Rose 2007, Wynne 
2007a; For criticisms of the anti-anthropomorphism literature see Allen & Bekoff 1997, 
Andrews 2010, Burghardt 1991 & 2007, Fisher 1990 & 1991). The second bias is a 
preference for the questionable value of parsimony (Fitzpatrick 2008, Sober 1998, 2005). 
I add to this discussion by showing that dubious appeals to parsimony are used to ground 
anti-anthropomorphism, and that this move results in a preference for maximally simple 
cognitive ontologies. I call this preferential bias Cognitive Conservatism, and proceed to 
show that it is reinforced by an idiosyncratic but common interpretation of the dominant 
statistical paradigm used to evaluate experimental results, the Neyman-Pearson Method 
(NPM) of hypothesis testing. I argue that the role of the null hypothesis in the NPM is of 
central importance, and offer a solution that retains the NPM, but modifies the strategy 
for devising a null hypothesis. My solution eliminates what I argue is the unfounded 
parsimony-based preference for simple cognitive ontologies and replaces it with 
empirically-driven expectations.  
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In the process of making my argument, I simultaneously address three audiences: 
(1) general philosophers of science who are interested in either the role of epistemic and 
non-epistemic values in science or the dependence-relations among methodology, 
statistical models, and interpretation of data and how these generate evidence; (2) 
philosophers of comparative cognition, and (3) comparative cognition researchers. The 
discussion in Chapters 1-4 incorporates these themes, while the conclusion following the 
main chapters summarizes them for these three audiences. My arguments proceed as 
follows:  
In Chapter 1, I establish that the appeal to parsimony is used to ground arguments 
against so-called anthropomorphism, showing how such appeals to parsimony result in 
Cognitive Conservatism (CC). This discussion is placed into historical context, and I 
show how the worry over anthropomorphizing animal subjects has inclined comparative 
cognition researchers toward austere cognitive ontologies. In addition to the historical 
analysis, I offer preliminary empirical evidence for the enduring relationship between 
anti-anthropomorphism and appeals to parsimony. The empirical evidence is two-fold: 
First, I locate a correlation between the occurrence-rates of the terms ―parsimony‖ and 
―anthropomorphism‖ using a Google N-gram analysis. Next, I conduct a search of 
recently published textbooks on comparative cognition and closely related fields, in order 
to show that the appeal to parsimony is, indeed, being used to ground anti-
anthropomorphism.  
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Having traced the problem to the gratuitous valuation of parsimony, I dedicate 
Chapter 2 to showing that the term, ―parsimony,‖ as it is deployed in comparative 
cognition, is ambiguous and a poor ground for hypothesis-choice. I offer a taxonomy of 
possible meanings in order to show the degree to which parsimony is conceptually 
profligate, and therefore liable to confuse rather than clarify debates.  In order to cut 
through some of the confusion, I identify, and analyze, those meanings that are most 
commonly assumed in defenses of CC. I isolate what I call ―ontological parsimony‖ as 
the meaning with the strongest uptake in comparative cognition, and illustrate the 
problem of using ontological parsimony to parse cognition. Having done this, I turn to 
earlier philosophical assessments of parsimony and CC in comparative cognition. I assess 
three such analyses. The first is Simon Fitzpatrick‘s (2008) deflationary treatment of 
parsimony in comparative cognition, in which Fitzpatrick concludes that the epistemic 
value of parsimony in a given situation is nothing over and above the epistemic values of 
the relevant background features of the hypothesis. Parsimony, Fitzpatrick concludes, 
cannot ground a preference for one hypothesis over another, much less for the preference 
for what I‘ve been calling CC.  The second analysis is a two-part assessment of Elliott 
Sober‘s works on parsimony in animal cognition research and its grounds for a limited 
form of CC. In the first of these, Sober argues that parsimony, in a narrower sense, may 
have a role to play in the selection of models of animal cognition, since models with 
fewer open parameters (i.e., more parsimonious models), may be better predictors. The 
second of these analyses of parsimony comes from Sober‘s (2005) argument that cladistic 
parsimony does not speak in favor of conservatism with regard to animal cognition. 
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Finally, I look at a third type of analysis of CC in comparative cognition, offered by 
Sober (2005, 2009) and then by Kristin Andrews (2009, 2011). These analyses locate the 
bias in the preference for Type II errors (roughly, false negatives) over Type I errors 
(roughly, false positives) within the NPM. Following Peter Godfrey-Smith (1994), I refer 
to this as the error-rate asymmetry. Sober‘s and Andrews‘ rejections of the error-rate 
asymmetry helpfully illustrate how biases can covertly drive experimental paradigms. 
However, as I argue in the following chapter, their focus on the error-rate asymmetry 
obscures the real culprit – viz., the null hypothesis (H0).  
In Chapter 3, I pick up the discussion of the Neyman-Pearson Method and its role 
in enshrining CC. I begin by showing that the emphasis on the error-rate asymmetry 
leaves out the feature that introduces the parsimony-based bias: namely, the null 
hypothesis. I use Godfrey-Smith‘s (1994) analysis of the NPM to show that comparative 
cognition employs a version what Godfrey-Smith calls the ―semantic‖ interpretation of 
the NPM, and which includes an Occamist component. On his view, this Occamism 
comes from a preference for the simplest H0, which Godfrey-Smith calls the natural null 
and which I denote as ―Hn.‖ Having identified the Hn as the source of the CC bias, I 
propose an account of how null hypotheses at the statistical level can both affect, and be 
affected by, null hypotheses at different levels of generality. I take the case of 
metacognition (roughly, thinking about thinking) in rats to illustrate my claim that 
warrant carries across what I call statistical nulls, experimental nulls, and theoretical 
nulls. This picture of warrant-transfer explains how parsimony appeals reinforce one 
another at different stages of scientific investigations.  
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In my final chapter, Chapter 4, I propose a solution to eliminating the CC bias 
from comparative cognition research. My proposal modifies the Neyman-Pearson 
Method (NPM) by removing the a priori preference for simple cognitive ontologies. I do 
this by eliminating the Hn, and replacing it with what I call the contextual null (Hc), 
which is the hypothesis with the best empirical evidence in its favor. The first half of this 
chapter is devoted to offering alternative defenses of the Hn and showing why these fail. I 
consider a range of defenses – some a priori metaphysical, some methodological, and 
some empirically-informed metaphysical – and explain why each one fails to support the 
general preference for a Hn. With the best defenses defeated, I conclude that the Hn may 
be excised from the NPM. I then show what it means to replace the Hn with a Hc.  Like 
the natural null, the Hc is a species of null hypothesis: while the Hn is the hypothesis of 
maximum cognitive austerity, the Hc is the hypothesis of best available information. The 
Hn instantiates whatever hypothesis presupposes the simplest cognitive ontology. The Hc 
instantiates whatever hypothesis the researchers have independent reasons to believe to 
be true, or likely to be true. Once more, I turn to the case of metacognition in rats to 
illustrate the difference between the natural and the contextual nulls, and to show how 
these statistical nulls affect hypotheses at other levels of generality.  
In the remainder of Chapter 4, I defend my proposal against three objections, and 
suggest a role for epistemic and non-epistemic values in the NPM. In defending the 
contextual null against objections, I show, first, why my suggestion does not place an 
undue burden on comparative cognition researchers. In brief, this is because researchers 
already take the sorts of considerations I recommend into account in formulating research 
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strategies before experiments begin; the problem is that they do not use these 
considerations to inform their null hypothesis choice, as I argue they should. The second 
objection dovetails with the first insofar as it questions my reluctance to take what 
appears, prima facie, to be the next logical step: to move to a Bayesian statistical 
approach. My response to this objection is simple: my recommendation is both more 
modest and more likely to receive uptake in the scientific community, since it does not 
require the radical revision of a deeply entrenched statistical paradigm. In fact, my 
suggestion does bring Bayesian intuitions into the frequentist (NPM) methodology. To 
the extent that this makes the experimental processes more transparent, I take my 
suggestion to be a success. Finally, I consider an objection from the severity analysis 
interpretation of the NPM, as offered by Deborah Mayo (2004) and Mayo and Aris 
Spanos (2009, 2011), which, inter alia, allows a finer-grained analysis of alternative 
statistical hypotheses than does the original accept/reject procedure of the NPM. I argue 
that this is an improvement over the traditional NPM, but that, to the extent that biases 
enter into the formulation of null hypotheses, the severity analysis approach would only 
limit, but not eliminate, the CC bias.  
After having argued that the putatively epistemic value of parsimony has no 
positive role to play in comparative cognition, I close Chapter 4 with a defense of 
epistemic and non-epistemic values in the NPM. Here I revive the error-rate asymmetry 
to show that, since the values of the acceptable error rates are chosen by convention, 
modifying them to cohere with appropriate moral reasons is both an epistemically 
legitimate and ethically laudable move.  
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Lastly, in my conclusion, I draw out the lessons from my discussion for the three 
audiences I mention above: philosophers of science, philosophers of comparative 
cognition, and, finally comparative cognition researchers. My discussion ends with a 
sketch of future projects that use my work in this dissertation as a point of departure.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Biases in Comparative Cognition: Parsimony and Anti-
Anthropomorphism 
 
 
People have until lately placed the burden of proof somewhat oddly in 
approaching [the] topics [of animal subjectivity and consciousness]. They 
have asked „Is there any reason to believe in subjective states in animals? 
As if subjectivity were a kind of phlogiston, an extravagant metaphysical 
hypothesis, and the negative answer to it were the safe, economical one. 
Mary Midgley 1984, 134 
 
Introduction 
In comparative cognition, appeals to parsimony are commonly used to argue against 
cognitive complexity or sophistication and in favor of allegedly simple cognitive 
ontologies (mechanisms, processes, and abilities). These arguments take parsimony to be 
an epistemic value,
1
 and one that univocally speaks in favor of attributing to animals the 
least sophisticated cognitive ontology that evidence allows. However, those who claim 
parsimony as a virtue of their methodology often fail to explain what they mean by 
―parsimony‖ or to offer justifications for preferring a parsimonious model of animal 
                                                          
1
 An epistemic value is a property, typically of a theory, that conduces to the truth of that 
theory. Epistemic values include such properties as internal coherence, external 
consistency, predictive value, explanatory scope. Insofar as truth-conduciveness is a 
virtue, epistemic values are good-making properties of theories or research programs. 
Non-epistemic values include moral, social, political, and practical values. Questions 
about the boundary between epistemic and non-epistemic – where the boundary lies, 
whether it exists at all, and of what utility it may be – have spawned a vast philosophical 
literature (Cf. Kuhn 1962, Longino 1990, McMullin 1982, Rooney 1992).   
10 
 
 
cognition. Sometimes ―parsimony‖ is used as a synonym for simplicity of the explanation 
or of the mechanisms presupposed by the explanation; other times ―parsimony‖ appears 
to refer to consistency with established theories. A result of such an ambiguous 
deployment of the term has been a proliferation of possible meanings and conceptual 
confusion. Despite this confusion, the reference to parsimony has a lot of currency with 
comparative cognition scientists, making it an important subject for philosophical 
analysis.  
In this chapter, I explain how the concept of parsimony has come to be used as 
grounds for the methodological heuristic of rejecting explanations of behavior positing 
sophisticated cognitive ontology in cases where an explanation relying on less 
sophisticated ontology fits the data equally well. I will refer to this methodological 
heuristic as Cognitive Conservatism (CC). CC is a broader version of what Elliott Sober 
(2009) calls the Principle of Conservatism (PC), which, he writes, ―cognitive scientists 
often regard [as] an instance of a more general methodological maxim, namely the 
principle of parsimony, a.k.a. Ockham‘s razor‖ (Sober 2009, 237). The PC, according to 
Sober, draws on Daniel Dennett‘s ―three-way distinction among zero-order, first-order, 
and second-order intentionality,‖ where an organism can be ascribed a first-order 
intentional state if that state is about some feature of the world that is not another mental 
state, and a second-order mental state if that state is about another mental state (Sober 
2009). A zero-order intentionality means that there is no mental state at all. The PC 
states: 
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(PC) hypotheses that explain an organism’s behavior by attributing lower-order 
intentionality are preferable to hypotheses that explain the behavior by 
attributing higher-order intentionality. (ibid)  
 
I prefer the broader CC to the PC since it is more general, and, in my view, more 
accurately reflects the diversity of responses to the vague edict to seek parsimonious 
interpretations of animal behavior. Following the structure of the PC, the CC states: 
(CC) Hypotheses that explain an organism’s behavior by attributing simpler 
cognitive ontologies (systems, mechanisms, processes, abilities) are preferable 
to hypotheses that explain the behavior by attributing complex cognitive 
ontologies. 
 
 CC is characterized by an exaggerated worry about overattributing complex cognition to 
animals, but without a parallel concern about possible underattribution. If the concern 
about underattribution was just as pressing as the concern about overattribution, then CC 
would merely be a caution to avoid incorrectly characterizing cognitive complexity in 
animals. However, since underattribution is not as much of a concern, CC is an a priori 
preference that requires, but rarely receives, sustained theoretical defense. I show that the 
CC is the modern version of anti-anthropomorphism – a tendency with a much longer 
tradition.   
In § 1.2, I describe two studies, which I have conducted to support the claim made 
in § 1.1 – viz., that appeals to parsimony and anxieties over anthropomorphism have a 
shared history, and that the effects of this shared history remains evident today. First, 
however, I begin with the problem of anthropomorphism.  
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1.1 Anti-Anthropomorphism, Cognitive Conservatism, and Appeals to Parsimony 
 
Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human traits to nonhuman entities, is generally 
treated as a mistake. In comparative cognition, anthropomorphism is most commonly 
treated as the mistaken attribution of uniquely human cognitive traits to nonhuman 
animals. I will offer a much more detailed account of the term and its history below (§ 
1.1.1), where I explain how the term came to be associated with the appeal to parsimony. 
The appeal to parsimony is similarly present in version of CC. Unlike anti-
anthropomorphism, the CC does not explicitly advise against imputing uniquely human 
cognitive properties to nonhuman animals, and in that respect it appears to be less 
anthropocentric and more general than anti-anthropomorphism. Nevertheless, versions of 
CC often assume that, on average, human cognitive traits are the most complex cognitive 
ontologies across all taxa. Since CC recommends opting for simpler cognitive ontologies 
in explanations of nonhuman animal behavior, the simplest cognitive ontology ends up 
being the least human-like cognitive ontology. In this section, I begin with a survey of 
meanings assigned to ―anthropomorphism‖ and the rhetorical uses to which the term has 
been put. Following that discussion, I offer a brief historical survey of the fear of 
anthropomorphism, which I will refer to as ―anti-anthropomorphism,‖ and the emergence 
of the view that parsimony is an epistemic value, at least with respect to comparative 
cognition. This historical survey focuses on two of the central areas in comparative 
13 
 
 
cognition: comparative psychology and ethology, and how the two have co-evolved to 
form the foundation of comparative cognition.  
1.1.1 Anthropomorphism: Meanings and Uses 
Anthropomorphism, as it is understood in common use, is the misattribution of human 
properties to nonhuman organisms, artifacts (such as cars and cell phones) and natural 
phenomena (such as floods and hurricanes).2 While this definition is relatively straight-
forward, the meaning of ―anthropomorphism‖ is anything but straight forward in the 
science of animal cognition.  
Anthropomorphism: Meanings 
In the first place, it is both normative and descriptive – used either to designate the error 
of attributing a uniquely human cognitive trait to an animal, or to pick out and the act of 
attributing a human cognitive trait to an animal, respectively. The ambiguity, however, 
does not end there. Anthropomorphism has also been identified as an attitude on the part 
of an individual scientist or group of scientists; as an interpretive strategy (Bekoff 2007, 
Burghardt 2007, Timberlake2007, Wynne 2007a, Wynne 2007b)3; as a natural or evolved 
tendency common to all human beings (Kennedy 1992, Horowitz & Bekoff 2007), and 
even as a means of assigning value to nonhumans (Coporeal and Heyes 1997). Moreover, 
on each of the above interpretations, anthropomorphism has received a combination of 
                                                          
2
 The term originates in theology, where it was used to describe the misattribution of 
human characteristics to God. As John A. Fisher says, it has been carried a negative 
connotation from its inception (Fisher 1991).  
3
 On this view, anthropomorphism, far from being epistemically destructive, is helpful in 
our study of non-human animals. This position is usually backed up with appeals to 
evolutionary continuity and convergence.  
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negative and positive appraisals. In short, not only is there no agreement regarding the 
value of anthropomorphism, but there is no consensus about its meaning.  
The disagreements about the meaning and value of alleged anthropomorphism run 
deep. For example, the biologist and ethologist Marc Bekoff writes that 
anthropomorphism ―is inevitable and involuntary‖ and that if ―we don‘t 
anthropomorphize, we lose important information‖ (Bekoff 2007, 124). He continues:  
Anthropomorphism is a much more complex phenomenon than we would 
have expected. It may very well be that the seemingly natural human urge 
to impart emotions to animals – far from obscuring the ―true‖ nature of 
animals – may actually reflect a very accurate way of knowing. (Bekoff 
2007, 131) 
Disagreeing about its utility, Stewart Elliot Guthrie writes that anthropomorphism is a 
mistake resulting from a ―rational‖ – by which he means adaptive –strategy of seeing the 
world in terms of what matters to us and is, in that way, an ―unavoidable product of a 
necessary perceptual strategy‖ (Guthrie 1997, 57). Even the staunchest opponent of 
anthropomorphism, John S. Kennedy (1992), thought that anthropomorphism might be 
inevitable, and may even be useful in predicting animal behavior. He writes:  
We could not abandon [anthropomorphic thinking] even if we wished to. 
Besides, we do not wish to. It is dinned into us culturally from childhood. 
It has presumably also been ‗pre-programmed‘ into our hereditary make-
up by natural selection … It is therefore useful, incidentally, in scientific 
research on the adaptiveness of [animal] behavior. (Kennedy 1992, 5) 
 
John A. Fisher (1990, 1991) offers a detailed analysis of the possible meanings of 
―anthropomorphism.‖ He concludes that, even if interpreted as the mistaken attribution of 
uniquely human properties to nonhuman animals, anthropomorphism should not be 
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viewed as a special kind of error against which special precautions must be exercised. 
Brian L. Keeley (2004) offers an updated version of Fisher‘s analysis, noting that 
anthropomorphism is only considered a problem with respect to mental phenomena. This 
addition is important, since it sheds light on an important double-standard – one that may 
be legitimate, but which cannot be merely assumed to be so: saying of a dog, engaged in 
a chase with an invading rabbit, that she is ―running‖ does not raise the same concerns as 
saying that the dog ―wants‖ to catch the rabbit. This may be warranted by the fact that the 
leg movements are clearly visible while the desire must be inferred from the behavior, 
and that what it means for a dog to ―want‖ is probably very different from what it means 
for a human to ―want.‖ But note that the same may be said of running: the mechanisms 
supporting a dog‘s run and those supporting a human‘s run are dramatically different, 
and, yet, we are comfortable calling both acts of locomotion a ―run,‖ but less comfortable 
calling the dog‘s motivation a desire.  
Fisher‘s disambiguation combined with Keeley‘s addition have made it into a 
number of citations in scientific literature (both opinions and introduction/discussion 
sections of research articles), though their work has not put the matter of the value or 
definition of ―anthropomorphism‖ to rest. Some comparative cognition researchers 
continue to speak of anthropomorphism as a mistake, while others press for 
anthropomorphic research programs. Various scientists and philosophers have taken this 
route, calling their approaches ―theromorphism‖4 (Timberlake 2002, 2007) or ―critical 
                                                          
4Timberlake explains his theromorphic program as ―using experience-based knowledge 
to view the world as though one were, in fact, a particular animal‖ (Timberlake 2002). He 
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anthropomorphism‖ (Burghardt 1991, 2004, 2007). These research strategies make room 
for the scientist to consider how the animal‘s sensory modalities and physiology may 
shape its perspective and, hence, behavior. Similarly, Jaak Panksepp – the cognitive 
scientist and psychologist who famously discovered that rats emit a high-frequency noise, 
which he called ―laughter,‖ during play – argues in favor of anthropomorphism. For 
Panksepp, an anthropomorphic approach is one that includes so-called folk-psychological 
terms, such as ―laughter,‖ into the study of animal behavior. Panksepp writes: 
…this more flexible psychological language could easily lead to a variety 
of novel predictions, especially at the human level, thereby promoting 
interdisciplinary integration of all relevant levels of analysis (Panksepp 
2005, 39).  
He defends this view further by arguing that evolutionary continuity suggests that 
―anthropomorphism is not necessarily as big a sin as it has traditionally been made out to 
be (ibid).‖5  
Given the continued confusion, I will forego offering my own views regarding the 
correct meaning, and will instead adopt the common interpretation of the term within 
animal cognition science as Kristin Andrews (2010) defines it: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
explains why he prefers this name to anthropomorphism as follows: ― I will call this 
practice theromorphism (taking the animal‘s view) to distinguish it from the more 
common anthropomorphic practice of presuming that the cognition processes of human 
and nonhuman animals are fundamentally the same…‖ (ibid).  
5
 Panksepp cites his 1982 work in which he argued that, ―recent advances in brain 
research may permit anthropomorphism to become a more useful strategy for 
understanding certain primitive psychological processes in animals than it has been in the 
past. Although its application may be risky under the best of circumstances, its validity 
depends on the degree of evolutionary continuity among brain mechanisms that elaborate 
emotions in humans and other animals‖ (Panksepp 2005, 39). 
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Anthropomorphism (A): The attribution of uniquely human mental 
characteristics to non-human animals  
Note that A is (i) highly restrictive in scope and (ii) normative: It sets up a comparison 
between humans on the one hand and all other animals on the other and it restricts the 
domain of relevant attributions to mental-state attributions; and, it is defined as a specific 
sort of mistake. On this definition, whether an attribution is anthropomorphic depends on 
the state of the world rather than the knower. That is, an attribution of some mental 
characteristic to non-human animals is potentially anthropomorphic if it is thought to be 
unique to humans, and it is actually anthropomorphic if that characteristic is in fact 
unique to humans.   
Anthropomorphism: Uses 
The charge of anthropomorphism continues to be leveled against specific interpretations 
of animal behavior or at entire research programs, which aim to investigate psychological 
abilities alleged to be uniquely human (Andrews, 2011). Consider the following excerpts 
from a range of articles and books in comparative cognition: 
 [Although] we cannot be certain that no animals are conscious, we can 
say that it is most unlikely that any of them are. Science does not deal in 
certainties but in order to keep going it must adopt working hypotheses, 
the most plausible at the time. These are by common consent treated as 
‗true‘ until replaced by more plausible ones. It is in that spirit that 
anthropomorphism is treated here as a definite mistake. (Kennedy 1992, 
32; emphasis added) 
If the study of animal behavior is to mature as a science, the process of 
liberation from the delusions of anthropomorphism must go on. (Kennedy 
1992, 5; emphasis added) 
If the history of other sciences can be a guide, the study of animal 
behavior will progress only to the extent that we can devise techniques and 
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metaphors that avoid imputation of human mental phenomena to animals 
which result from metaphoric extensions of our folk psychology (Michel 
1991, 268).6  
[Anthropomorphism is] the ascription to animals of human psychological 
qualities … [and]  is a form of mentalism … [which] should have no place 
in an objective science of comparative psychology. (Wynne 2007, 125; 
emphasis added) 
Human-centered thinking is a prejudice, a bias, a distorting lens between 
the affected individual and an objective perspective that is essential to 
accurately understand other organisms … anthropomorphism is a problem 
specific to mentalistic interpretations … [of] animals. … Contrary to the 
perspective that the welfare of animals is fostered by a priori assumptions 
that they must be similar to us, I would argue that a more parsimonious 
and objective approach is more likely to lead us to valid understanding 
(Rose 2007, 141-42; emphasis added)  
[Even] when we are not explicitly assuming that other animals have minds 
like our own, our natural tendency to understand the world through 
narrative means that we may nevertheless observe, experiment on and 
interpret their behaviour in narrative forms that rely on an essential 
anthropocentrism. (Barrett et al. 2007, 565; emphasis added) 
One can almost hear [his critics] exclaiming, ‗Evidence be damned! We 
have minds to explore!‘ (Blumberg 2007, 145) 
What each of these quotes reveals is that anthropomorphism, understood as the ascription 
to nonhuman animals of whichever mental or psychological processes the writer 
                                                          
6
 Michel‘s primary target appears to be folk psychology, which he takes to be an 
inadequate model of human psychology. However, in his discussion Michel slides 
between multiple meanings of ―folk psychology,‖ which ultimately allows him to 
conclude that intentionalistic terms have no place in comparative psychology. On one 
interpretation, folk psychology is a theory of human behavior that serves both 
explanatory and predictive functions, which is stated in intentionalistic terms. On the 
other interpretation, folk psychology is just the ascription of intentionalistic predicates to 
human beings which roughly amounts to the following: people have beliefs, desires, 
thoughts, and motivations, and these interact in semi-regular ways to produce behaviors. 
This latter interpretation is weakly predictive insofar as it doesn‘t specify the contents of 
the intentional predicates -- it is merely a useful framework within which to build 
psychological instruments better tuned to specific questions. On the former interpretation, 
by contrast, folk psychology specifies the contents of the intentional predicates. 
19 
 
 
considers to be uniquely human, is considered to be a threat to the objectivity or progress 
of comparative cognition as a science.  
The quote from Barrett et al. is especially instructive, as it offers a window into 
the kinds of mental phenomena that are commonly assumed to be uniquely human, and 
therefore would be anthropomorphic if applied to nonhumans. In the quoted paper, 
tellingly titled, ―Social brains, simple minds: does social complexity really require 
cognitive complexity?‖ the authors express concerns about primate social cognition being 
distorted by anthropocentric assumptions, stemming from the human tendency to view 
the rest of the world through an anthropomorphic lens. In the case of social cognition, 
they argue, the human tendency to narrativize social behaviors results in a focus on, and 
search for, the wrong kinds of cognitive mechanisms. As they write:  
In the case of social cognition, anthropocentrism leads us to ask questions 
about other primates‘ social cognition from an unduly distorted 
perspective. This is one that privileges conscious, ‗higher‘ forms of 
cognition, based on language and meta-representational ‗theory of mind‘ 
(ToM) skills, because we think of these as essential and fundamental to 
the understanding of the behaviour of other humans… (Barrett et al. 2007, 
564) 
 
The result, as they claim, is that researchers waste their time searching for the capacity to 
employ a Theory of Mind (ToM), when they ought to be exploring alternative 
explanations of primate social behavior, such as explanations that draw on a view of 
cognition as embodied and distributed. This latter approach, they argue, can then be used 
to explain elements of human social cognition (Barrett et al. 2007).  
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Barrett et al.‘s objections illustrate how the rejection of anthropomorphism shapes 
research. In order to understand this, some definitions are in order. First, TOM is a 
hypothesized mechanism by which individuals make sense of and predict others‘ 
behaviors though a mental model of the others‘ belief, desires, perceptual states, and so 
on. ToM is said to be a meta-representational mechanism insofar as it requires that the 
possessor of a ToM be able to represent other representations – such as beliefs about 
others‘ beliefs. ToM is thus a representational theory of cognition. An alternative 
representational theory of social cognition is the simulationist theory, on which agents 
interpret and predict the behavior of others by running an off-line simulation of the 
others‘ behavior. Hybrid ToM-simulationist theories are also available, and are too 
numerous to recount here. Importantly, non-representational or partially-representational 
theories of cognition reject ToM on the basis that these theories ignore crucial features of 
the ways that cognitive abilities arise, or how cognition is constituted. These theories 
include embodied cognition and distributed, or embedded, cognition. The theory of 
embodied cognition holds, roughly, that ―cognition deeply depends on aspects of the 
agent‘s body other than the brain‖ (Wilson and Foglia 2011). Distributed, or embedded, 
cognition holds that ―cognition deeply depends on the natural and social environment,‖ 
and this theory ―places particular emphasis on the ways in which cognitive activity is 
distributed across the agent and her … environment‖ (ibid). Cognition is, on this view, 
the dynamic product of a body-world interaction, where some environmental affordances 
allow the production of sophisticated cognitive tasks, while others do not. To use an 
example from Barrett et al., mixing up Scrabble tiles when looking for a word helps the 
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Scrabble player to imagine new combinations of letters. The movability of the tiles is an 
environmental ―affordance,‖ which is partly responsible for the player‘s decision to play 
a given word. This is contrasted with the stronger thesis of extended cognition, which 
holds that cognition is not merely distributed across the agent‘s environment, but is 
―partially constituted‖ by it (ibid). This is a very rough sketch of three theories of 
cognition whose details continue to be hotly debated. I note these disputes here by way of 
foreshadowing the problem of framing hypothesis-choice decisions in terms of relative 
cognitive complexity, as I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
Returning now to Barrett et al., even if they are right to recommend broader 
engagement with non-representational theories of cognition, their reasons for this 
recommendation rest on two peculiar assumptions. First, they assume that 
representational (and especially meta-representational) explanations of behavior are in 
some sense ―higher‖ than other kinds of cognition. Since the title of their article asked 
whether ―complex‖ social cognition could be the result of ―simple‖ mental processes, one 
may suppose that ―higher‖ here means ―complex.‖ I will return later (Chapter 2) to a 
critique of what the concept of mental and cognitive complexity is, but for now it is 
worth noting that Barrett et al. are employing a hierarchical metaphor in the service of 
defending non-representational alternative explanations of animal behavior. The 
assumption that cognition can be so easily ordered, however, is a holdover from the 
vocabulary of early comparative psychology, as I will show in § 1.1.2. Meanwhile, note 
that it is unclear why representational theories of cognition should be in any sense 
―higher‖ or more complex than distributed or embodied cognition.  
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Second, they assume that to search for meta-representational capacities in 
nonhumans is to embark on an anthropomorphic enterprise. There may be many good 
reasons to adopt their suggestion, but, as they write in the same essay,  
…there is also an argument to the effect that anti-anthropomorphism is 
equally suspect, since it assumes implicitly that there are unique human 
traits, identifiable a priori, and that these should not be attributed to 
creatures to which they do not ‗belong‘ into the familiar trap of claiming 
that some cognitive properties are uniquely human. (ibid) 
…there is no reason why, taking an evolutionarily grounded view of 
cognition, other species should not also manifest some of the same 
cognitive capacities as humans, either by descent or convergence. (ibid) 
 
Their aim – to rid the study of other animals of anthropocentric research questions and 
―to avoid an approach to animal sociality that places humans at the comparative centre‖ 
(ibid) – is well founded, and their suggestions are likely to lead to productive research 
strategies. However, by assuming that meta-representation is a ―higher,‖ or more 
complex, ability and that, because it is representative of human social cognition it should 
be presumed absent in primate social cognition, they make just such an a priori judgment.  
In addition to such explicit discussions of anthropomorphism – and, what is 
sometimes used for the same purpose, ―anthropocentrism,‖ – the debate over imputing 
human-like properties to animals has begun to give way to debates about the merits of 
presuming complexity versus simplicity of cognitive function. However, many of the 
assumptions behind anti-anthropomorphism can be found in these discussions. Notably, 
the view that erring on the side of less complexity or sophistication is more parsimonious 
in the case of nonhuman animals, but not in the case of humans marks a point of 
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continuity between research today and the earlier concerns over anthropomorphic 
research programs. Likewise, although researchers are careful to hedge against over-
attributing cognitive complexity to animals, the worry over under-attributing cognitive 
complexity is virtually absent. In the context of anthropomorphism, Frans de Waal notes 
this latter asymmetry and recommends calling the mistake of underattribution 
―anthropodenial,‖ a term that has not caught on since he recommended it in 1999.  
Philosophers writing on this subject, such as Sober (2005) and Andrews (2011), 
have similarly criticized the asymmetry between anthropomorphic and anthropodenialist 
concerns. Sober, for example, writes that it ―is a revealing fact about current scientific 
culture that the opposite mistake [from anthropomorphism] – of mistakenly refusing to 
attribute human mental characteristics to nonhuman organisms—does not even have a 
ready name‖ (Sober 2005). Sober (2005, 2009) argues that both kinds of mistake are 
equally wrong, and that neither should be preferred a priori. The preference for what are 
often referred to as ―lower-level‖ explanations of animal behavior – a term that is used 
loosely to mean less complex or less sophisticated –is the modern version of the anti-
anthropomorphism concern, or what I call Cognitive Conservatism (CC). It bears noting 
here that a number of researchers, such as Cecilia Heyes and Louise Barrett, often appear 
to hold that CC should be observed for humans as well as nonhumans (Cf. Heyes 1998, 
2012 and Barrett et al, 2007). While this position has the virtue of consistency, Heyes and 
Barrett, too, slip into the language of anti-anthropomorphism. Moreover, the virtue of 
consistency aside, CC relies, as I shall argue, on a problematic preference for simplicity.  
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The example from Barrett et al. provides a glimpse into how arguments against 
anthropomorphic attributions coexist with, and are supported by, a preference for 
―simpler‖ models of animal cognitive processes.  Another example is beautifully 
illustrated by the prominent psychologist and evolutionary biologist, Sara Shettleworth, 
in her opinion article, ―Clever animals and killjoy explanations in comparative 
psychology.‖ She writes: 
[Anthropomorphic explanations] have resurfaced in an outpouring of studies 
directed toward demonstrating previously unsuspected human-like abilities in 
other species: episodic memory, creative manufacture and use of tools …, 
teaching, theory of mind ..., planning …, empathy and so on… Much of this 
research is integrated in a more sophisticated way than in the past with 
evolutionary thinking and comparative neuroanatomy, ecology, human cognitive 
and developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and other biological and 
cognitive sciences … Much of it relies on scrupulous behavioral criteria for 
testing mentalistic predictions …. Nevertheless, although the extent of human–
animal cognitive similarity is undoubtedly a key issue for comparative 
psychology, it sometimes seems the agenda is to support anthropomorphic 
interpretations rather than to pit them experimentally against well-defined 
alternatives. (Shettleworth 2010, 478; emphasis added) 
Shettleworth is certainly right to complain against pre-empirical biases clouding the way 
that researchers frame their problems. She is also right, as she goes on to argue, that less 
lofty explanations of human behavior are available and ought to be explored. However, in 
the above quote, she both paints all of the research programs listed in the first sentence as 
―anthropomorphic,‖ and characterizes ―anthropomorphism‖ in pejorative terms in a 
glossary entry, writing that it is ―usually [used] with the implication [that the attribution] 
is done without sound justification‖ (Shettleworth 2010, 477). The suggestion is clear: 
allegedly anthropomorphic programs are likely unjustified. Her final sentence, which I 
have italicized, is one form that CC tends to take. It says: do not conclude that these 
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―human-like‖ or ―complex‖ processes do, or may, underlie animal behavior when 
alternative explanations are available. The addition of the term ―well-defined‖ is also 
telling, as I will discuss at greater length in the section on different meanings of 
―parsimony‖ (§ 2.1). For now, I will note that the term ―well-defined‖ is used to signal to 
those familiar with the debates that established explanatory models, such as models of 
associative learning, ought to be preferred. Associative theories or models vary in detail, 
but all aim to explain behavior in terms of the strengths of acquired associations from 
exposure to paired events, and requiring the identification of the salient features of these 
events that separate them from background information (Shettleworth 2013, 34; see also 
Rescorla and Wagner 1972). Much more will be said about associationism as the 
presumptive default by virtue of its alleged simplicity and ubiquity in Chapters 2 and 4.  
Lastly, an interesting new trend has emerged wherein researchers employing the 
CC strategy refer to allegedly complex cognitive explanations not as ―anthropomorphic,‖ 
but as ―anthropocentric.‖ For example, in the conclusion to one of the chapters in her 
2009 textbook, Shettleworth admits that she has been engaged in an ―exercise in 
developing [deflationary] killjoy explanations for kinds of behavior….that from an 
anthropocentric viewpoint seems to demand more complex kinds of understanding‖ 
(Shettleworth 2009, 413). She concludes the section with an optimistic rally in favor of 
seeking so-called ―killjoy‖ explanations, writing that, ―whatever the resolution to the 
debates [about causal reasoning, planning, and instrumental tool use in animals], an 
appreciation of how apparent complexity can arise out of cognitive simplicity should be 
just as much a cause of joy as any validation of anthropomorphism‖ (ibid). It is clear that 
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the two terms are very closely related, if not interchangeable, occurring on the same page, 
in the same context, and both opposed to the preferred research strategy of seeking 
―basic‖ mechanistic alternatives.  
This recent development carries interesting sociological implications. For 
instance, it suggests that one lesson from those who oppose the pejorative labeling of 
anthropomorphism has been implicitly accepted by anthropomorphism‘s critics: namely, 
that humans are not so special. I suggest this reading because, while anthropomorphism is 
seen as bestowing to animals a valuable property that is, in fact, uniquely human, 
anthropocentrism is cast as the opposite: that of denying to the animals what is uniquely 
theirs. This rhetorical strategy has been employed with success by Povinelli (1998) and, 
later, by Cecilia Heyes (2010). The results are the same emphasis on difference between 
humans and all other animals, whether one sees herself as guarding against 
anthropomorphism or against anthropocentrism.  
To see how Cognitive Conservatism, anti-anthropomorphism, and the reliance on 
parsimony have come to play such a prominent role in comparative cognition and the 
philosophy of animal cognition, I turn to an historical overview of comparative 
psychology and its synthesis with ethology. 
1.1.2 Comparative Psychology, Ethology, and Anthropomorphism: A Brief History  
 
Few disciplines have clearly identifiable starting points, and comparative cognition is no 
different. The survey that I offer here covers some of the important developments in two 
dominant subfields of comparative cognition: comparative psychology and ethology. 
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Along with charting the routes that brought these fields together, I also track the 
development of the concern over anthropomorphism. This concern, I will show, shares a 
history with another preference: the preference for parsimony. 
 The anthropomorphism allegations can be traced back to a series of 
misinterpretations of a passage from one of the founding texts in comparative 
psychology: Conwy Lloyd Morgan‘s (1852 – 1936) Introduction to Comparative 
Psychology (1894). The passage, which has come to be known as Morgan‘s Canon (MC), 
states:  
(MC) In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a 
higher psychical faculty if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the 
exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological scale. (Morgan 
1894, 53) 
MC has been variously interpreted as a parsimony principle, an anti- anthropomorphism 
principle, and an injunction against so-called anecdotalism. As with 
―anthropomorphism,‖ the term ―anecdotalism‖ comes with a negative valence, suggesting 
the unreliability of hearsay. In the ethological context, ―anecdotalism‖ is allegedly 
exemplified by George John Romanes‘ (1848 – 1894) collection of cases of animals 
executing apparently cognitively demanding behaviors in his Mental Evolution in 
Animals (1883). Romanes intended these cases to be used as evidence for the theory of 
mental continuity, or the thesis that mental abilities are not all-or-nothing, but rest on a 
spectrum. Romanes was influenced by Charles Darwin‘s (1809 – 1882) theory of 
evolution by natural selection and Darwin supported Romanes‘ theory of mental 
evolution as both a colleague and friend.  
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It is true that Morgan criticized Romanes for relying on the anecdotal method in 
making the case for mental continuity through the selection of mental traits, preferring a 
more experimental approach. However, according to historian Robert Boakes, Morgan 
did not intend for his criticism to signal a rejection of Romanes‘ entire project, as many 
later critics of have suggested. Morgan was interested in the evolutionarily informed 
study of animal intelligence, just as Romanes was. His criticism was of Romanes‘ 
methods – the generalization from a collection of anecdotes – which he did not consider 
to be equal to the task. However, even the anecdotalism charge is often overstated. On 
this criticism, Romanes was overly credulous, publishing the stories he received in his 
Animal Intelligence (1882) uncritically by taking his interlocutors at face value. 
However, as Goodrich and Allen (2007) point out, Romanes, far from uncritically 
accepting the interpretations of his interviewees, considered it a matter of scientific 
objectivity to document each story as faithfully as possible (Goodrich & Allen 2007). 
Objectivity, in Romanes‘s view, required the abstention from adding one‘s own analysis 
to the narratives one was collecting. What is more, Animal Intelligence contained the case 
studies whose theoretical assimilation under a theory of mental continuity between 
humans and other animals Romanes published years later. However, as Boakes (1984) 
writes, this first publication of case studies cemented his legacy. ―Romanes,‖ writes 
Boakes, ―had a great deal of influence on the subsequent development of animal 
psychology, but his successors saw him only as the archetypal purveyor of anecdotes 
about animals‖ (Boakes 1984, 25).  
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Another difference of interpretation bears noting: Morgan‘s criticisms of 
Romanes are sometimes incorrectly interpreted as a rejection of Romanes tendency to 
attribute sophisticated cognitive abilities to nonhuman animals. However, while Morgan 
was reluctant to draw the same conclusions as Romanes for many of the case studies 
Romanes offered, this was not because Morgan considered such attributions clearly 
wrong, but, merely unsupported by the evidence that Romanes presented (Boakes 1984).  
Failure to differentiate between these two criticisms has led a number of later 
commentators to use Morgan‘s criticisms of Romanes as evidence for Morgan‘s alleged 
anti-anthropomorphism. This has bolstered the misinterpretations of MC as an anti-
anthropomorphism principle.  
Some of these elisions served the purposes of the later schools of thought in 
psychology and ethology, most notably behaviorism. Behaviorism, in a variety of 
forms, presided as the dominant paradigm in psychology generally, and 
comparative psychology specifically, beginning in the early decades of the 20
th
 
century and lasting until the late 1950s, when a cognitive revolution overtook 
human psychology. The cognitive revolution did not, however, arrive in 
comparative psychology until much later, and its progress has been decidedly 
slower in comparative psychology than in its human counterpart.
7
 
So, what was behaviorism and why did the behaviorist comparative psychologists 
and ethologists take MC to be a proscription against attributions of mental states to 
                                                          
7
 Elements of this tendency remained in (human) developmental psychology, especially 
on work with pre-linguistic infants (Andrews 2011). 
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animals? The first thing to note is that behaviorism is typically separated into three 
logically, if not practically, distinct positions, each of which has been interpreted 
differently by different behaviorists. Philosophers may be most familiar with the first 
position: or logical, or analytic, behaviorism.  In addition to logical behaviorism, there 
are psychological and methodological types of behaviorism.  
Logical behaviorism is a positivist theory of meaning as it applies to psychology. 
In the positivist tradition of eliminating unobservables, it holds that mental-state terms 
ought to be reduced to behavioral terms. For example, according to logical behaviorism, a 
belief is identical with a behavioral disposition under specified environmental conditions.  
The other two types of behaviorism are more concerned with the science than with 
meaning. Methodological behaviorism is the view that psychology ought to be the study 
of behavior, rather than a science of the mind (Graham 2010).
 
This is a departure from 
earlier versions of psychology, whose aim was to understand the processes of the mind, 
including those that had no identifiable behavioral correlate. Psychological behaviorism 
accepts methodological behaviorism, and provides a ―research program … [that] purports 
to explain human and animal behavior in terms of external physical stimuli, responses, 
learning histories, and (for certain types of behavior) reinforcements‖ (ibid). These 
learning histories consist of associations among stimuli and behavioral outputs. 
Associationism was the most powerful explanatory tool of psychology. The shift toward 
behavioral regimens and learning histories was a departure from the earlier studies of the 
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mind, which were largely conducted via introspection by early psychologist-philosophers 
such as William James (1842–1910).8  
Different individuals in the history of behaviorism held versions of these three 
views. J. B. Watson (1878–1958), for instance, was a psychological behaviorist, but he 
was not committed to the strong version of logical behaviorism. By contrast, B.F. Skinner 
(1904–1990) held that mental-state concepts, such as beliefs, desires, and even sensations 
were ontologically reducible to behavioral-state terms. For such radical behaviorism, as 
Skinner himself called his view, the subjectivity of mental phenomenal was an illusion.  
However, even for more moderate behaviorists, who allowed that there might be 
some phenomenological fact of the matter about mental states, the study of psychology 
remained a study of behaviors. Positivistic science did not deal in unobservables, and 
insofar as psychology aimed to be positivistic, any mental state that was not translatable 
into a behavioral state was not detectable to, and therefore not the proper subject of, 
scientific investigation. For the behaviorist psychologist, the goal of her research was the 
articulation of psychological laws of learning, spelled out in behavioral terms. These 
were the laws of associative learning and psychophysical laws, and they were assumed to 
                                                          
8
 William James, one of the early founders of modern psychology, used the method of 
introspection to gain insight into the workings of the mind. He famously used himself as 
a subject, taking mind-altering substances and recording his thoughts in his notebook. 
Introspectionism lost favor with later psychologists who considered the method overly 
subjective and therefore unscientific.   
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hold, with slight variations, across taxa – that is, they were presumed to be true as much 
for pigeons as for humans.9   
Coming back to the comparative psychologists‘ relationship to Morgan, we can 
see that theirs was a reinterpretation of Morgan that fit with their goals of rejecting 
mentalism in favor of behaviorism. This took the form of an assimilation of Morgan‘s 
criticisms of Romanes and comments about methodological caution into a narrative that 
painted behaviorism as the natural conclusion to the progress of comparative psychology, 
shedding the Jamesian introspectionism of early psychology and Romanes‘ alleged 
anecdotalism in favor of a strictly operationalizable study of behaviors. The aim of the 
new programs was not the understanding of individual animals, but the articulation of 
behavioral laws. Although a cursory reading of Morgan‘s Introduction to Comparative 
Psychology reveals Morgan to be firmly committed to mentalistic interpretations of 
animal behavior, some strict behaviorists appropriated his criticism of Romanes as an 
indictment of mentalistic concepts (such as belief and desire) in the study of nonhuman 
animals. 
Behaviorism lost much of its influence in human psychology by the late 1950s to 
early 1960s, when increasing emphasis on computational and representational models of 
learning gained in popularity and as logical behaviorism fell from favor among 
philosophers. Behaviorism nevertheless retained a firm hold on comparative psychology, 
                                                          
9
 The behaviorist school of thought in psychology was not monolithic, and it underwent 
important changes over time. For a detailed history of psychology during the behaviorist 
period, see Boakes‘ From Darwin to Behaviorism. For a concise overview, see George 
Graham‘s entry ―Behaviorism‖ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
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where, in contrast with studies of human adults, linguistic reports of subjective feelings 
by the study subjects were unavailable. This split between human and comparative 
psychology
10
 allowed many of the old behavioristic attitudes to continue to flourish in 
animal cognition studies. Chief among these was the view that animal should be studied 
in a rigidly controlled laboratory environment, so that ecological factors that separate 
different species could be eliminated as noise. This assumption led to some interesting 
discoveries, but also obstructed progress in comparative psychology, as Timberlake 
describes:  
Early experimental psychologists working with animals overtly rejected 
anthropomorphism to emulate physics and physiology by developing reliable 
apparatus and procedures … These experimenters developed models capable of 
producing behavior from combinations of reflexes, motivation, and basic 
associative laws. The result was information about thresholds and discrimination 
capacities along dimensions ranging from color hue to numerosity, and mea-
surements of the apparent response-strengthening effects of deprivation, and 
reward amount, delay and intermittency.  
A shortcoming of this approach, in producing information that could be used to 
construct a functional model of the animal, is that the sensory, motor, and 
motivational information produced for each species was embedded in the design 
of procedures and apparatus rather than integrated within a model of the 
functional world of each species ... In a sense, the data were interpreted as though 
each species represented a different falling body encountering the same general 
gravitational field in a vacuum, instead of a living organism with markedly 
different surface-to-weight ratios related to flying, gliding, swimming, and drift-
ing capabilities, each suited to different wind and surface conditions and 
motivational functions. (Timberlake 2007) 
Timberlake‘s criticism is an ethologists‘ criticism, i.e., a reminder that a full 
understanding of animal behavior could not be accomplished by treating the environment 
                                                          
10
 I should note humans are included in the domain of subjects of comparative 
psychology. In fact, much of comparative research focuses on comparisons between 
some animal species and humans.  
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and development as inessential. The analogy with falling bodies advises students of 
comparative psychology to attend to the differences among animal species, and to seek 
these in a variety of places, which self-consciously reflects the co-founder of ethology,  
Nikolas Tinbergen‘s, four questions around which ethology was to be structured. These 
include ―1. Causation or the proximate mechanisms by which a given behavior is 
produced, 2. Ontogeny or the developmental history of the organism, 3. Phylogeny, or the 
evolutionary history of the organism, and 4. The adaptive function of the behavior‖ 
(Tinbergen 1963). 
Ethologists in the early- to mid-20
th
 century were as skeptical of mentalistic 
explanations as the psychologists, although they tended to differ with respect to their 
methods and goals. While the ethologists regarded animal behavior as comprehensible 
only in the context of ecology and evolution, comparative psychologists preferred to 
study animals under tightly controlled and austere laboratory conditions. These 
differences in practice led psychologists to criticize what they saw as loosely controlled 
means of collecting observational data. Ethologists, in turn, regarded the psychological 
studies as producing results that could not be generalized to the wild population because 
the methods often lacked ecological validity. For example, testing a social animal under 
conditions of isolation is ecologically invalid, since it is unlikely to capture the animal‘s 
actual range of abilities. These methodological differences could be explained by the two 
groups‘ different goals: While ethologists sought to answer Tinbergen‘s four questions 
about particular species, psychologists searched for generalizable laws of behavior. These 
differences shaped the environments in which the two schools conducted their research: 
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While most psychologists conducted their work in laboratories with the aim of 
establishing behavioral generalizations, most ethologists worked in the field or under 
semi-natural conditions, such as the ―farm‖ where the other founder of ethology‘s 
conceptual base, Konrad Lorenz (1903 – 1989), made many of his groundbreaking 
observations (Burkhardt 2005). These differences in research goals and methodological 
practices complicated the later synthesis of the two fields into comparative cognition, but 
they also enriched the practices of each field. Although differences remain, they are 
significantly less pronounced today, with both psychologists and ethologists conducting a 
combination of field and laboratory work, and carrying out experiments in both settings. 
Increased collaboration is blurring the lines between the field and the laboratory, with 
research being conducted under a combination of laboratory and natural conditions or in 
semi-natural conditions, such as large enclosed habitats.  
With respect to the two fields‘ attitudes toward anthropomorphism, it is important 
to remember that ethology and comparative psychology share some common history. 
Both were influenced by positivistic views of science, and specifically behaviorism, and 
both were informed by Morgan, whose influence on ethology, though not equal to his 
effects on comparative psychology, was substantial (Boakes 1984). Despite this shared 
history, differences remain. For example, due perhaps to their immersion into the social 
worlds of their animal subjects, ethologists have tended to be more at home with 
mentalistic attributions than were the comparative psychologists. In this respect, their 
anxiety over anthropomorphism has, on average, been less acute than that of their 
psychologist counterparts. In fact, the man at the forefront of the cognitive revolution in 
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the theretofore behavioristic studies of animal behavior, Donald Griffin (1915 – 2003), 
was a behavioral biologist and ethologist. He argued for what he called ―cognitive 
ethology,‖ which was a study of the mental processes and mechanisms behind animal 
behavior. Others called for a revision to the traditional program as well. For instance, 
eulogizing the behaviorist program in psychology, Colin Beer writes, ―Like trying to turn 
quickly enough to catch your own shadow before it moves, the attempts to find 
behavioral coin to cash the concepts of mind continually come up short‖ (Beer 1997, 
201). 
In addition to explaining the anti-anthropomorphism of middle-20
th
 century 
animal behavior sciences, the popularity of the behaviorist program also explains why 
parsimony had such an appeal. After all, positivistic science viewed phenomena as occult 
just in case they could not be observed, and mental states could not, it was thought, be 
directly observed.11 Allegedly private mental phenomena were regarded as explanatorily 
inert, and therefore redundant in any explanation of animal behavioral abilities. As such, 
explanations that relied on mental phenomena were considered extravagant and 
nonparsimonious. Mary Midgley (1983) put it best when she described the attitude of 
animal cognition researchers of her time as treating animal subjectivity and 
consciousness as a kind of ―phlogiston.‖ An illustration of this view comes from a strong 
advocate of anti-anthropomorphism, Clive Wynne. In the following passage, he criticizes 
                                                          
11
 This is not to say that the view that mental states are not directly observable is the 
position of every behaviorist, or is rejected by every non-behavioristic philosopher of 
mind. On the contrary, a number of philosophers have held the view that mental states 
could be directly observed in behavior (See, e.g., Dupré [2006]).  
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the argument that the complex behaviors exhibited by a New Caledonian crow named 
Betty suggest that Betty was planning her actions. He writes: 
… the [mere] inconceivability … of an associative robot completing the tasks as 
Betty did is an extremely weak ground to reject an objective parsimonious 
explanation of behavior in favor of a vague mentalistic one (Wynne 2007b, 152; 
italics added).12 
Wynne may be an extreme case, but much of what he assumes in the above quote is 
endorsed by other researchers. For instance, while current animal cognition researchers 
are comfortable with some mental-state attribution, many agree that associative 
explanations are both ―objective‖ and ―parsimonious‖ whereas alternatives may be 
termed ―mentalistic,‖ with the pejorative connotation derived from the behaviorist 
antipathy toward the mental. Moreover, more sophisticated mental states, such as pride or 
sympathy, continue to be viewed as uniquely human and therefore ineligible as 
descriptions of animal behaviors. Abilities such as ―planning‖ are similarly treated as the 
hypothesis of exclusion: only when associationist accounts fail to fit the data are 
alternatives considered. Similarly, most comparative cognition researchers today continue 
to express agnosticism about animal subjectivity. The agnosticism isn‘t limited to the 
Nagelian question of ―what it‘s like‖ to be, e.g., an anxious or a happy dog, but whether 
there is anything at all that it‘s like to be an anxious or a happy dog (Stich 1978). For the 
scientist, this question is presented in terms of whether animals are conscious or have a 
sense of awareness, which is frequently treated as the same question. The dominant view 
                                                          
12
 This is not to suggest that all instances of skepticism regarding animal cognition are the 
result of atavistic positivism, as Allen (2006) rightly cautions. On the other hand, 
philosophers, Allen notes, would be equally wrong to assume that the fall of positivism in 
philosophy brought with it a fall of all positivistic science. 
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is that a study of animal awareness of consciousness is unlikely to get far off the ground. 
For example, Alan Kamil expresses strong reservations regarding the study of animal 
consciousness, writing: 
the test of … models … [that] … include postulated internal states … is not truth 
but usefulness. Do they generate new predictions or insights which have utility? 
… This is the challenge which proponents of animal awareness must meet … 
[and] … the issue is not proving that animals have minds, it is demonstrating that 
making the awareness (or consciousness) assumption leads to exciting new 
questions and discoveries. (Kamil 1998, 23) 
 
Such agnosticism over animal awareness or consciousness can easily shade into atheism 
or at least skepticism about animal subjectivity. This is not as simple as a conflation of 
the absence of evidence for the evidence of absence. The problem comes in when 
scientists hold both that (1) evidence for animal subjectivity can only come from 
empirical methods and (2) a study of animal subjectivity is unlikely to be empirically 
tractable.  
Griffin criticized this agnosticism, holding that a science could speak to the 
question of subjectivity of animal mental states. In his Animal Minds (1992), Griffin lays 
out his case for a study of animal consciousness. Griffin‘s arguments were met with 
intense skepticism from the scientific community. One problem was that in advocating 
for greater continuity between the studies of animal and human psychology and behavior 
in a new field that Griffin called ―cognitive ethology,‖ he was not always clear about 
cognitive ethology‘s goals: was it a study of animal cognition or consciousness? As even 
his advocates, such as Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff, admitted more work needed to be 
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done to ―make the study of animal consciousness empirically tractable‖ (Allen & Bekoff 
1997).  
Perhaps due to the elision between cognition and consciousness, Griffin‘s 
cognitive ethology was treated with suspicion in much of animal cognition science. Many 
explicitly sought to distance themselves from what they saw as Griffin‘s 
anthropomorphism. The editors of two widely-used textbooks contrast their projects with 
his. For example, in the first chapter of Balda, Pepperberg, & Kamil‘s Animal Cognition 
in Nature: The Convergence of Psychology and Biology in Laboratory and Field (1998), 
Kamil writes: 
There is only one reason not to adopt this label [of cognitive ethology]: it 
has been pre-empted by Don Griffin and others… defining cognitive 
ethology in terms of subjective experience: awareness, consciousness, etc. 
Many of us working in the field find this term … so objectionable that we 
completely avoid using the term… (Kamil 1998, 22) 
Similarly, the preface to Edward A. Wasserman and Thomas Zentall‘s 
Comparative Cognition: Experimental Explorations of Animal Intelligence (2006) 
reads: 
…we wish to take the present opportunity to place cognitive ethology into 
logical and methodological perspective as well as to lobby on behalf of 
what we and others believe may be a preferable alternative to this 
mentalistic movement in behavioral science. [This is] what current 
workers call comparative cognition. (Wasserman and Zentall 2006, 4; 
original emphasis) 
The organizing principle of Kamil‘s cognitive ethology — or, its ―hard core,‖ as Kamil is 
an avowed Lakatosian — is ―that organisms possess some type of internal representation 
of the external world‖ (Kamil 1998, 4; Lakatos 1970). Tellingly, for Kamil, the question 
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of whether an animal represents a state of affairs is orthogonal to whether that animal is 
aware or conscious. Kamil takes this to be an additional question, not an entailment of 
representation, contra Griffin. Similarly, Wasserman and Zentall position their views of 
comparative cognition as a study of the mechanisms underpinning behaviors, firmly 
committed to a ―parsimonious‖ methodology (a version of the CC) and an anti-
anthropomorphism that differentiates itself from cognitive ethology.  
Whether the boundary between permissible and impermissible attributions is 
drawn at imputing to animals subjective states, representations, complex representations, 
or any internal states at all, one thing is clear: Wherever the boundary is drawn, 
anthropomorphism is considered an error of excess. It involves imputing more to animals 
than they in fact possess. And, in this simple sense, anthropomorphism is 
unparsimonious. The same reasoning lies behind the CC. In the introduction to their 2006 
anthology quoted above, Wasserman and Zentall write that a challenge for comparative 
cognition, as they see it, lies not only in understanding the cognitive underpinnings of 
behavior, but also in delineating cognition from ―simpler Pavlovian and instrumental 
learning processes, as well as other behavioral or physiological processes like reflex 
action, maturation, fatigue, and motivation‖ (ibid; emphasis added). ―The challenge,‖ 
they write, ―…is to identify flexible behavior that cannot be accounted for by simpler 
learning mechanisms‖ (ibid). This is a clear statement of the CC, as well as an 
identification of the allegedly simple alternatives with associative learning. Even more 
explicitly committing to both the parsimony reading of MC and to the CC, they write: 
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In addition [to I.P. Pavlov‘s and E.L. Thorndike‘s techniques for studying 
animal learning], respect for Morgan‘s canon of parsimony tempers the 
tendency for workers in the field of comparative cognition to invoke 
overly elaborate interpretations of the behavioral evidence, as Darwin and 
his early followers were prone to do. As Yoerg and Kamil (1991) echoed a 
century after Morgan advanced his canon, ―we should be circumspect in 
our evaluation of the level or complexity of explanation the evidence 
demands.‖ (Wasserman and Zentall 2006, 5) 
As expected, both the CC and anti-anthropomorphism are supported through appeals to 
parsimony and invocations of MC.  
This brings my brief historical survey to a close. The trends I have identified 
continue through today, and I will end this section with an example that illustrates the 
fact that CC affects even comparative cognition researchers who are otherwise 
sympathetic to attributions of relatively sophisticated cognition to nonhumans. Consider 
the following quote from Stan A. Kuczaj, II and Rachel Thames Walker‘s criticisms of 
linguistic abilities in the bottlenose dolphin, Ake:  
[It] is not necessary to think of Ake‘s abilities in linguistic terms … without 
recourse to analogies to human grammatical abilities [and failing to keep the 
researcher‘s and the subject‘s perspective separated] opens the door to rich 
interpretations of behavior (Morgan, 1894). (Kuczaj and Walker 2006, 586; 
emphasis added)  
Note the cited reference to Morgan in support of avoiding ―rich interpretations of 
behavior,‖ which are identified with human abilities, because they are not ―necessary.‖ 
The authors are open to the possibility that dolphins are capable of putatively complex 
cognitive tasks such as planning, and yet they conform to the view that ―rich‖ 
interpretations should be avoided if more impoverished ones are available. Again we see 
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the worry about overattribution without any attendant worry about underattribution – a 
clear sign of the CC.  
Next, I must establish that parsimony is used to ground anti-anthropomorphism 
and the CC. I focus my investigation on the relationship between ―parsimony‖ and 
―anthropomorphism,‖ and conduct a two-part empirical investigation into this 
relationship, which I describe in the following section. 
 
1.2 Anthropomorphism and Parsimony: A Correlation and a Conceptual Link 
In the previous section, I suggested that parsimony is used to ground both anti-
anthropomorphism, and CC. I presented an historical overview of the development of 
comparative cognition, which suggested avenues for the retention of CC and anti-
anthropomorphism. In this section, I provide evidence for the close dialectical connection 
between the terms ―anthropomorphism‖ and ―parsimony.‖  
My strategy is two-fold: First, in Study 1, I identify a correlation over time by 
looking at data from Google Ngrams
13
, which suggests a correlation between the 
occurrences of the terms anthropomorphism and parsimony in the entire corpus of books 
scanned into Google Books.  I present evidence from the graphical representations of the 
                                                          
13
 Google Ngrams is a publically available, web-based, program that searches all of the 
books in Google Books and returns the change in relative frequency of the searched term 
over time. The relative frequency is calculated by taking the total number of unique 
occurrences and dividing it by the total number of terms from that year. An individual 
Ngram can be a single term, such as ―apple‖ or ―x1,‖ or a combination of terms, such as 
―green apple‖ or ―2 3 4.‖ The ―n‖ stands for the number of items in a given string, so that 
a single term is a 1-gram, a double search is a 2-gram, and so on.   
43 
 
 
Google Ngrams.14 I conclude that the Google Ngram search suggests an historical trend, 
which I map on to the shifts within the history of comparative psychology.  
Second, in Study 2, I performed a manual search (i.e., one not guided by 
algorithms): I searched for references to anthropomorphism and parsimony and related 
terms in popular introductory textbooks. This strategy allowed me to focus on the 
publically accessible pedagogical and professional aspects of research and to assess the 
co-occurrences of ―anthropomorphism‖ and ―parsimony‖ in a given text. Specifically, I 
looked at whether the terms appear in the same section and, if so, what relationship they 
bear to one another.
15
  This study tests the prediction that the trend identified in Study 1 
continues to have an impact at the level of scientific pedagogy. It predicted, and found 
evidence that, the connection between anthropomorphism and parsimony has become 
regularized and consolidated in textbooks.
16
   
                                                          
14
 Further support for the conclusions drawn from the graphical representations can be 
derived from correlation analyses on the raw data from the Google Books database. 
However, I do not conduct this research here, as it is my view that the conclusions I draw 
from the graphical representations are sufficiently telling for the purpose of suggesting 
that a correlation exists. Nevertheless, the methods for the correlation analysis are noted 
in the appendix to the dissertation. 
15
 Another strategy, which I have not used, but with which would be a useful supplement 
to my findings, is a survey of comparative psychologists‘ attitudes towards 
anthropomorphism and parsimony.  
16
 It should be noted that although the textbook search provides some evidence for my 
hypothesis, it does not prove that the hypothesis is true. This is due to the limitations of 
my approach. For example, my searches cannot show whether authors who make 
references to parsimony in support of a CC argument are doing so because they endorse 
this argument or because they wish to acknowledge that others have cited this argument 
before. Similarly, my textbook search is silent on whether the issue of parsimony and its 
relationship to anthropomorphism or the CC is discussed correctly or at all in classrooms. 
Each of these lacunae can be filled with sociological studies, such as a formal survey of 
teachers and researchers. The data in Study 2 will also be silent on the reasons behind the 
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1.2.1 Study 1: Google Ngrams 
Methods 
Google Ngram searches all books accessible to the Google database to establish the 
frequency of word occurrences over time, and produces a graphical representation of the 
change in frequency over time (Figures 1.1-1.9). Because multiple terms can be included 
at the same time, this method generates an intuitive visual representation of the co-
occurrence of terms over any length of time desired (the full range is between 1600 C.E. 
and 2008 C.E.). The graphs represent the number of times the term occurs in a given year 
divided by the total number of non-unique terms for that year. In other words, each year 
is assigned a relative frequency of the search term‘s occurrence. A search for two terms 
will result in a graph showing the rate of change in the relative frequencies during the 
years specified by the search parameters.  
Because the resulting graph shows the frequency of terms, the fact that there were 
fewer total books in 1600C.E. than in 2000C.E. is not a confound. The resolution of 
change in frequency can be adjusted by setting the ‗smoothing‘ factor up to as high as 
―50,‖ where smoothing factor of ―0‖ means ―no smoothing.‖ Smoothing means that the 
results of multiple years are averaged to produce a single data point for all those years. In 
Google‘s case, the smoothing algorithm uses a moving average. This means that, if, e.g., 
I am looking at the years 1950 – 1960 and I use a smoothing factor of 3, the frequency for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
publication trends – viz., what social or deliberative forces prompt the recapitulation of 
the arguments I‘m assessing. A semantic search algorithm using a complete database of 
published works would give a better sense of whether the terms are being used together 
in a meaningful way. This may be possible in the future, but the methods are still in early 
stages of development.  
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the year 1952 will be the average of the years 1952, 1951, and 1953. Smoothing has the 
advantage of showing longer trends, but it can also obscure important peaks and 
valleys.
17
 Next, I look at the results.  
Results  
I conducted the following searches using the Google Ngram: I searched for the term 
―parsimony‖ and ―anthropomorphism‖ from 1800 to 2008 with a ―smoothing‖ factor of 
―3,‖ which is the Google default. The range was chosen based on the following criteria: 
(a) The years 1600-1799 were eliminated in order to make the frequency correlations 
more visible; and (b) The starting year was 1800, rather than 1880, in order to include a 
period of time before modern psychology developed as an experimental science. This 
was done to see whether the establishment of the field appeared to have an effect on the 
correlation. As we can see from Figure 1.1, this appears to have indeed been the case.  
 
 
                                                          
17
 One of the limitations of this approach is that the search cannot be conducted on 
stemmed terms. Stemming is the process of combining all the grammatical variations of a 
term into a single data point.   
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Figure 1.1 Results of a search for the terms “parsimony” and “anthropomorphism” 
(not stemmed) from the years 1800 to 2008. 
 
Figure 1.1 The x-axis is time, while the y-axis is relative frequency. The percentages are very low because 
the majority of terms are numbers, which swamp out all words. This will be true of all further Ngram 
graphs as well. Here we see a convergence of frequencies beginning around 1880.  
 
In Figure 1.1 we can see that the terms ―parsimony‖ and ―anthropomorphism‖ appear to 
change in frequency at the same rate beginning around 1880. The graph also tells us that 
the term "parsimony" occurs more frequently in any given year than the term 
―anthropomorphism‖ but that they both occur at very close rates. Searching for the same 
terms in the range 1880 – 2008, to get a zoomed in view on the time period starting with 
the launch of comparative psychology, produces the following results (Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2 Zooming in around the time modern psychology was being developed 
(1880) 
Figure 1.2 Here I ―zoom in‖ to the period between 1880 and 2008, which gives a more detailed view of the 
co-occurrences of the terms ―parsimony‖ and ―anthropomorphism.‖ 
 
As can be seen, the co-occurrence trend appears to be robust in the sense that the 
frequencies of the occurrences over time appears to be approximately equal. This chart 
allows me to ask what happened around 1970-1980 to make the trends diverge slightly. 
Some of the divergence in Figures 1 and 2 beginning before 1970 may be due to the 
introduction of the concept of cladistics parsimony, in which case we should expect to 
see the frequency of the occurrence of ―parsimony‖ to increase more rapidly than the 
frequency of ―anthropomorphism.‖ Indeed, this appears to be true, as we can see in 
Figure 1.3, below. 
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Figure 1.3: “Anthropomorphism,” “parsimony,” “phylogenetic,” “cladistic/s,”1850 -
2008  
Figure 1.3 Testing for the effects of the introduction of cladistics on the increase in the frequencies of the 
term ―parsimony‖ shows that as cladistics may have had an effect on the divergence in the curves. The 
steepest curve is marked in green and represents the change in frequencies of the term ―phylogenetic.‖  
 
In Figure 1.3, I compared tested the increase in the frequency of ―parsimony‖ against the 
introduction of cladistics by searching for terms popular in cladistics: ―phylogenetic,‖ 
―cladistic‘ and ―cladistics.‖ The yellow and teal curves on the bottom-right should be 
summed into one larger curve. The chart shows that a rise in the use of the term 
―phylogenetic‖ coincides with the rise in the terms, ―cladistic and cladistics.‖  
Next, I changed the smoothing factor in Figure 1.2 from 3 to 0, or ―no 
smoothing.‖ As noted in the methodology section, smoothing can help identify longer 
trends, but some trends may be mere artifacts of smoothing. To ensure that the 
frequencies co-occurred, I produced the following graph.   
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Figure 1.4: The same as Figure 1.2, with a smoothing factor of “0.”  
 
 
As one can see from Figure 1.4, the co-occurrence is impressively robust. That is, the co-
occurrence persists even at a finer-grained resolution. For example, the spikes in 
frequencies appear to follow one another, such as happened around 1900 – 1905. For the 
rest of the graphs, I used a smoothing factor of 3.18 
Next, I ran searches for other grammatical forms (Figures 1.5, 1.6, and 1.7). This 
produced the following visual approximations of stemming. These produced interesting 
results. Figure 1.5 shows that the adjectival form (―parsimonious‖ and 
―anthropomorphic‖) does not show significant co-occurrence until the late 1980s, 
although it appears that they begin to converge as early as 1910. This presents a possible 
problem, as adding this form to the noun form will shift the curve. There is some 
question, however, over whether the adjectival forms ought to be added to the noun form. 
One reason to avoid adding the curve is if the following hypothesis is true: the noun form 
                                                          
18
 I used the smoothing factor of 3 because it is the Google default. This choice is 
arbitrary, but it does not affect the conclusions drawn for the purposes of this dissertation.  
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of ―parsimony‖ is more likely to occur when parsimony is not the central subject than is 
the noun form of ―anthropomorphism‖ when the subject is not anthropomorphism.  
 
Figure 1.5: “Parsimonious” and “Anthropomorphic” 
 
 
The adverbial forms (parsimoniously and anthropomorphically), on the other hand 
reproduce the curve more faithfully. However, they occur even less frequently than the 
adjective forms, and are therefore less likely to affect the shape of the stemmed curve. 
 
Figure 1.6: Frequencies of “parsimoniously” and “anthropomorphically” 
Figure 1.6 Note that the frequencies represented by the numbers on the y-axis are much smaller than those 
for graphs of the noun form or the adjective form.  
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In order to get a graphical representation of the relative frequencies of different 
grammatical forms of the search terms, I generated the following graph in Figure 1.7. If 
one averages all the curves for the stems, the resulting graph would more accurately 
represent the entire corpus. As one can see, the adverbial forms contribute virtually 
nothing, while the adjectival forms would have a large impact when added to the noun 
forms. The co-occurrence would, however, remain, although the absolute frequency of 
anthropomorph* may outpace that of parsimon*. 
Figure 1.7: Relative frequencies of stemmed “anthropomorph*” and “parsimon*” 
 
 
Figure 1.7 Each curve represents the combined frequencies of the noun, adjectival, verb, and adverbial 
forms of both ―anthropomorphism‖ and ―parsimony,‖ including the capitalized versions of each.  
 
For the rest of the tests, I used the noun forms, since these were by far the most 
common form. In order to control for these terms appearing outside the context of 
comparative cognition broadly construed, I searched for ―anthropomorphism‖ and 
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―comparative psychology‖ and ―comparative cognition‖– an admittedly limited search 
(Figure 1.8).
19
  
Figure 1.8 Frequencies of “comparative psychology” and “anthropomorphism” 
from 1800 to 2008 
Figure 1.8 Note the nearly invisible curve for ―comparative cognition,‖ represented in green (at the very 
bottom).  
 
I noted the slight divergence toward the tail-end of the graph in Figure 8, with the 
frequency of ―anthropomorphism‖ increasing while ―comparative psychology‖ decreased 
in frequency. I postulated that the divergence could be due to the introduction of new 
subfields into the study of animal cognition. To test this, I ran another Ngram search to 
see whether the drop-off in ―comparative psychology‖ frequency corresponded to the 
increase in usage of cognate fields, such as ―cognitive ethology,‖ ―comparative 
cognition,‖ and ―animal cognition‖ (Figure 1.9). I limited the search parameters to 
starting date of 1950 in order to make the results visible.  
 
                                                          
19
 The query for the phrase ―comparative cognition‖ returned instances of the enquoted 
phrase, not of the sum for the individual words. 
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Figure 1.9 Frequencies of “comparative psychology” and other related term, from 
1950 - 2008 
 
 
Figure 1.9 The chart tracks the use of ―comparative psychology‖ (top curve in blue) and related terms, ―comparative 
cognition,‖ ―cognitive ethology,‖ and ―animal cognition.‖ 
 
When all the alternative field names are added to the ―comparative psychology‖ graph, 
we can see that the drop-off disappears and the correlation with the frequency of a 
stemmed version of ―anthropomorphism‖ remains stable (Figure 1.9). The results suggest 
that this hypothesis is plausible. A statistical analysis of the raw data (using cross-
correlation analysis with multiple time-lags) would generate even more reliable results, 
though the visual representation is enough to suggest that this result is likely to be 
replicated by the analysis. 
 
Discussion 
The graphs in Figures 1.1 and 1.3 show a very clear correlation between 
―anthropomorphism‖ and ―parsimony.‖ The occurrence-rates appear to follow one 
another very closely beginning around 1880. This is predicted by the hypothesis that the 
correlation is to be found primarily in comparative psychology since the field in its 
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modern form was (arguably) launched shortly after the first experimental psychology 
laboratories were established in Germany by Wilhelm Wundt (1879) and in the United 
States by G. Stanley Hall (1884).20 Comparative psychology was developing at the same 
time, coming into its own with Romanes‘s Animal Intelligence (1882) and especially 
Morgan‘s replies to Romanes, culminating with the 1894 publication of his Introduction 
to Comparative Psychology, popularly regarded as the first manual on experimental 
comparative psychology. Romanes was roundly criticized for his alleged 
―anthropomorphism‖ and, since Morgan was one of his better known critics, it should not 
be surprising that the publication of Morgan‘s textbook should have facilitated the 
emergence of a secondary literature employing this term. Although Morgan did not use 
the term in his textbook more than a handful of times, the concept was drawn out in the 
secondary literature and exploded around the time that behavioristic psychology began to 
come into its own. Although this is an extremely rough sketch of a very complex history, 
these few markers are enough to suggest that the dramatic change in the frequencies 
shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.3 was not an artifact of the data.  
                                                          
20
 One objection, as noted by Matthew Hurley (personal correspondence), is that some of 
the positive correlation after the field was established may be due to an appropriation of 
this correlation by other fields. I agree that this may contribute to some of the persistence 
of the correlation seen in the Ngrams. However, if the comparative psychology 
established a correspondence between anthropomorphism and parsimony that managed to 
persist through time in other disciplines, this would add evidence to my hypothesis that 
the correlation was robust within animal cognition.  
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1.2.2 Study 2: Textbook Searches on Amazon.com 
Methods 
Next, I looked at a sample of textbooks to see whether ―anthropomorphism‖ occurred at 
all and whether it or some variation was supported by an appeal to parsimony.  In order to 
obtain my sample, I searched for books that would be likely to be used in a classroom 
setting today.  
This required multiple steps. First, I searched for books based on their popularity, 
as measured by (1) the purchase rate from the Amazon.com ―best-seller‖ lists under 
multiple relevant categories (Best Seller Category Search) and (2) the relevant results 
from the top 100 results in searches for ―comparative cognition‖ and ―comparative 
psychology‖ under Amazon‘s ―books‖ section (Best Seller Free Search). The third kind 
of search looked at the ―related items‖ lists for established textbooks (Related Item 
Search).  
In each of these, I controlled for popular science books (e.g., Caesar Milan‘s dog 
training manuals), and highly specialized textbooks (e.g., books on avian cognition or on 
episodic memory), and left out books published prior to 1998. The choice to eliminate 
everything published before 1998 was based on the assumption that texts published 
before 1998 are very unlikely to be used as textbooks, except, perhaps, in classes on the 
history of the field. This approach has the advantage of providing relatively reliable 
popularity measures, which it is safe to assume reflects the relative popularity of the 
textbooks in the field.
21
  
                                                          
21
 An alternative approach would have been to assess textbooks based on the syllabi of 
select professors or direct reporting used by comparative psychology professors in the top 
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The Best Seller Category Search involved multiple searches due to the 
imprecision of Amazon‘s categorization. Following the hierarchy shown in Figure 1.10, I 
performed a search of the top 100 results for each of the sub-categories on the far-right of 
the graph, shown in green and red. The green searches produced some (n>0) relevant 
results, while the red searches produced no relevant results.  (Raw data can be found in 
the appendix).  
Figure 1.10: Amazon’s Best-Seller Category Hierarchy  
 
Figure 1.10 Sections marked in green represent branches that produced results. Sections marked in red 
represent branches that dead-end at no results. The irrelevant categories are omitted.  
Next, I consolidated the lists as follows: I aimed to identify the top 20 texts based 
on how likely they were to be textbooks rather than supplementary texts. I did this based 
on their popularity (based on the number of overlaps across categories). Additionally, if 
the book had more than one edition, I considered it very likely to be a textbook. In those 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 programs. The disadvantages of how to determine the best program recommended 
against using this approach. One alternative to determining the best program would be to 
identify the most influential comparative psychologists who are also teaching 
introductory courses in animal cognition and look at their syllabi.  
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cases, I used the most recent edition for my search and excluded the earlier editions to 
avoid repetition. I was able to identify 21 textbooks, excluding anything published before 
1998.  Of these, I was able to analyze eight, chosen based on their availability on 
Amazon and through the Boston University Library (for a list of the original 21 books, 
see Table 1A in Appendix). Once the textbooks had been identified, I conducted a search 
according to the following rules, in the order presented: 
Index Search: Search the index for entries on the following list of terms under either 
major headings or subheadings, listing redundancies: parsimony, anthropomorphism, 
Morgan‟s Canon, Clever Hans, simplicity, complexity, Occam‟s Razor (allowing for 
differences in spelling). The following terms were added to the search after the first three 
searches were conducted: killjoy explanations (from Shettleworth), behaviorism (for 
possible overlap with references to anthropomorphism or parsimony), anthropocentrism, 
and human uniqueness. 
Textual Search and Analysis: Examine text for indexed terms and search for 
correlations between anthropomorphism-related (anthropocentrism, human uniqueness) 
terms, parsimony-related terms (Occam‟s Razor, simplicity, complexity, killjoy 
explanations) and connecting terms, which might serve either or both functions (Clever 
Hans, Morgan‟s Canon). Finally, analyze textual evidence for explicit or implicit link of 
anthropomorphism and parsimony.  
Results  
As predicted, the textbooks, almost unanimously, introduced the concept of 
anthropomorphism together with that of parsimony or simplicity, often through 
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discussions of MC, and sometimes of Clever Hans. Notably, the indexes contained 
references to the key terms in high proportions (see Table 1A in Appendix for a full list 
of noted indexed terms). Seven of the eight books surveyed related anthropomorphism to 
one or another kind of failure to supply ―simple‖ explanations of animal behavior, and 
nearly all of these drew on MC, with one going as far as to call parsimony a ―law.‖ 
Injunctions against anthropomorphism were typically found together with cautionary 
tales about Clever Hans and appeals to Morgan‘s authority.22 The following is a more 
complete analysis of the eight textbooks surveyed, in the order in which they were 
assessed.  
(1) Measuring Behavior: An Introductory Guide, Ed 3. 2007; Paul Martin & Patrick 
Bateson 
The book, intended as an introduction to students of animal behavior, contained explicit 
instructions on avoiding attributions of complexity, which were implicitly identified with 
―human-like‖ cognition, such as ―conscious awareness and intentions‖ (Martin and 
Bateson 2007, 19). Although the term, parsimony was not used, Occam‘s razor was 
invoked in injunctions against alleged anthropomorphism. For instance, in a brief section 
titled ―Anthropomorphism‖ in the chapter titled, ―Think before you measure,‖ the 
following passages are of note: 
Observations of animals often leave the strong impression that the animals 
know what they are doing. However subsequent analysis frequently 
reveals that seemingly complex and purposive behavior can be produced 
                                                          
22
 I should note here that my analyses are descriptive – the aim is merely to assess the 
texts for a correlation between worries over anthropomorphism and appeals to parsimony.  
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by simple mechanisms that do not involve conscious awareness or 
intentions. (Martin & Bateson 2007, 19; emphasis added). 
Using human emotions and intentions as explanations for animals‘ 
actions can impede further attempts to understand the behavior. In general, 
therefore, you should start by obeying the injunction of Occam’s razor to 
explain animal behavior in the simplest possible way until you have good 
reason to think otherwise. (ibid; italics in original; bold emphasis added).   
Martin and Bateson instruct their readers to avoid anthropomorphism (―using human 
emotions and intentions as explanations of animal behavior‖) by defaulting to the 
simplest possible explanation of behavior. The implication, clearly, is that the simplest 
possible explanation (a) involves the attribution of simple mechanisms and (b) is not 
anthropomorphic. Martin and Bateson go on to warn their reader that a slavish obedience 
to this rule is likely to stifle the scientific creative process. Imagining animals to possess 
human traits is encouraged, they suggest, but only to the extent that such imagining is 
understood to be a ―heuristic‖ and not a description of the animals‘ being studied.  
(2) Comparative Psychology: Evolution and Development of Behavior, Second 
Edition. 2008; Mauricio Papini 
Although anthropomorphism is not indexed, Clever Hans is, and Morgan‟s Canon is 
identified with parsimony. References to parsimony and Clever Hans appear in the same 
section, with ―the scientist‘s projection of his or her own psychological processes [onto 
the animal],‖ which is juxtaposed with ―the scientist‘s quest for objectivity and 
theoretical simplicity‖ (Papini 2008). In other words, the mistaken anthropomorphism is 
interpreted as a nonparsimonious move. Then, on page 15, which is indexed as both 
Morgan‟s Canon and Clever Hans, Papini refers to MC as ―Morgan‟s Canon of 
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parsimony‖ (Papini 2008, 15; emphasis in original). He then uses Clever Hans to 
illustrate its point, though he does not explicitly state what the point is. However, the 
following paragraph suggests that Papini sees the danger as one of anthropomorphism, 
when he writes: 
Morgan‘s canon creates a tension between the scientist‘s projection of his or her 
own psychological processes, which often play a creative role in the development 
of new hypotheses, and the scientist‘s quest for objectivity and theoretical 
simplicity (ibid).  
Expanding upon what this ―theoretical simplicity‖ means, Papini defines MC in the 
glossary at the end of the Introduction as follows: ―Also known as parsimony, the canon 
emphasizes that explanations of behavioral capacities should be based on the simplest 
possible mechanisms‖ (Papini 2008, 29).23  
(3) Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior, Second Edition, 2010; Sarah Shettleworth 
Although there is no mention of parsimony by name in the index, there are a number of 
entries on anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism, which are cross-referenced with 
references to MC and ―killjoy‖ (deflationary) explanations of behavior. The entries on 
anthropomorphism overlap with the entries on Clever Hans, Morgan‘s Canon, and killjoy 
                                                          
23
 Perhaps related to this favorable view of the parsimony/anthropomorphism connection, 
Papini gives a favorable treatment of behaviorism. In introducing it, he positions 
behaviorism as a response to the search for animal minds and a move away from 
introspectionism and anecdotalism toward experimentalism and ―objectivity.‖ He leaves 
the section on an extended quote from J.B. Watson, and returns to the subject in the 
glossary. There, he defines ―Behaviorism‖ as, ―An approach to psychology that 
emphasizes behavior as the object of study and concentrates on observable events (e.g., 
stimuli and responses) that can be measured and manipulated objectively‖ (Papini 2008, 
27). The reference to objectivity suggests a positive evaluation of behaviorism‘s program, 
since objectivity is generally taken to be a good-making property of science. 
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explanations. Although Shettleworth does not use the term parsimony in the text, she 
contrasts her killjoy explanations to complex explanations, suggesting that her preferred 
method is a search for simple mechanisms to explain sophisticated behaviors. 
Furthermore, such simple mechanistic explanations are presumed to be non-
anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric. In other words, Shettleworth‘s textbook leads 
the reader to believe that anthropomorphism is unparsimonious, and parsimonious 
explanations are the best.  
(4) Fundamentals of Comparative Cognition, 2013; Sarah Shettleworth 
Explanations in terms of simple mechanisms and processes are preferred over allegedly 
―anthropomorphic‖ or ―anthropocentric‖ explanations, understood in terms the standard 
set of allegedly ―complex‖ cognition (e.g., intelligence, cognitive maps, numerical 
cognition, and tool use). For example, Shettleworth writes, ―Nowadays, applying 
Morgan‘s Canon… often means trying to distinguish behavior based on such simple 
phylogenetically general cognitive processes from that based on apparently more 
complex or specialized ones‖ (Shettleworth 2013, 17). 
(5) Principles of Comparative Psychology, 2002 Greenberg and Haraway  
Although the index does not place anthropomorphism and parsimony on the same page, 
the individual passages tell a different story. MC combines all three usual 
misinterpretations: an anti-anthropomorphism principle, and anti-anecdotalism principle, 
and a parsimony principle. The notions of higher and lower mental processes are neither 
unpacked nor flagged as problematic. The section on parsimony suggests that beliefs and 
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desires are intervening variables with questionable explanatory scope, and should 
therefore be used only when needed. The authors suggest, on page 13, that knowing that a 
horse has been water-deprived and watching it drink when given water is all the 
information one needs; attributing the property of ―thirst‖ to the horse is unnecessary, and 
therefore doesn‘t belong in a scientific account of behavior. A passage from the historical 
overview of comparative psychology connects anecdotalism, anthropomorphism, and 
parsimony: 
Although perhaps best known today for fallacies inherent in his anecdotal 
method and for his easy assignment of human mental faculties to animals 
– a practice known as anthropomorphism – Romanes nevertheless 
succeeded in establishing his idea of a gradient of mental processes across 
the animal kingdom as a basic premise of early comparative psychology. 
A quantum improvement in the theoretical analysis of behavior occurred 
with the 1900 formulation of Morgan‘s canon …, a rule prohibiting 
invocation of higher mental processes to explain behaviors that could be 
accounted for by processes standing lower in the psychological scale. 
(Greenberg and Haraway 2002, 6; emphasis in original) 
On the passage on Clever Hans, set out in a box, we have the following: 
Hans indeed was quite a clever horse, but his skill rested not upon 
possession of humanlike intelligence, but upon the comparatively simple 
principles of instrumental conditioning. Our acceptance of Pfungst‘s 
explanation over von Osten‘s is a fitting application of Morgan‘s canon: 
That in the attribution of mental capabilities we must accept the simplest 
explanation that is available for a given example of behavior. (Greenberg 
and Haraway 2002, 7) 
On the subject of parsimony (p13), we have: 
Of two or more competing theories that appear equally successful at 
accounting for the same set of facts, the one that succeeds by use of the 
fewest number of principles is judged the winner, because it has achieved 
the greatest degree of summarization. The evaluation of a theory, then, 
follows the principle of parsimony that guides contemporary science. 
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…when psychologists wish to make statements about the mental processes 
of animals, these statements must take the form of hypothetical 
interpretations… 
…We may say, by way of example, that water deprivation made a horse 
thirsty, or willing to drink, and so it drank. …. The mental processes that 
intervene between the observed cause and effect are not observed and are 
useful only in a theoretical interpretation of the horse‘s behavior… For 
such reasons such statements remain theoretical. (Greenberg and Haraway 
2002, 13) 
 
(6) Determinants of Animal Behavior. 2002. Jo-Anne Cartwright. 
This book draws a very close connection between anti-anthropomorphism and the ―law of 
parsimony,‖ which Cartwright identifies with MC. Although it takes 
―anthropomorphism‖ and ―parsimony‖ as two separate issues, the book treats human-like 
mental processes and ―complex mental processes‖ as effectively identical. Similarly, it 
does not differentiate between the complexity of explanations and the complexity of the 
mental processes imputed to animals. For example, in the section on ―the problem of 
anthropomorphism,‖ Cartwright writes the following: 
Over the years a great deal of fanciful animal folklore has arisen. This has often 
led to the mistaken belief that animals behave in particular ways for the same 
reasons that humans do – for example, because they are angry, frustrated puzzled, 
happy, etc. Adopting such a stance is to commit the ‗sin‘ of anthropomorphism; 
that is, attributing animals with the same qualities as humans. (Cartwright, 7) 
 
In the section immediately following, titled, ―The Law of Parsimony (Lloyd Morgan‘s 
canon),‖ Cartwright clearly states that explanations positing associative processes are 
simpler than explanations positing knowledge. She writes: 
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According to the Law of Parsimony (also known as Lloyd Morgan‘s canon) 
explanations of animal behavior should always use the least complex level of 
explanation that makes the least assumptions. Therefore in the case of [a cat 
escaping Thorndike‘s box] we should adopt the second explanation [that the cat 
learned associations], and should not assume that animals have complex mental 
processes unless we are unable to explain behavior in any other way. (Cartwright 
2002, 9). 
We must avoid anthropomorphism at all costs when studying animal behavior…. 
Finally, we must adhere to the Law of Parsimony whenever possible. (Cartwright 
2002, 10) 
 
(7) Perspectives on Animal Behavior, Ed 3. Goodenough, Judith & Betty McGuire & 
Elizabeth Jacob (2010). 
This book attributes the anti-anthropomorphism principle to Morgan, eliding the 
injunction against anthropomorphism with the prescription for simpler theories. This 
suggests that simplicity implicitly underwrites anti-anthropomorphism.  Goodenough et 
al. write: 
…early descriptions of animal behavior were often subjective, anthropomorphic 
accounts. C Lloyd Morgan helped stop the anecdotal tradition, thereby helping 
comparative psychology to become the objective science it is today. He argued 
that behavior must be explained in the simplest way that is consistent with the 
evidence and without the assumption that human emotions or mental abilities are 
involved. This idea was crystallized in Morgan‘s Canon … In other words, when 
two explanations for a behavior appear equally valid, the simpler is preferred. 
People were urged to offer explanations of an animal‘s behavior without referring 
to the animal‘s presumed feelings or thought processes‖ (Goodenough 2010, 17) 
This description is not challenged during the rest of the historical chapter. Instead, 
behaviorism is presented as a step in the direction of objectivity, although the authors 
imply that behaviorists were studying mental ―capacity‖ indirectly – through studying 
learning.  
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(8) Animal Behavior, Ed. 9, John Alcock 
This textbook avoids discussing anthropomorphism, and only cladistic parsimony is 
mentioned. This book does not make the mistaken appeal to parsimony, and the absence 
of a discussion of anthropomorphism is therefore salient.  
1.2.3 Conclusion and Discussion 
The selection of the textbooks above illustrate that appeals to parsimony are made in the 
service of injunctions against anthropomorphism. Parsimonious explanations are 
contrasted with anthropomorphic ones, and it is the law-like appeal of parsimony that 
does much of work in establishing that anthropomorphism is clearly a scientific faux 
pas.
24
  
In the end, it appears that there is not only a correlation between the terms 
anthropomorphism and parsimony but a correlation between the worry over 
anthropomorphism, or over-attribution of sophisticated cognition to nonhuman animals, 
and a belief that parsimony is a theoretical virtue carrying independent epistemic weight. 
This latter part was suggested by the content search portions of the Ngram search and the 
                                                          
24
 A limitation of my textbook and journal searches is that published records cannot speak 
definitively to researchers‘ beliefs or broader goals. I cannot, for instance, conclude from 
this search that researchers today are less concerned with defending or defeating the 
theory of human uniqueness, since most comparative cognition researchers are working 
on highly specialized issues – albeit issues with broader implications. Their research does 
not leave them very much time to publish on these broader topics except in brief 
references in the discussion portions of the journals. This is a noteworthy point because 
the result of this sociological state of affairs is that the general consensus on the value of 
parsimony or the threat of anthropomorphism must be inferred from the publications with 
care: well-conducted surveys would be tremendously helpful. Since I will not be 
conducting these surveys at this time, I note that those of my conclusions that rest on this 
empirical data are provisional. 
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textbook search. This analysis shows that there is enough of a correlation to merit further 
research.
25
  
 
1.3 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter provides the background for the rest of the dissertation by introducing the 
bias against attributions of complex cognitive mechanisms or processes to animals. I 
called this bias Cognitive Conservatism, and traced its roots to interpretations of 
Morgan‘s Canon as an anti-anthropomorphism principle and as a parsimony principle. I 
offered a brief historical analysis of the evolution of anti-anthropomorphism, concluding 
that Cognitive Conservatism is the modern form of anti-anthropomorphism, and that the 
latter was also grounded in appeals to parsimony.
26
 This allowed me to use the term 
―anthropomorphism‖ as a proxy for ―Cognitive Conservatism‖ in the Google Ngram 
search study, which corroborated my thesis that parsimony and anthropomorphism were 
closely rhetorically related. To establish that this was a grounding relation, I conducted a 
follow-up study on popular textbooks. My search revealed a number of examples that 
corroborated this hypothesis. Next, I turn to an examination of the concept of parsimony 
in comparative cognition. I note that, just as with ―anthropomorphism,‖ the notion of 
―parsimony‖ in comparative cognition is multiply ambiguous, and cannot be used to 
support a general preference for simple cognitive ontologies.  
                                                          
25
 While the data may not demonstrate that my hypothesis is definitely true, they offer 
some support for the hypothesis. 
26
 There is no parallel ―positive‖ use of Cognitive Conservatism, as there is with the 
various attempts to reclaim the term, ―anthropomorphism‖ by researchers such as Bekoff.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Parsimony in Comparative Cognition: Disambiguation and Analysis 
 
If associative learning were merely „behaviourist‟, and if behaviourism 
had been shown to be false by the „cognitive revolution‟ in psychology, 
then … [we] could safely assume that associative learning is a fiction, 
something like phlogiston, dreamed up by previous generations of 
scientists to explain data that can now be explained in a much more 
rigorous and felicitous way. – Cecilia Heyes 2012, 2699 
 
Introduction 
Having argued that parsimony is used to ground anthropomorphism and what I call 
Cognitive Conservatism (CC) in Chapter 1, and having explained their historical 
connection to Morgan‘s Canon (MC), I now turn to a closer examination of parsimony as 
a putative epistemic value in comparative cognition. I begin by providing a taxonomy of 
meanings of ―parsimony,‖ restricting my analysis to the ways in which the term is used in 
comparative cognition (§2.1.1). I then turn to four evaluations of the appeal to parsimony 
in comparative cognition: Simon Fitzpatrick‘s deflationary account (§2.2.1), Sober‘s 
reconstruction of parsimony in model-selection terms (§2.2.2a), Sober‘s reconstruction of 
parsimony in evolutionary terms (§2.2.3b), and Andrews‘s and Sober‘s discussion of the 
principle of conservatism in experimental hypothesis-choice (§2.2.3). I argue that 
Fitzpatrick‘s deflationary analysis, in focusing on the normative, justificatory structure of 
parsimony, succeeds in explaining the intuitive appeal of certain parsimony claims but 
does not suggest a remedy for the continued misuse of parsimony terms. It also fails to 
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appreciate how deeply embedded the concept is in comparative cognition. Similarly, 
Sober‘s model-selection justification for parsimony relies on a narrowly circumscribed 
definition of parsimony – i.e., parsimony as the number of adjustable parameters in a 
model – and therefore does not track the actual deployment of the term in comparative 
cognition. Finally, I assess Sober‘s (2005) and Andrews‘s (2011) criticisms of a version 
of the parsimony-based CC bias vis-à-vis a critique of the error-rate asymmetry in the 
Neyman-Pearson Method of hypothesis testing. These analyses get close to revealing 
how parsimony enters into the experimental setting of the comparative cognition 
research. However, as I will explain in Chapter 3, critiquing the error-rate asymmetry 
does not go far enough. In order to see how parsimony enters into the experimental 
setting, one must look at the role of the null hypothesis and the statistical paradigm within 
which it is embedded.  
  
2.1 Parsing Parsimony  
 
In the entry on ―Simplicity‖ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Alan Baker 
(2011) identifies three questions about simplicity that warrant philosophical interest: the 
definition of simplicity, its usage, and the justification of its uses. Thus far, I have 
explained its usage in comparative cognition: simplicity or parsimony is most commonly 
used to ground CC, with a few exceptions (cf. Heyes 1998). In this section, I address the 
definitional question. Subsequent sections address justifications of some of these versions 
of parsimony.  
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Commenting on the status of philosophical and scientific discussion of simplicity, 
Baker writes that the ―apparent familiarity of the notion of simplicity means that it is 
often left unanalyzed, while its vagueness and multiplicity of meanings contributes to the 
challenge of pinning the notion down precisely‖ (Baker 2011). Baker‘s analysis concerns 
the notion of simplicity broadly construed – both as a philosophical notion and as a 
concept that has been employed by scientists and statisticians. He divides ―simplicity‖ 
into ―elegance‖ and ―parsimony,‖ where ―Syntactic simplicity, or elegance, measures the 
number and conciseness of the theory's basic principles [and] ontological simplicity, or 
parsimony, measures the number of kinds of entities postulated by the theory‖ (ibid). 
Although I will not adopt Baker‘s distinctions – I use ―simplicity‖ and ―parsimony‖ as 
synonyms – the problem of familiarity and vagueness are no less true of the concept of 
parsimony in comparative cognition than it is of simplicity more generally. Sometimes 
parsimony refers to the smallest number of cognitive entities, while other times it refers 
to the fit between the hypothesis and current dominant theory. One may wonder how, if 
parsimony is indeed used to ground CC or anti-anthropomorphism, it can do so when it is 
employed so loosely. Two general explanations are possible:  
(1)  References to ―parsimony‖ are not intended to draw on a precise definition of 
the term or its logical relations to the argued-for position; their purpose is 
more rhetorical than logical.  
(2) Different researchers use the term to mean very different things at different 
times. 
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It is my view that the truth is somewhere in the middle. While I suspect that an 
informative sociological account is available, I do not wish to psychologize the 
researchers who reference parsimony in support of their claims. Instead, I focus on the 
cumulative effects of employing the concept of parsimony as if it had both a singular 
meaning and a firm epistemological foundation. Toward this end, I draw out possible 
meanings of ―parsimony‖ in the literature, but always with an eye to its rhetorical 
function. This distinguishes my project from much of what has been written about the 
role of parsimony or simplicity in comparative cognition by other philosophers (Sober 
2005; Allen-Hermanson 2005; Fitzpatrick 2009) and philosophically minded 
psychologists (Thomas 2001; Karin D‘Arcy 2005). The majority of what is written on 
this subject concerns two big questions:  
(1)  Is MC a parsimony principle for comparative cognition?  
(2)  Is a parsimony principle for comparative cognition useful or harmful to 
the field‘s progress?  
 
Most philosophers and some scientists agree that the answer to (1) is ―No‖ (Kimler 2000, 
Thomas 2001, Sober [1998, 2005, 2009, 2012], Fitzpatrick 2008, Heyes 2012), despite 
the persistence of this assumption in areas of the scientific community. Within 
comparative cognition, MC continues to be misinterpreted as a special case of Occam‘s 
Razor. This definition is found in many textbooks, psychological encyclopedias, and 
discussion sections of journals, as was discussed in §§1.1 and 1.2. Another example 
comes from Elsevier's Dictionary of Psychological Theories (2006): 
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PARSIMONY, LAW/PRINCIPLE OF. = Lloyd Morgan's/Morgan's canon  
= Occam's razor  
= Occam's principle  
= economy, principle of […]  
Occamism, however, faces significant theoretical problems. First, the defense of a 
maximally simple ontology was initially found in now-controversial theological 
metaphysics.  In the late 19
th
 Century, Occamism, divested of its theological moorings, 
was reintroduced to epistemology. In this new guise, the proscription against multiplying 
entities came to refer to theoretical entities posited by a given theory. ―Contemporary 
philosophers,‖ writes Baker, ―have tended to reinterpret [Occam‘s Razor] as a principle 
of theory choice: [Occam‘s Razor] implies that—other things being equal—it is rational 
to prefer theories which commit us to smaller ontologies‖ (Baker 2011). Whether one 
takes a realist attitude toward the ontologies postulated by the theory depends on how one 
wishes to justify this preference. One way to do this is to adopt an instrumentalist view of 
theories. However, since comparative psychologists today are unlikely to be theologically 
inclined to accept Occam‘s ontology of a maximally simple world, or to be strict 
instrumentalists, ontological parsimony requires a new metaphysical ground if it is to be 
maintained.  
There is more philosophical controversy with respect to the second question – that 
is, on the subject of the usefulness of a parsimony principle. For example, the cognitive 
psychologist Cecilia Heyes argues that the appeals to parsimony have no scientific value, 
and recommends striking parsimony from the scientific lexicon, especially where 
72 
 
 
parsimony is used as a defense of sophisticated cognition (Heyes 1998).27 Most recently, 
Heyes returned to the issue of pre-empirical bias, arguing this time against the 
widespread use of the parsimony-based interpretation of MC on the grounds that this 
interpretation is both historically inaccurate and conceptually flawed. By contrast, Simon 
Fitzpatrick (2009) offers a deflationary account of parsimony, on which the warrant for 
appeals to parsimony comes from background assumptions behind a given appeal. Yet 
another approach comes from Sober (2009), where he defends a view on which 
parsimony justifies preferring one model of animal behavior over another. Importantly, 
Fitzpatrick and Sober allow for the possibility that parsimony, when properly understood, 
may not support the Principle of Conservatism (PC), and would not, by extension, 
support CC. Sober‘s and Fitzpatrick‘s analyses of parsimony in comparative cognition 
are two of the analyses I discuss in §2.2 of this chapter.   
                                                          
27
 In this article, Heyes rejects explanations of a range of (nonhuman) primate behavior 
that posit theory of mind, arguing that for each case, alternative explanations, such as 
associative learning, are available. Having made this point, Heyes goes on to reject what 
she views as the best remaining reasons to favor theory of mind explanations – two of 
which rely on parsimony principles. As she writes in her abstract: ―Arguments to the 
effect that … the theory of mind hypothesis should be accepted because it is more 
parsimonious than alternatives or because it is supported by convergent evidence are not 
compelling. Such arguments are based on unsupportable assumptions about the role of 
parsimony in science and either ignore the requirement that convergent evidence proceed 
from independent assumptions, or fail to show that it supports the theory of mind 
hypothesis over nonmentalist alternatives‖ (Heyes 1998, 101). The two versions of 
parsimony she evaluates are the claim that having a theory of mind is less cognitively 
demanding than alternatives, and that a theory of mind explanation is easier to understand 
than an associative explanation. She rightly argues that these two types of argument 
(which she labels ―simpler for them‖ and ―simpler for us,‖ respectively) are weak and can 
just as easily speak in favor of associative learning (Heyes 1998, 109-10).  
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In the following subsection (§2.2.1), I offer a taxonomy of uses of ―parsimony‖ in 
comparative cognition, many of which draw on the Occamist interpretation of MC. The 
taxonomy sets the stage for subsequent arguments (Chapters 3 and 4) against an a priori 
preference for parsimony, in designating default hypotheses.  
2.1.1 Taxonomy 
I propose the following list of plausible interpretations of ―parsimony‖ as used in the 
scientific literature on animal cognition. Importantly, the list does not exhaust all possible 
interpretations, since not all philosophical theories are relevant to comparative cognition 
or, arguably, to science in general. For each item in the list, I provide at least one 
example from the literature. Some of the examples will be open to multiple 
interpretations. I maintain that this variability of use and interpretation does not implicate 
the taxonomy; instead, it reveals a problem with the deployment of this concept in the 
literature. This conclusion is in conflict with Fitzpatrick‘s (2009) views, where he 
suggests that the project of providing a complete list of possible interpretations of 
parsimony or simplicity may be impossible. My list is incomplete, and I agree with 
Fitzpatrick that such lists ―could be extended indefinitely,‖ for example, by spelling out 
the ―‗amount of stuff‘ that psychological explanations have to posit‖ (Fitzpatrick 2009, 
267).28 However, I proceed by limiting my taxonomy to those notions that are most 
commonly used by comparative cognition scientists.  
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 Fitzpatrick also offers a partial taxonomy of different kinds of simplicity. His list is as 
follows: (Fitzpatrick 2009, 266): A. ―Simplicity as psychological unity.‖ This 
corresponds to a preference for explanations that can unify diverse behavioral responses 
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i. Ontological parsimony 
The first notion of parsimony I wish to examine is what I call ontological parsimony. 
Ontological parsimony is a preference for maximally simple cognitive properties, 
whatever those properties happen to be. A preference for ontological parsimony is based 
on the view that simpler cognitive mechanisms, processes, abilities, or systems are more 
likely to actually be present than complex cognitive mechanisms, processes, abilities, or 
systems. In other words, it is a realist justification of CC.  
 If this definition is unsatisfying, that is because I have yet to say what it means for 
a cognitive ontology to be simple or what kinds of entities qualify as possible cognitive 
entities. I provide a provisional list of the latter later in this section. A working definition 
of the former might be that ontological cognitive simplicity measures the amount of stuff 
– it measures how many tokens of types or entities are present in the target cognitive 
system. However, providing a comprehensive general account of ontological cognitive 
simplicity is more difficult than it is profitable. A pluralistic account, which accepts a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
under a single capacity or ability. B. ―Simplicity as parsimony of mental representation.‖  
This somewhat confusingly titled type of simplicity corresponds to a preference for 
explanations positing what Fitzpatrick, following the comparative cognition scientists, 
refers to as the ―lowest level‖ representations, though what these levels correspond to is 
never articulated. The nature of representations, or their connection with metacognitive 
abilities, is similarly undiscussed.  C. ―Simplicity as (less) cognitive sophistication.‖ 
Fitzpatrick does not define ―cognitive sophistication,‖ except to equate it with ―lowest‖ 
cognitive processes consistent with the available data‖ (ibid) so it is unclear what he has 
in mind.  D. ―Simplicity as analogy.‖ This is a presumption in favor of similar cognitive 
mechanism for similar behaviors.  E. ―Simplicity as evolutionary parsimony.‖  
This is a presumption in favor of homologous cognitive mechanisms for similar 
behaviors in closely related species (Fitzpatrick 2009, 266-69). This list is self-
consciously incomplete. However, it also suffers from some incoherence. For example, 
categories A and B seem to be special cases of category C, and it seems odd to separate 
them without explaining the significance of this choice. 
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variety of definitions of ontic simplicity, is more likely to track actual use. However, a 
pluralistic account will have to include means of simplifying particular ontologies. For 
example, some of the ways in which a mechanism is simple do not apply to ways in 
which a concept is simple, and yet both are putative cognitive entities. To make this point 
more clear, consider two importantly different measures of a cognitive system‘s 
complexity: heterogeneity and plasticity.  
One means of measuring the relative simplicity of a system is by assessing its 
heterogeneity, on the assumption that more homogenous systems are simpler (Godfrey-
Smith 2002). Cognitive ontologies may be simplified in this way across a number of 
contexts. For example, a physical system in the brain may be homogenous with respect to 
function if the system is responsible for only one kind of function; it might be 
homogenous with respect to consistency if it consists of the same kinds of stuff or if the 
system carries out one or multiple functions using only one type of neurobiological 
subsystem.  
Another means of measuring the relative complexity of a cognitive system, which 
is common in comparative cognition, is through the system‘s ability to perform flexibly 
in a variety of environments. A simple system is one that produces rigid behavioral 
patterns that do not change with the environment. For example, an ant that encodes 
distance from its hive by the number of steps it takes and the direction in which it was 
headed, will not find its way home if an experimenter elongates or shortens its stride for 
the return trip (in Shettleworth 2010, 270). Since the ant cannot choose to employ a 
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different homing tool after its stride length is experimentally altered – continuing to count 
the number of steps before stopping – it may be said to be using a rigid and therefore 
simple system.  
As these two examples illustrate, how one measures simplicity is indexed to the 
features that one is interested in measuring. Given the link between the system of 
measurement and the ontological class being measured, an account of simplifiers will be 
uninformative unless it is embedded in a discussion of the relevant reference class of 
entities being simplified.  
With this caveat in mind, ontological parsimony can be applied to a broad range 
of ontological classes and subclasses: from mechanisms, to processes, to mechanism-
process systems, and more. This makes ontological parsimony one of the more capacious 
interpretations of parsimony in comparative cognition. It also means that ontological 
parsimony is the version that comes closest to the original Occamist principle. Recall that 
Occamism has both a metaphysical and methodological component, with the latter based 
on the former: It warns against needlessly multiplying entities in our theories, and it does 
this because the simplest theory is also the most likely to be true, or to be an accurate 
description of the world.  
Due to the attribution of Occamism to Morgan, ontological parsimony in 
comparative cognition is normally interpreted as the rule to prefer ―less cognitively 
complex‖ explanations. The most extreme version of this interpretation comes from the 
radical behaviorist tradition, discussed in Chapter 1, which rejects unobservable mental 
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phenomena as excess metaphysics. Some radical behaviorists consider all ―mentalism‖ 
(ascription of mental states) to rely on a dualist metaphysics of mind (Kennedy 1992). 
For example, in the article cited in §1.1, where Wynne decries the resurgence of alleged 
anthropomorphism, he writes: 
Mentalism fails to qualify as a scientific explanation […because…] it uses 
ultimately non-material causes to attempt to explain behavior. It goes 
outside the physical world in its search for explanations. (Wynne 2007, 
132) 
Seen as requiring substance dualism, the ascription of mental states to nonhuman animals 
appears to (a) violate scientific norms, insofar as science presupposes a materialist 
ontology, and (b) require a less parsimonious ontology than purely materialist 
explanations (Cf. Baker 2011).  While the rejection of substance dualism is right, the 
belief that mental terms imply substance dualism is much too quick.  
The majority of comparative cognition researchers are now comfortable with 
imputing some internal states to nonhumans, which mediate between environmental 
inputs and behavioral outputs, turning their focus toward a simple cognitive ontology.  
Describing the preference for a simple cognitive ontology, however, faces some 
challenges. First, there is no single agreed-upon definition of cognition that will satisfy 
all philosophers or researchers. Even apparently innocuous definitions turn out to be 
problematic. Consider the following hypothetical definition:  
cognition = def  information-processing that mediates between 
environmental inputs and behavioral outputs.  
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This is effectively the working definition that Sarah Shettleworth (2013) uses when she 
writes that ―[for the purpose of] this book, cognition embraces all processes involved in 
acquiring, storing, and using information from the environment, from perception to 
decision making, from a mouse‘s memory for familiar odors to a chimpanzee‘s 
apparently planful use of tools‖ (Shettleworth 2013, 1). This catholic definition of 
cognition is, however, too broad for some and too narrow for others. Among the latter 
critics, proponents of extended cognition theories may object that Shettleworth‘s account 
rules out alternative accounts of cognition by stipulating that cognition is something that 
mediates between the environment and the organism‘s actions; Shettleworth‘s working 
definition appears to rule out the possibility that cognition is (partially) constituted by the 
interactions between an organism and its environment.  Among the former critics would 
be those who do not think that calling all information-processing mechanisms cognitive is 
useful. As she notes in her 2010 textbook: ―Cognitive is often reserved for the 
manipulation of declarative rather than procedural knowledge‖ (Shettleworth 2010, 5). 
The former refers to ―knowing that‖ while the latter refers to ―knowing how‖ (ibid). 
Similarly, ―cognitive‖ might be reserved for ―higher-order processes,‖ where ―first-order 
processes operate directly on perceptual input, as when a stimulus triggers a response or 
creates a trace in memory‖ while ―second order processes operate on first-order 
processes, as in evaluating the strength of one‘s memory of an event‖ (ibid). Finally, 
cognition may refer to representational and computational processes (ibid). Those who 
consider associative theories to be non-representational will object to the catholic 
definition of cognition, which takes associative processes to be cognitive. Finally, one 
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might object that replacing ―cognition‖ with ―information-processing‖ trades one 
ambiguous term for another. In the remainder of the dissertation, references to cognition 
should be interpreted agnostically – as taking no single view of cognition – except where 
otherwise specified.  
I acknowledge these challenges to making sense of the concept of ontological 
parsimony. The popularity of this notion, however, means that the challenge is worth 
addressing. I approach this challenge by abstaining from making a normative claim 
regarding the appropriate definition of cognition. Instead, I choose a ground-up approach 
of listing some of the most popular cognitive entity-candidates that are assumed to be 
subject to ontological cognitive parsimony claims. I base my judgment on whether: (a) 
the researchers take themselves to be discussing cognition and (b) they employ the 
concept of simplicity or parsimony in their discussions, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Cognitive Entities subject to Ontological Parsimony Claims 
The list of possible cognitive ―entities‖ is, as Fitzpatrick (2009) suggests, potentially 
endless. Fortunately, comparative cognition researchers often limit their analyses to a 
range of these. The following discussion enumerates five of these, while also showing 
that claims of ontological parsimony are often ambiguous with respect to the entity they 
wish to simplify. Among putative cognitive entities, I include, (a) faculties and abilities; 
(b) representational levels and orders of intentionality; (c) computational processes and 
mechanisms; (d) modules and systems; and, finally (e) consciousness and awareness. I 
have chosen the items on this list based on the most frequent attempts to fit these putative 
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entities into a cognitive hierarchy. As will become clear toward the end of this discussion, 
however, ―[it] is an error to try to describe a single hierarchy of cognitive skills, from the 
simplest to the most complex‖ (Godfrey-Smith 2002, 136). 
a. Faculties and Abilities 
I begin with the most vague notion of a cognitive entity: the ―faculty‖ or ―ability,‖ often 
treated as synonymous and taken to mean, roughly, ―something that an animal can do 
with its mind.‖ For example, in a (2009) article detailing their study of tool-use among 
New Caledonian crows, Joanna H. Wimpenny and colleagues writes: 
While the ability of [some New Caledonian crows] to use three tools in 
sequence reveals a competence beyond that observed in any other species, 
our study also emphasises the importance of parsimony in comparative 
cognitive science: seemingly intelligent behaviour can be achieved 
without the involvement of high-level mental faculties, and detailed 
analyses are necessary before accepting claims for complex cognitive 
abilities. (Wimpenny et al. 2009; emphasis added) 
 
In this passage, Wimpenny et al. interpret (ontological) cognitive complexity in two 
distinct ways, which they appear to treat interchangeably – as ―levels‖ of ―mental 
faculties‖ on the one hand, and as ―cognitive abilities‖ that fall on a scale of 
―complexity.‖ Note that both formulations are multiply ambiguous, despite being used to 
pick out some feature of the cognitive world.  
b. Representational levels and orders of intentionality 
A very popular attempt to make the idea of levels of cognition mentioned above more 
precise is to frame the discussion in terms of representation. On this view, a 
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representation of, e.g., an apple is a lower-level representation than a representation of 
the representation of an apple. This higher-level representation is considered more 
complex than lower-order representations. Such an account of representation is 
surprisingly popular in comparative cognition (Cf. Crystal and Foote 2009; Shettleworth 
2010). This is all the more surprising, since the notion of a representation is seldom 
defined. It is therefore unclear whether researchers have in mind what David Pitt calls the 
broad sense of representation common to philosophy, on which representations are 
defined as ―mental objects with semantic properties‖ or the computational sense common 
to cognitive science, on which mental representations are ―information-bearing 
structures‖ (Pitt 2012). On either interpretation, it is not clear and rarely explained why a 
representation of a representation should be more complex in an interesting sense than a 
representation of a state in the environment.29  
Compounding the problem of defining representations and articulating an account 
of complexity in terms of representational levels is the fact that the concept of a 
representational level is often used interchangeably with the concept of an order of 
intentionality. Intentionality means ―aboutness.‖ For example, a painting of a dog is, in 
some sense, about that dog. Representations are all about something, and therefore are 
                                                          
29
 Sober (1998) offers one exposition of intentional levels complexity. He writes: ―I want 
to propose a … diachronic and causal [account of intentionality]: second-order 
intentional states are caused by first-order intentional states. If a chimp believes that a 
trainer knows where the food is, this second-order belief is caused by the chimp's having 
various first-order beliefs about the trainer (e.g. that he was near the food when it was 
hidden). However, first-order beliefs need not be caused by second-order beliefs (though 
they may be in some instances). If this is right, then a hypothesis of second-order 
intentionality may postulate more layers of intervening variables than a hypothesis that 
asserts first-order intentionality only‖ (Sober 1998, 495).  
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intentional objects. However, there is dispute in philosophy over whether intentional 
states must be representational.
 30  Sober offers the following definition of intentionality 
as it is ―assigned to organisms (or to ―systems‖): 
Organism O has nth-order intentionality  
=def O has at least one nth-order mental state (ibid) 
Of course, not all philosophical distinctions find purchase with scientists, and it is not 
difficult to see why the concepts of representation and intentionality have merged in 
comparative cognition: both include pre-packaged hierarchical concepts (levels and 
orders), which appear to follow an intuitive recursive ordering. The trouble is that 
intuitions about representational levels or orders of intentionality run shallow, while the 
problems that these concepts are issued to solve require more nuance and depth. 
Specifically, comparative cognition researchers appeal to representational levels when 
deciding between, e.g., associative and metacognitive explanations of behavior. The 
common assumption is that metacognition is representational, whereas association is 
either non-representational or ―thinly representational‖ (Heyes 2012).31  
Since it is presumed that representations can be ordered by complexity (by 
discrete levels), it follows that the least complex system is one that lacks representational 
ability altogether. Since associative systems are (often) assumed to be 
                                                          
30
 See Ruth Millikan‘s 1989 account of intentionality without representation. 
31
 Heyes differentiates between ―thin or concrete‖ representations such as ―impressions‖ 
and ―memory traces‖ with ―abstract or conceptual representations‖ such as ―reasoning‖ 
and possessing ―the structured or language-like quality necessary to support inference 
processes‖ (Heyes 2012, 2700). On her view, associative processes are weakly cognitive 
in the sense of being ―thinly‖ representational (ibid). 
83 
 
 
nonrepresentational (except in the information-processing sense) they are also taken to be 
the most simple. The next step up in complexity is a low-level representation, followed 
by high-level representation, which is what metacognition apparently requires.  
The assumption that associative explanations are the simplest kinds of 
interpretation of a novel animal behavior is implicit in the following quotation from an 
earlier paper by Heyes (1998), in which she argues that deception in nonhuman primates 
has not been proven to rely on theory of mind: 
… the claim that theory of mind underlies this capacity in primates, that 
they sometimes act with the intention of producing or sustaining a state of 
ignorance or false belief in another animal, has little support. The evidence 
is almost exclusively anecdotal … and the behavior described in each 
anecdote is subject to one or more alternative interpretations. Many 
anecdotal reports of deceptive behavior invite several alternative 
interpretations: that the behavior occurred (1) by chance, (2) as a result of 
associative learning, or (3) as a product of inferences about observable 
features of the situation rather than mental states… (Heyes 1998, 106) 
Note that the alternative explanations each involves prima facie less sophisticated 
cognition than theory of mind (ToM), and that Heyes has ordered them in a typical, 
apparently ascending, order of sophistication: starting with ―chance,‖ or no cognitive 
involvement, moving to associative learning, and ending with allegedly basic reasoning, 
or reasoning about observable features of the world rather than presumably unobservable 
mental states. Heyes‘ implicit hierarchy is typical of the messy partitioning into more and 
less complex, more and less sophisticated, or ―higher‖ and ―lower‖ behavior-regulating 
processes. Shettleworth (2010) admits as much when she writes that: 
In contemporary practice ―lower‖ usually means associative learning, that 
is, classical and instrumental conditioning or untrained species-specific 
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responses. ―Higher‖ is reasoning, planning, insight, in short any cognitive 
process other than associative learning. (Shettleworth 2010, 17-18) 
The assumptions that (i) representations can be ordered according to complexity, that (ii) 
representational complexity ought to guide hypothesis-choice, and that (iii) associative 
systems are non-representational or ‗thinly representational‘ and therefore simpler than 
metacognition, have broad implications for the entire research program on metacognition. 
Namely, those working in metacognition assume that associative learning is the default 
hypothesis, which must be definitively rejected before metacognitive alternatives can be 
proposed as alternatives. Consider how a recent article on the question of metacognition 
versus associative learning in primates frames the project:  
While a low level, associative approach to learning and behavior provides 
a full account of the empirical studies [of primate and rat uncertainty 
monitoring abilities], this does not prove that monkeys and rats are not 
using higher level metacognitive processes in those experiments. 
Essentially, we have two different accounts of the same pattern of 
behavior; one in terms of well-established processes of stimulus–
reinforcement learning and the other in terms of cognitive monitoring in a 
hierarchy of decision making, wherein an animal is able to monitor and 
make decisions regarding other decisions that it has made or is 
contemplating. 
…  
Notwithstanding the [relative underdevelopment of metacognitive 
theories], suppose that a suitably well-specified psychological theory of 
higher level metacognition were developed; should we then prefer the 
associative or the higher level account? The available behavioral evidence 
cannot decide between the two, and hence, the conservative answer would 
be to fall back on C. Lloyd Morgan‘s (1903) canon … The implication of 
this canon for the analysis of metacognition in animals is self-evident. (Le 
Pelley 2012, 20; emphasis added) 
In other words, Le Pelley takes it as a given that the ―conservative‖ choice is the one that 
prefers association to metacognition. This is not because the associative hypothesis is 
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well-specified, and hence makes clear predictions, while the metacognitive one is 
underspecified, and hence does not make clear predictions. Rather, association is 
preferred because it is considered simpler. Le Pelley‘s project – to seek an associative 
model for behavior that had previously been considered evidence of metacognition – in 
fact assumes that metacognition has the burden of proof.  
c. Processes and Mechanisms 
Another candidate for a cognitive entity is a computational process or mechanism. 
Processes and mechanisms can be ontologically parsimonious when they are inexpensive 
(metabolically or computationally), efficient, or based on a small number of rules or 
moving parts. (For more on computational parsimony of mechanisms, see §2.1.ii below.) 
Since processes are performed by mechanisms, and mechanisms undergo processes, the 
concept of a cognitive mechanism is occasionally used interchangeably with the notion of 
processes. Mechanisms may be either abstract relationships, such as the ―mechanism‖ of 
associative learning, or physical, such as the neurological substrates of associative 
bonds.32  
One example of a mechanism‘s simplicity interpreted computationally comes 
from Penn and Povinelli (2007), in their argument that there is, at present, no evidence 
for ToM in any animals. They reason that showing that animals possess metacognitive 
abilities (in this case, ToM) requires demonstrating – empirically or theoretically – that 
                                                          
32
 The question of how best to characterize what a mechanism is remains outside the 
scope of the present dissertation, however. For discussion see Craver 2007 and Bechtel 
and Abrahamsen 2005. 
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the observed behavior would have been impossible without it. They clearly state that the 
default assumption should be that the animal possesses only the standard set of 
representational abilities that would make them candidates for ToM experiments. Instead 
of limiting their discussing to representation, Penn and Povinelli move from 
representation to computation, writing: 
From  a  scientific stance,  however,  we  are only warranted  in attributing an ms 
[mental state] variable  to the subject if we can specify why an fToM of some kind  
is computationally necessary in order to perform the given behaviour and why the 
information provided by the resulting ms variable is not redundant with  
information provided by the [other variables, such as ―internal goal states,‖ 
―informational states that affect and/or mediate the goal-directed behaviour of a 
cognitive agent,‖ ―any dynamic, occurrent information obtained through 
perceptual inputs (including autonomic and proprioceptive channels);‖ and 
―feedback from the organism's sensorimotor loops (including online and offline 
emulators)]. (Penn and Povinelli 2007, 734-35)  
In such cases, cognitive complexity is sometimes spelled out in terms of processes or 
mechanisms, and the computational or processing power required to run these processes. 
On this view of ontological cognitive parsimony, the theory or model imputing the less 
computationally demanding processes to the animal is preferred to the theory or model 
that imputes a greater computational burden. We might consider computational burden a 
cognitive ―entity,‖ although this admittedly stretches the definition of ―entity.‖33  
Penn and Povinelli ground their a priori preference for theories that impute the 
least computationally sophisticated preferences in claims about explanatory scope. 
However, other arguments in favor of less computationally demanding theories or models 
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 In addition, by defining metacognitive abilities as additional to ―informational states 
that affect and/or mediate the goal-directed behaviour of a cognitive agent,‖ Penn and 
Povinelli are defining metacognition as external to normal information processing. 
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rely on the idea that computational complexity is positively correlated with energetic 
demand, and combined with a preference for theories or models that require less 
energetically demanding processes. Arguments in favor of preferring the least 
energetically demanding theories, in turn appeal to fitness, as will be discussed in the 
following chapter. When computational demand is further correlated with 
representational power, the result is a preference for the least sophisticated 
representational abilities, grounded in a preference for energetic economy. In this way, 
representational levels are sometimes mapped on to physical features of the animal mind. 
I will assess these arguments in § 4.1.3. 
d. Modules and Systems 
Another entity-type is the cognitive module or system, which is partly ―defined by [its] 
domain-specificity‖ (Shettleworth 2010, 549). On this view, a cognitive system is simpler 
if it has fewer specialized types of modules than an alternative system. In comparative 
cognition, a modular view of the mind is popular among advocates of the ―dual-process 
theory‖ of cognition, on which associative systems are present in all organisms, but 
where some organisms, such as humans, have additional systems for abstract processing 
abilities (Karin-D‘Arcy 2005; Heyes 2012, 2698). Exactly what a system or a cognitive 
module is remains an open question, and different researchers are likely to be operating 
with divergent ontological commitments with respect to cognitive modules. Cognitive 
modules inhabit the ontological hinterland, somewhere between physical systems and 
ability-types. Shettleworth cautions against taking the idea of a cognitive module too 
literally, writing that any given domain-specific process (cognitive module) is unlikely to 
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have a single isolated physical correlate (Shettleworth 2010, 551). Something like 
associative learning, for example, may be a general property of certain kinds of neural 
circuits regardless of the specific input-output system they serve (ibid).  
e. Consciousness and Awareness 
Finally, the most controversial classes of mental – and possibly cognitive (depending on 
the definition of cognition) – phenomena are consciousness and awareness. 
Consciousness and awareness are often treated as synonyms in the psychological 
literature, and both are treated with extreme skepticism. ―Most people who study 
comparative cognition,‖ writes Shettleworth, ―remain agnostic as to whether animals 
process information consciously or not‖ (Shettleworth 2010, 23).  In humans, tests that 
differentiate between conscious and unconscious processes are plentiful, as these rely on 
verbal reports. However, the absence of verbal reporting (in human languages) is 
assumed to make similar studies with nonhuman animals and infants unreliable. Attempts 
to circumvent this problem ―require us to accept some piece of the animal‘s behavior as 
equivalent to the person‘s verbal report‖ (Shettleworth 2010, 7). However, since, as 
Shettleworth writes, we can never know whether this behavior is equivalent to the report, 
we can never know what the animal experiences. For this reason ―the point of view of 
most researchers studying animal cognition is that how animals process information can, 
and should, be analyzed without making any assumptions about what their private 
experiences are‖ (ibid). What is most interesting for my purposes is that conscious 
awareness in nonhumans is considered by most researchers to be explanatorily inert, 
inaccessible to scientific investigation, and, often, epiphenomenal. There are exceptions, 
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most notably Griffin, who thought conscious awareness could be scientifically explored 
and assigned a causal role in behavior, but such views are rare. Even behaviors that are 
regularly attended by conscious awareness in humans, such as gauging one‘s certainty 
about a question or reasoning about the beliefs and desires of others, are assumed to be 
separable, in practice, from awareness. Even tests that are designed to measure animals‘ 
self-awareness, such as the Mirror Self-Recognition Test34 (MSR) are defined 
functionally – i.e., in terms of the tasks that the animal is capable of carrying out – and 
make no claims about the subjective states that may or may not attend such behaviors. As 
a rule, awareness is taken as an additional property, and is commonly razored away.  
It should be clear from this brief discussion that the concept of ontological 
cognitive simplicity is doubly ambiguous: not only is it unclear what aspect of cognition 
is picked out by a given argument, but it is also unclear what it means for such systems to 
be ―simple.‖ First, the following are all candidate cognitive ontologies: representational 
states, physical mechanisms, physical mechanisms plus their process-states, physical 
mechanisms plus their representational counterparts, and more. Second, the following are 
all candidate hierarchies: levels, types of cognitive ontology, tokens of cognitive 
                                                          
34
 The MSR was first developed by Gallup in the 1970s to test primates for self-
awareness. In a typical test, the animal is first shown a mirror and allowed to explore its 
features. Then the animal is anaesthetized and a mark is placed on the animal in a spot 
that can only be seen with the aid of the mirror. The animal is subsequently released and 
provisioned with a mirror. For animals whose physiology permits it, if the animal touches 
the spot when looking in the mirror more often than when not facing the mirror, then it is 
said to pass the MSR. The MSR has been applied to a variety of animal species, including 
birds and dolphins (modified to replace the need to touch the marked spot), with varying 
results. It has also been criticized for being overly restrictive. For example, in privileging 
the vision over other sensory modalities, such as olfaction, the MSR may bias results for 
species that are not primarily visual.   
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ontologies, speed of process, efficiency of process, number of steps in a process, scale of 
mechanism, speed of mechanism, and efficiency of mechanism. 
This double ambiguity suggests that a single, broad, definition of ontological 
cognitive parsimony is unlikely to be of much utility. After all, any concept that includes 
both, e.g., the metabolic cost of a brain mechanism and the number of representational 
―levels‖ is unlikely to be very useful. Peter Godfrey-Smith rightly said that it ―is an error 
to try to describe a single hierarchy of cognitive skills, from the simplest to the most 
complex‖ (Godfrey-Smith 2002, 136).  
ii. Theoretical parsimony  
A second common version of parsimony is what I call theoretical parsimony, which 
recommends choosing the simplest theory or model of animal cognition that best explains 
a given set of behaviors. According to Baker (2011), a theory‘s simplicity can be 
measured either by ―the number and conciseness of the theory's basic principles‖ or ―the 
number of kinds of entities postulated by the theory‖ (Baker 2011). Baker calls these 
elegance and ontological parsimony, respectively, though for the sake of clarity, I will 
refer to these as syntactic theoretical parsimony and symbolic theoretical parsimony, 
respectively.35 Most comparative cognition scientists appear to be concerned with 
symbolic theoretical parsimony. Yet another way in which a theory may be simple is if it 
                                                          
35
 To elegance, I would also add ―syntactic elegance,‖ on which a theory or model is 
syntactically simpler when the symbolic units used to represent the target system are 
conserved. For example, a theory that can be represented using an equation with the 
smallest number of variables or the shortest length of characters may be theoretically 
simple with respect to syntactic elegance. 
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is easy to understand or easy to use. This is the sense that Heyes had in mind when she 
argued against accepting a theory just because it was ―easy for us‖ to understand (Heyes 
1998, 110). I take it that few comparative cognition scientists have this sense in mind. 
The case is more complicated with respect to the latter formulation – namely, ease of use, 
since we might use something with ease even if we don‘t understand how it works.  
(Symbolic) theoretical parsimony is related to ontological parsimony in the 
following sense: if a theory or model is meant to describe these target system, then the 
preference for simplicity of the theory or model suggests a preference for ontological 
parsimony. However, some comparative cognition researchers consider their job to be 
prediction, and value models based on their usefulness in generating more testable 
predictions (cf. Kamil 1998).  For these researchers, the theory or model does not have to 
be true of, or isomorphic with, the target system; it needs to be empirically adequate and 
useful. More often than not, however, researchers are equivocal about their realist 
commitments. However, because the subject of much comparative cognition research is 
the explanation of behaviors and abilities in terms of actual mechanisms and processes, 
we may suppose that this explanation is at least in part descriptive.36   
Consider the following example from Shettleworth‘s discussion of experiments 
testing metacognition using the uncertainty-monitoring paradigm in humans and in other 
species: 
                                                          
36
 For an account of how false or idealized models can explain, see, e.g., Bokulich 
(forthcoming); for a mechanistic account of explanation, see e.g., Craver (2007).  
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When people choose the ―uncertain‖ option in such studies [as she described], 
they say they experience a feeling of uncertainty, but whatever the subjective 
states of the animals here, behavior consistent with metacognition in these tests 
can be completely accounted for in terms of learned contingencies and the 
resulting competing response tendencies… (Shettleworth 2010, 247; emphasis 
added).  
In other words, the human ability to report makes all the difference in terms of the 
conclusions drawn from the experiments. Functionally identical behavior in nonhuman 
animals and in humans receives different interpretations because adding the ―feeling of 
uncertainty‖ to the model of nonhuman behaviors does not add anything in terms of 
explanatory value. Although Shettleworth does not explicitly invoke parsimony or 
simplicity in the above quote, it is clear that she is opting for the theory that has 
explanatory power equal to its rival, but which is more theoretically parsimonious 
because it does not posit another type of process (viz., feelings of uncertainty). 
Historically, this is the version of simplicity that has received the most 
philosophical attention, as evidenced by the fact that the entry on simplicity in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy focuses on the issue of using simplicity as a guide 
in theory choice. The other versions of parsimony that I note, on this approach, fall under 
the heading of possible justifications for, or implications of, the theories. 
iii. Parsimony as external coherence 
Another way that parsimony is used in the comparative cognition literature is to refer to 
something like consistency with other experimental results and existing theories. 
Parsimonious hypotheses, on this interpretation, are those that support or, at minimum, 
don‘t challenge the dominant theoretical framework. On this ―external coherence‖ 
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interpretation of parsimony, a hypothesis acquires additional epistemic weight on the 
basis of its superior fit not with experimental data, but with the established theoretical 
beliefs of the scientific community. Coherence with well-established theories, on this 
view, provides additional evidence for the truth of the hypothesis.  
In comparative cognition, parsimony as external coherence has been used to 
ground very different claims. For instance, Frans de Waal (1997) writes that the debate in 
comparative cognition is between those who opt for what he calls ―cognitive parsimony‖ 
and those who prefer ―evolutionary parsimony.‖ Cognitive parsimony may be understood 
as ontological parsimony. Evolutionary parsimony, however, is not an ontological claim. 
Instead, it is a coherence claim on which some ontologically nonparsimonious 
explanations of animal behavior are to be preferred because they are consistent with 
evolutionary principles. The principle de Waal has in mind is that ceteris paribus, ―when 
closely related species of animals act the same, the underlying mental processes are 
probably the same, too‖ (DeWaal 1997, p. xiv). This, in turn, should be interpreted as an 
appeal to cladistic parsimony, as Sober (2012) writes, ―according to which the 
complexity of an evolutionary hypothesis is measured by counting how many changes in 
character state the hypothesis requires‖ (Sober 2012, 231).  De Waal‘s evolutionary 
parsimony is one of a handful of parsimony-based arguments against the 
recommendations of Cognitive Conservatism.  
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iv. Agential parsimony  
Less often discussed is the behavioral interpretation of parsimony. What I call ―agential 
parsimony‖ is a caution understood as a resistance to altering one‘s position regarding a 
well-established principle, theory, or method. Although there are good Bayesian reasons 
for agential parsimony, there are equally obvious reasons to be wary of remaining overly 
suspicious of novel ideas. When parsimony is invoked as a guide to behavior, especially 
in scientific textbooks and by the supervisors of student researchers, the result can be a 
fashioning of a kind of scientific personality. Historians and sociologists of science have 
argued that scientific pedagogy shapes not only the products of future research, but the 
future researchers themselves (Kuhn 1996, Longino 1991, Daston & Galison 2010). I 
take it that this basic claim is uncontroversial, even if specific elaborations of the claim 
are not. I suggest that appeals to parsimony in comparative cognition are especially 
effective because they fit into the broader scientific culture of preferring to err on the side 
of false negatives. If I am right, then the result of pro-caution pedagogy is a kind of 
inertia on the part of individual scientists and the scientific communities they compose. 
Agential parsimony may be one mechanism by which parsimony as external coherence 
comes to be valued. 
 A few examples of putative agential parsimony come to mind. These are 
distinguished by the use of the idea of ―carefulness‖ or ―caution‖ or ―prudence,‖ and by 
the personal attacks on the character of individual scientists. The starkest examples of 
such attacks come from anti-anthropomorphists, especially those responding to Griffin‘s 
proposal of cognitive ethology. For example, Helena Cronin, commenting on Griffin‘s 
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―anthropomorphic‖ turn toward cognitive ethology writes: ―A Griffin bat is a miniature 
physics lab. So imagine the consternation among behavioristic ethologists when Mr. 
Griffin came out … as a sentimental softy‖ (qtd. in Bekoff and Allen 1997).  
Charging researchers with anthropomorphism or sentimentality is tantamount to 
charging them with unscientific sloppy thinking, carelessness, and a kind of inferential 
profligacy. In this quote – representative of many – Cronin makes the implication that 
Griffin is an outsider of the scientific community, which is characterized by its caution 
and the sort of rigor one might find in physics. Using individuals, such as Griffin, as 
examples of scientific heresy is one of the methods by which scientific communities 
maintain the status quo. Agential parsimony of this sort clearly has its merits – without 
some common principles to guide scientific programs, it would be difficult to know 
where to begin. However, agential parsimony can be overemphasized.  
v. Unificationist parsimony  
Closely related to external coherence parsimony, is what I call unificationist parsimony, 
on which a parsimonious explanation is one that unifies the largest number of behavioral 
phenomena under a single principle, such as a behavioral rule or a single type of 
mechanism. Early behaviorists were after this kind of parsimony (as well as ontological 
parsimony), seeking to apply as few rules as possible to explain the behavior of all 
organisms. Present-day examples include Shettleworth (2010) and Misti R. Karin-D‘Arcy 
(2005), who have appealed to this version of parsimony when arguing in favor of erring 
on the side of associative learning in behavioral explanations.  
96 
 
 
For instance, consider Shettleworth‘s claim that, ―because associative learning is 
phylogenetically so widespread, it is generally the most reasonable null hypothesis in 
terms of evolution‖ (Shettleworth 2010, 553). Note that if associative learning is 
phylogenetically widespread, it follows that it is most likely very old, since, the chances 
of many distantly related species possessing the same mechanism without sharing a 
common ancestor who possessed that mechanism are very slim. However, Shettleworth 
draws on studies that have themselves taken associative learning to be the default 
hypothesis, so the claim that associative learning is virtually ubiquitous across extant taxa 
is premature. Without that claim, the claim that it is ancient and therefore likely to 
underlie behaviors being experimentally examined is also premature. What remains is 
that associative learning hypotheses have proven to be extremely good at capturing the 
phenomena across a very wide range of cases.  
vi. Parsimony in cognitive models and simulations  
Simulations and models represent a relatively new approach to testing theories of animal 
behavior in comparative cognition. Parsimony in models and simulations has both 
ontological and theoretical elements, but is most productively treated as a distinct 
category. These vary widely in terms of the questions asked and the implementation of 
the computer simulations. Parsimony in this context applies to the model that the 
simulation is testing, and the measure of the simplicity of this model can take numerous 
forms. One common form is in terms of the number of rules that the simulated animal is 
employing. Another measure of the simplicity of the model is closer to theoretical 
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parsimony insofar as a model is said to be simple if it represents allegedly simple 
cognitive processes.  
First, consider an example of the preference for cognitive models that represent 
simpler processes. Crystal and Foote‘s (2009) analysis of earlier tests for metacognition 
includes a section on simulated cognitive models. The model, in this case, is of 
uncertainty-monitoring behavior. They write: 
The main issue [in their paper] is the appropriateness of appealing to a complex 
proposal (i.e., metacognition). Thus, the purpose of testing a less complex 
proposal … is to determine if the output of the model can account for the data. If 
the output of the model accounts for the data, then it is not appropriate to select 
the more complex proposal to explain the [observed behavioral] data (absent an 
independent line of evidence that cannot be explained by the low-level model). 
(Crystal and Foote 2009, 10; emphases added) 
In other words, if two cognitive models produce simulated behaviors that track the 
observed behaviors equally well, then we must choose the cognitive model that is the 
least complex. Note that metacognition is the more complex model ex hypothesi than a 
so-called ―low-level‖ model. For Crystal and Foote, a low-level model is a model that 
represents the simplest cognitive processes (Crystal and Foote 2009, 2). For their 
purposes, cognitive processes include representations, which can be either ―primary‖ or 
―secondary,‖ where a primary representation is ―an internal representation of the 
stimulus‖ to which the ―presentation of a stimulus gives rise‖ (ibid). A secondary 
representation is a ―representation which operates on a primary representation,‖ and is 
how they understand metacognition (ibid). They expand on this definition with reference 
to their interpretation of Carruthers (2008), writing that ―first-order explanations are 
representations about stimuli in the world (i.e., beliefs about the world), whereas 
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metacognition involves representations about beliefs (i.e., knowing that you hold a 
particular belief‖ (Crystal and Foote 2009, 1). The question of what exactly it means for a 
representation to ―operate on‖ another representation is not directly addressed in the 2009 
paper. Whatever it means, this view appears to be causal, mirroring Sober‘s (1998) 
suggestion that first-order intentional states may cause second-order intentional states. 
Despite the similarity, there is no evidence to suppose that Crystal and Foote had Sober‘s 
causal account in mind.  
Similarly, Cruse and Wehner (2011) turn to simulations to resolve the debate over 
whether ants and bees navigate using representations, such as mental maps, or through a 
non-representational means. ―Mental maps‖ are representations of an organism‘s 
environment, and serve as one type of explanation for the navigational abilities of insects: 
the insect identifies features of its environment and compares it against a mental map of 
the known terrain, which allows it to generate a flight or walking path. In their study, 
Cruse and Wehner assume that a representational system requires centralized processing 
of peripheral information, whereas a non-representational system is decentralized, with 
each element in the periphery responding without transferring information to the other. 
On their model, decentralized information from disparate systems within a given insect – 
i.e., information acquired from various perceptual modalities – is processed 
independently to produce apparently coordinated behavior. On Cruse and Wehner‘s 
rendering of the mental map model, information from disparate systems is integrated into 
a central representation, or a ―mental map,‖ which produces coordinated behavior. They 
found that their decentralized model can reproduce the apparently flexible behaviors of 
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the ants and bees, concluding that, since both models capture the behavioral phenomena 
equally well, but the mental map model contains an additional component (the central 
processing system), there is ―no need for a cognitive map.‖ They write, 
In the present account we … design an architecture that allows us to test whether 
a distributed network based on the main experimental results obtained in the study 
of desert ant navigation is able to simulate the behavioural performances of ants 
and bees – and especially those performances that have not been used in 
designing the architecture. If such a solution was definitely found, a cognitive 
interpretation could be given up as it represents a more complex hypothesis. If no 
such solution was found, the probability for the existence of a cognitive map 
would increase. (Cruse and Wehner 2011, 2; emphasis added)  
 
Their title reflects this conclusion: ―No Need for a Cognitive Map: Decentralized 
Memory for Insect Navigation.‖ The phrase, ―no need,‖ in this context is an expression of 
the principle that cognitive complexity should only be posited when simpler mechanisms 
cannot account for the behavior – i.e., an expression of Cognitive Conservatism. Similar 
claims take the form of ―non-necessity‖ of postulating more putatively complex cognition 
when simpler explanations are available. 
An example of the rule-minimizing version of parsimony in cognitive models 
comes from Bell & Pellis‘ (2009) simulation of rats‘ theft-aversion behavior. Rats are 
social animals who regularly steal food from one another. In order to avoid having their 
food stolen by others, rats perform a number of evasive maneuvers. Bell and Pellis set out 
to model these maneuvers and, simultaneously, to test a cognitive model underlying this 
behavior. They took careful measures of real rats and compared these with the 
corresponding distances in their simulated rats. The simulated rats used a simple 
distance-invariance rule to guide their actions (i.e., the rule to keep their noses a fixed 
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distance apart), and appeared to behave just as real rats. Bell and Pellis concluded that 
rats only need to keep track of this single variable (the distance between noses) in order 
to execute the observed behaviors during theft-avoidance. This cognitive model is, 
arguably, a how-possibly model of rats‘ actual behavior. However, the authors of this 
study argue that while the successful replication of the real world behaviors using their 
model does not prove that rats in fact employ this computational strategy, it does suggest 
that more complex rule-following strategies are not necessary. But recall that such non-
necessity claims are a feature of Cognitive Conservatism.  
Similarly, van der Vaart et al. (2012) propose a model of food-caching behavior 
in jays, a species known to cache food in the wild and to have performed with aplomb on 
episodic-like memory tasks (Clayton & Dickinson 1998, Emery 2006)37. Van der Vaart et 
al. cite ―simplicity‖ as a desideratum of an hypothesis, writing on the subject of theory of 
mind in corvids that:  
a reason to favor [a] ‗prior learning hypothesis‘ is that it seems cognitively 
simpler than ‗theory of mind‘; it does not require corvids to be capable of mental 
state attribution, which is a controversial claim for all species other than humans. 
(Van der Vaart et al. 2012, 1)  
However, because the prior learning hypothesis may carry a heavy cognitive burden as 
well, they propose an alternative model of jay caching behavior based on one rule: cache 
more when stressed. They then run a simulation that shows that this one rule produces the 
same behavior in the simulated birds as was observed in the live birds. This simulation, 
                                                          
37
 The evidence for episodic-like memory in jays is extensive, and Nicola Clayton is one 
of its pioneers.  Some of the earliest findings are published in: Clayton & Anthony 
(1998). For a review of avian cognition, which argues that corvids such as crows and jays 
and parrots are some of the most cognitively sophisticated birds see Emery (2006).  
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being ―simple,‖ is used as evidence against the metacognitive explanation. The obvious 
objection to this conclusion is that their model is perfectly compatible with a 
metacognitive explanation – after all, some human behaviors can also be replicated using 
a stress model, but the stress model is only one small part of the story.  Moreover, the 
stress model in jays may even require a metacognitive account to explain why birds in 
close proximity to one another should experience stress in the first place. 
Van der Vaart et al. appear to be appealing to ontological parsimony and 
parsimony-as-coherence to suggest that their simulation is likely to be an approximately 
true description of scrubjay cognitive systems. By contrast, Bell & Pellis recognize that 
further reasons are required to show that their non-necessity claim is evidence for the 
accuracy of their model. They appear to admit, in other words, that the mere simplicity of 
their model does not currently increase the probability of the model being a true 
description. However, they leave open the possibility that a story might be provided that 
would lend simplicity this evidentiary weight.  
There are more general problems with considering simplicity or parsimony to be 
an epistemic virtue in a cognitive model when parsimony in models recommends 
reducing the number of rules. Namely, these rules are features of the surface grammar of 
a model, and further unpacking these rules or parameters can sometimes reveal a great 
deal of complexity. I discuss these and additional problems with parsimony in models 
and simulations in Chapter 4.  
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Conclusion 
The above list of parsimony definitions may not be exhaustive, and some appeals to 
parsimony may have more than one interpretation. What I wish to note is that the 
taxonomy makes clear that more often than not, multiple versions of parsimony are 
operating in parallel. For example, the CC is a kind of parsimony principle insofar as it is 
a behavioral rule for choosing among hypotheses. It is, in fact, a version of theoretical 
parsimony. However, how CC is spelled out depends on what the hypotheses take to be 
the relevant notions of parsimony.  
2.2 Against Justifications of Parsimony in Comparative Cognition 
I now turn to earlier analyses of the justifications of the presence of parsimony in 
comparative cognition. As I mentioned in Chapter 1, most of these earlier analyses seek 
to offer an account of parsimony in comparative cognition that either defends or rejects 
the parsimony interpretation of MC and, second, asks whether a parsimony justification 
of MC is reasonable for comparative cognition. In this section, I present, and briefly 
assess, four analyses of parsimony in comparative cognition.  
Recall that the vast majority of the comparative cognition community continues to 
treat parsimony and simplicity as bearing independent epistemic weight, or providing 
independent evidence for the truth of a hypothesis. Earlier analyses of parsimony have 
taken this presumption as a starting point. Some reject the view that parsimony confers 
independent epistemic weight on an hypothesis, while others seek to reposition 
parsimony from an epistemic value to a practical one – useful for prediction. Sober 
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(2009) takes the latter approach, arguing that parsimony, interpreted as the number of 
adjustable parameters in a model, confers greater predictive accuracy on a model (§2.2). 
Sober concludes that this increase in predictive accuracy does not, however, correspond 
to an increased likelihood of the model accurately describing its target system. By 
contrast, Simon Fitzpatrick (2009) argues that parsimony does not have any independent 
epistemic value. On his view, appeals to parsimony can be legitimate only when 
interpreted as stand-ins for appeals to other kinds of evidence. In fact, Fitzpatrick‘s 
conclusion draws on Sober‘s earlier (1998, 2005) claims that ―invocations of parsimony 
in science often should be viewed as expressions of subject-matter-specific background 
theories‖ (Sober 2009). Both of these accounts focus on what I have been calling 
theoretical parsimony. Sober (2012) asks whether parsimony considerations can support 
evolutionary arguments in favor of assuming homologous proximate (cognitive) 
mechanisms for similar behavior between members of closely related species. He 
concludes that although cladistic parsimony does support the above conclusion, cladistic 
parsimony is a questionable heuristic, and a much better supporting theory comes from 
Reichenbach‘s causal account of evidence. Finally, Sober (1998, 2005) and Andrews 
(2009, 2011) present a version of CC that places the discussion in statistical hypothesis-
testing terms. I present this view last, in §2.2.4, and expand on it in the following chapter, 
where I argue that the statistical hypothesis-testing framework makes it possible to see a 
crucial entry-point for what I have been calling ontological parsimony. I turn now to each 
of these analyses.  
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2.2.1 Fitzpatrick’s Deflationary Treatment 
Simon Fitzpatrick (2009) offers a deflationary treatment of parsimony or simplicity.
38
 His 
account rejects the view that parsimony has independent epistemic weight, as it is 
assumed to have. On his view, parsimony appeals have evidentiary weight in virtue of the 
background information on which they implicitly draw. As he puts it,  
[The] deflationary account… denies that simplicity should be seen as a 
general theoretical virtue and criterion for theory choice in its own right. 
… Where we do seem to be justified in preferring theories that are 
‗simpler‘ in some particular respect, some other consideration is doing the 
real epistemic work. Typically [these] are various background theoretical 
considerations. (Fitzpatrick 2009, 269)  
Fitzpatrick argues that, by looking at the background considerations, his deflationary 
account can help resolve the confusion that occurs when researchers who implicitly draw 
on different senses of parsimony reach incompatible conclusions about the same set of 
data.  
Fitzpatrick uses as his case study the tests of mindreading, or interpreting others‘ 
behavior in terms of their mental states, in chimpanzees, that were conducted by Hare et 
al. (2000, 2001), challenged by Daniel Povinelli and Jennifer Vonk (2006), and defended 
by Tomasello and Call (2006). The experiments in question tested chimpanzees for the 
ability to adopt the perspective of another chimpanzee by setting up an opportunity for a 
subordinate chimpanzee to acquire food in the presence of a dominant chimpanzee. Since 
subordinates will not take food that a dominant chimpanzee desires when the dominant is 
clearly in a position to take it, Hare et al. hypothesized that if the subordinate chimpanzee 
                                                          
38
 Fitzpatrick uses these interchangeably, following the standard in comparative 
cognition. 
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avoided taking food that a dominant could see, but took the food that was visible to the 
dominant, then it was reasoning based on an understanding of the dominant‘s visual 
perspective.  
In their experiments, Hare et al. (2001) tested the first part of this hypothesis – 
namely, whether a subordinate chimpanzee took food that the dominant could not see. 
The experiments involved setting up a barrier between the dominant and the subordinate 
chimpanzees, which blocked visual access to a piece of food for the dominant but not for 
the subordinate subject (See Figure 2.1).  
Figure 2.1 Chimpanzee theory of mind experimental setup 
 
Figure 2.1: The subordinate chimpanzee has visual access to a piece of food, but the dominant does not. The 
experiments tests whether the subordinate understands that the dominant does not have visual access to the piece of 
food. Image from Hare et al. (2001). 
An additional piece of food was visible to both. Hare et al. found that the subordinate 
chimpanzee took the food that was blocked from the dominant‘s view, but did not take 
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the food when the dominant could see it. After conducting follow-up trials that controlled 
for possible confounds, they concluded that the subordinate was capable of visual 
perspective-taking, or reasoning about the visual perspective of another. Visual 
perspective-taking is considered to be a kind of mindreading, and therefore a relatively 
sophisticated form of cognition. This conclusion was soon challenged.  
The challenge came in the form of a re-interpretation of the results. Povinelli and 
Vonk (2004, 2006) contended that Hare et al. were not entitled to their conclusion 
because an allegedly more parsimonious interpretation was available: namely, the 
chimpanzees may not have been mindreading, but merely ―behavior-reading,‖ or 
adjusting their actions based on behavioral cues from the dominant (Povinelli and Vonk 
2006; Penn and Povinelli 2007). Both explanatory models of the chimpanzees‘ behavior, 
the mind-reading model and a behavior-reading model, are empirically adequate. 
However, Povinelli and Vonk argued that the behavior-reading hypothesis is more 
parsimonious because it requires only a representation of behavior rather than a 
representation of behavior plus a representation of the dominant‘s perspective. Tomasello 
and Call (2006) responded to the appeal to parsimony by providing a parsimony-based 
argument of their own, which spoke in favor of the mindreading hypothesis. They argued 
that the behavior-reading hypothesis appears ad hoc, since it requires postulating that the 
animals must use a different rule for every alteration to the physical environment, 
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whereas acting based on knowledge of the others‘ perspective requires applying this 
single concept to a broad range of cases.39   
As Fitzpatrick rightly notes, the two appeals to parsimony/simplicity, actually 
have different meanings. Tomasello and Call draw on what Fitzpatrick calls ―simplicity 
as psychological unity‖ because this view prefers explanations that limit the number of 
rules that a cognitive system must implement. Povinelli and Vonk, according to 
Fitzpatrick, instead rely on a version of simplicity that he (somewhat confusingly) calls 
―simplicity as parsimony of mental representation,‖ because their view entails a 
preference for lower-order representations. Importantly, representations are assumed to 
be easily categorized into a hierarchy: an organism that can only represent the world is 
cognitively simpler than an organism that can represent another representation. 
Fitzpatrick does not, however, explain what a representation is, or why representational 
states can be hierarchically ordered.
40
 This aside, Fitzpatrick‘s point – that Tomasello and 
Call are drawing on a different notion of parsimony/simplicity than Povinelli and Vonk – 
is correct.  
 After providing an analysis of the background assumptions that attend both of 
these versions of parsimony, Fitzpatrick concludes that: 
In both the anti-behaviorist argument and the reading of Tomasello and 
Call‘s argument I am proposing, it is clear that what is doing the real 
                                                          
39
 For an objection to Povinelli and Vonk (2004) see Andrews (2005). 
40
 One may argue, on Fitzpatrick‘s behalf, that offering an account of representation is 
not Fitzpatrick‘s goal, and that he is working within the dubious ontology of 
representational hierarchies that the researchers he describes prefer.  
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epistemic work is not the ―simplicity‖ of behaviorist versus cognitive, or 
behavior-reading versus mindreading explanations per se … Rather, it is a 
set of background assumptions concerning the previous experiences  (or 
innate endowments) of subjects that [according to Fitzpatrick] casts doubt 
on the plausibility of the kind of story that behaviorist/behavior-reading 
accounts have to tell in order to account for data… The justification for 
these arguments depends not on a general justification for preferring 
simple theories to less simple ones, but rather on the justification for the 
relevant background assumptions. (Fitzpatrick 2009, 274) 
In other words, Fitzpatrick recommends taking a deflationary approach to parsimony 
claims by reducing each to the set of background assumptions, and then adjudicating 
between competing explanatory theories based on this information.  
I agree with Fitzpatrick that parsimony does provide additional evidential support 
when these appeals are understood as appeals to warrant-carrying background 
information. However, I suggest that ontological parsimony could carry epistemic weight 
if the ontology were empirically informed. For example, if it had been true that natural 
selection tended to favor cognitive simplicity, then preferring a simpler cognitive model 
over a more complex one would, ceteris paribus, be warranted, provided that ―cognitive 
simplicity‖ is a coherent or useful concept. One might argue on Fitzpatrick‘s behalf that 
appealing to background information in order to ground the simpler ontology is no 
different from his deflationary proposal. The question turns on whether grounding a 
claim in something is equivalent to reducing it to those grounds. I suspect that it is not, 
but confess that whether the difference is merely semantic is not an important question 
for my project. My purpose is not to provide a new theory of parsimony but to uncover 
how it functions in comparative psychology. In this sense, my account is not identical 
with, but is inspired by Fitzpatrick‘s plea to assume a plurality of context-relative 
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meanings of parsimony and to seek these in the details of theoretical considerations that 
bear on specific cases.  
 
2.2.2 Sober’s Revisions: A New Take on Cladistic Parsimony and Parsimony in 
Akaike’s Model-Selection Framework 
 
Sober has offered numerous analyses of the nature and utility of parsimony, especially as 
this term is deployed in comparative cognition. In this section, I discuss two of these. In 
the first, Sober (2009) argues that parsimony can be a deciding factor between two 
hypotheses under some circumstances. However, in these instances, parsimony does not 
support the Cognitive Conservatist (CC) conclusions, nor is it intended to support it. 
Thus, the lessons that emerge from Sober (2009) do not aid in resolving the controversy 
in comparative cognition. By contrast, Sober (2012) offers a helpful analysis of one of the 
standard parsimony-based arguments against versions of CC, namely cladistic 
parsimony, and rejects it in favor of a different evolutionary claim in favor of rejecting a 
principle like CC. He offers an assessment of the inference about cognitive mechanisms 
from behavioral data combined with information about phylogeny.  
Sober’s revision A: Parsimony as the number of open parameters in the Model 
Selection Framework 
In one of his numerous essays on the subject of parsimony and animal cognition, Sober 
sets out to challenge the view that he calls the principle of conservatism, which I have 
been calling PC. Recall that PC states: 
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(PC)  hypotheses that explain an organism’s behavior by attributing lower-
order intentionality are preferable to hypotheses that explain the 
behavior by attributing higher-order intentionality. (Sober 2009, 237) 
  
PC is a call for parsimony insofar as it recommends hypotheses that impute the lowest-
order of intentionality. However, it is not yet clear whether the notion of parsimony in 
play is ontological parsimony or theoretical parsimony, and whether the theoretical 
parsimony in question has ontological commitments – that is, whether the theory or 
hypothesis should be interpreted along realist lines. Whether these are features of the 
organism or features of a theory or model of the organism (or both) depends on how 
Dennett‘s three-way distinction is interpreted. As Sober notes, philosophers have 
interpreted Dennett as an anti-realist about the mind, despite Dennett‘s own protestations, 
while cognitive scientists have adopted the distinction as a useful tool (ibid). Sober‘s own 
view is that ―instrumentalism about models of beliefs and desires does not entail 
instrumentalism about beliefs and desires‖ (Sober 2009, 257).  
Sober begins by showing that PC is not justified by the axioms of probability or 
one kind of Bayesian reformulation, as these approaches would be insensitive to 
empirical data and ungrounded, respectively (Sober 2009, 241). He similarly dismisses 
―frequency data,‖ noting that information about the frequencies of types of intentionality 
is incompatible with Morgan‘s intentions, as MC was meant to be an a priori principle 
(ibid). Instead, he proposes a reformulation of PC into model-selection terms, calling it an 
―improvement‖ to the PC (ibid). Next, I summarize his improved PC (PCSober), noting 
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how the version of parsimony that emerged from Sober‘s account differs from the PC and 
from CC. 
Sober‘s revision of the PC requires reinterpreting the PC in light of the Akaike 
model selection theory, on which the goal of model selection is predictive accuracy. A 
model, M, is scored for projected predictive accuracy according to the following formula 
(Sober 2009, 243):  
log{Pr[data | L(M)]} – k 
L(M) is the instantiation of a model, M, and ―k  is the number of adjustable parameters in 
M; it measures the model‘s complexity‖ (ibid). This formula is used in the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) to score competing models. In other words, model A is 
simpler or more parsimonious than model B if A has fewer adjustable parameters – i.e., a 
smaller value for k –than B. A starts with an advantage over B, but fit-to-data, measured 
by log{Pr[data | L(M)]}is also a factor in determining predictive accuracy. As Sober puts 
it, ―more complex models will have higher values for log{Pr[data | L(M)]}, but they will 
incur a larger penalty by virtue of having a larger value for k‖ (Sober 2009, 243-44). 
According to Sober, this equation explains why false models can still be predictively 
accurate: Suppose A has a k value of 1 and a log{Pr[data | L(M)]} value of -.7. Thus, A is 
highly idealized, but very parsimonious. Suppose that another model, B, has a k value of 
7 and a log{Pr[data | L(M)]} value of -.1. B is unparsimonious but less idealized. Thus, 
A‘s predictive accuracy score is -1.7 and B‘s predictive accuracy projection score is -7.1. 
Thus, a highly idealized model, A, has a higher projected predictive accuracy score than 
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B, even though B has a better fit-to-data score. Note that since the goal of model selection 
is to identify the most predictively accurate model and not truth, and since false models 
can still be predictively accurate, the AIC is instrumentalist. It would appear that the 
notion of parsimony in play is not ontological after all – it is closest to what I have called 
theoretical parsimony.  
 Sober goes on to apply the AIC to the question of parsimony in models of animal 
cognition. In model-selection terms, the new PC reads as follows: 
(PCSober) A model that postulates only lower-order intentionality (using 
n parameters to do so) is better than a model that postulates 
both lower-order intentionality (using n parameters) and 
higher-order intentionality (using m additional parameters).  
(Sober 2009, 248) 
―However,‖ he notes, ―if introducing higher-level intentionality permits one to have 
fewer parameters overall while still fitting the data equally well, parsimony will speak in 
favor of introducing higher-order intentionality‖ (ibid). Parsimony, in this case, still 
refers to the value of k. Note that this formulation is employing putatively ontological 
parsimony (orders of intentionality) and theoretical parsimony (number of adjustable 
parameters in a model), although only the former plays an active role.
 41  
                                                          
41
 Sober‘s conclusion in favor of a recast version of parsimony is in contrast with his 
earlier work. In his 1998 article on deciding between what he called ―mentalistic‖ and 
―behaviorist‖  explanatory models of animal behavior, Sober provides an account of 
when it is appropriate to choose a model of animal cognition that postulates intervening 
variables (between environmental input and behavioral output). He argues that deciding 
between a ―mentalistic‖ model and a ―behavioristic‖ model is an instance of the general 
issue of black-box inference. The former assumes intervening variables between the input 
(environmental cues) and output (behavior). The latter assumes no intervening variables 
between environmental inputs and behavioral outputs. He argues that the question of 
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 Next, Sober applies PCSober to a case study in comparative cognition. He uses the 
Hare et al. trials described in § 2.2 to argue that model selection theory can speak in favor 
of the higher-order interpretation, which is the mindreading interpretation, and against the 
lower-order behavior-reading interpretation (Sober 2009, 252). The reason for this is that 
the behavior-reading interpretation requires the development of multiple models with 
additional adjustable parameters, while the mindreading model requires only a single 
model with two adjustable parameters (ibid).
42
 This conclusion is similar to Fitzpatrick‘s 
characterization of Tomasello and Call‘s argument for a more unified psychology insofar 
as both show the benefits of unity. There is, however, a crucial difference: in Sober‘s 
example, what is unified is not the animals‘ psychology but the model. Sober concludes 
by noting that while the model selection framework is instrumentalist for models, it is not 
instrumentalist or anti-realist for either non-model propositions or for fitted models – that 
is, instantiations of a model. 
PCSober is a model-selection principle for comparative cognition that conflicts 
with CC insofar as it operates within an instrumentalist framework, and inasmuch as it 
allows for the possibility that an explanation positing more sophisticated or complex 
cognition is preferred to an explanation positing less complex cognition, all else being 
equal. Moreover, to the extent that PCSober focuses on orders of intentionality, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
parsimony, interpreted as the number of adjustable parameters in a model, is not relevant 
to whether researchers ought to choose an intervening variable model over a no-
intervening variable model.  
42
 In fact, the mindreading model may have fewer adjustable parameters, if, for instance, 
one rejects the assumption that second-order intentionality requires first-order 
intentionality. 
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narrower in scope than CC, which includes systems, mechanisms, and processes in 
addition to orders of intentionality.  
Sober’s Revision B: Conservatism About Cognition and Evolutionarily Conserved 
Features 
Sober‘s second analysis of a parsimony appeal in comparative cognition comes down to 
an analysis of the evolutionary arguments in favor of CC‘s opposite. As he writes, ―My 
project here is not to inquire further into the justifications of Morgan‘s canon, but to 
consider an evolutionary argument for something like the canon‘s mirror image‖ (Sober 
2012, 229). This mirror-image claim comes from De Waal‘s argument that ―The most 
parsimonious assumption concerning nonhuman primates is that if their behavior 
resembles human behavior the psychological and mental processes involved are probably 
similar too (De Waal 1991, 316. in Sober 2012, 229). It states:  
[If] human beings and a closely related species (e.g., chimpanzees) both exhibit 
behavior B, and if human beings produce B by occupying mental state M, then 
this is evidence that M is also the proximate mechanism that chimpanzees deploy 
in producing B. (Sober, 230) 
Put in terms of Bayesian confirmation theory, this claim reads (ibid): 
PrA (chimpanzees have M | humans have M) > PrA(chimpanzees have M)    
―A‖ means that the ―probabilities are assigned on the assumption that A is true‖ (ibid). In 
the example above, A is the assumption that humans and chimpanzees share a behavioral 
trait, B. Sober argues that this position can be defended on cladistic parsimony grounds, 
as is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Since chimpanzees and humans are closely related, and 
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since humans and chimpanzees both perform B, the most parsimonious assumption is that 
the most recent common ancestor also performed B. Since humans perform B by 
employing M, it is most parsimonious to assign M to both the most recent common 
ancestor and to the chimpanzees.
43
  
Figure 2.2 Cladistic parsimony and attributions of ancestral or derived traits 
Figure 2: This image is replicated from Sober (2005), with the black hash mark representing the point where a change 
in character state occurred. This diagram shows that both hypotheses (a) and (b) are equally parsimonious in the sense 
of cladistic parsimony. Sober writes, ―Given just that human beings have the derived character state D, (a) assigning 
the derived character state D to dogs and (b) assigning the ancestral character state A to dogs are equally parsimonious‖ 
(Sober 2005, 93). 
Sober notes that cladistic parsimony is difficult to justify. Nevertheless, he argues, the 
proposition above can also be defended on grounds unrelated to cladistic or any other 
type of parsimony (Sober 2012, 232). His solution relies on Hans Reichenbach‘s model 
of causation, on which two effects issuing from a common cause are likely to be 
positively correlated (Sober 2012, 233). Substituting the common ancestor for a common 
cause and humans and chimpanzees for the ―effects,‖ Sober concludes that 
Reichenbach‘s causal model supports Sober‘s Anti-Canon. However, this Anti-Canon 
does not, as Sober concludes, tell us just how much more likely it is that similar behaviors 
                                                          
43
 This is illustrated further in Figure 1A in the appendix.  
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exhibited by closely related species are produced by the same proximate mechanism than 
that the behavior is produced by different proximate mechanisms. Moreover, 
independently of its plausibility, Sober‘s analysis does not track the usage of ‗parsimony‘ 
in comparative cognition, but rejects the common parsimony-based version of MC and 
the CC, which amounts to a rejection of theoretical and ontological parsimony.   
2.2.3 Sober and Andrews on the Neyman-Pearson Method  
 
In addition to the revisionary analyses of parsimony, Sober (2005) has also argued 
against interpreting Morgan‘s Canon as a parsimony principle. In this analysis, he 
focused on the statistical system used by comparative cognition researchers, namely the 
Neyman-Pearson Method (NPM) of hypothesis testing. Although he does not cast the 
NPM as a source of parsimony bias, he does take it to be the source of a bias like the one 
in CC. Andrews (2009, 2011) draws a similar conclusion about the damaging 
consequences of the NPM, though her worry is over the misapplication of the NPM in 
comparative cognition. Despite their differences, both Sober and Andrews take issue with 
the same feature of the NPM: the preference for one kind of error over another. I agree 
that this feature poses a problem, but argue that it is only a problem when a different 
feature of the NPM – the null hypothesis (H0) – is defined using an Occamist parsimony 
principle. Let us now take a look at the NPM and at Sober‘s and Andrews‘s criticisms of 
this method and its application in comparative cognition.  
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A. Neyman-Pearson Method 
Comparative cognition uses the Neyman-Pearson Method of hypothesis testing 
for statistically evaluating experimental data. The NPM is what is known as a frequentist 
statistical method. Frequentist methods aim to ―provide a reliable decision procedure with 
controlled long term error rates‖ (Dienes 2008, 148). Two other statistical methods – or, 
what the statistician and psychologist Zoltan Dienes calls ―schools of inference‖ – are 
Bayesian and likelihoodist (ibid). These aim to ―indicate how prior probabilities should 
be changed by data‖ and to ‗indicate relative strength of evidence‖ (ibid). Although the 
NPM is not the only statistical system available to science, it is the orthodoxy in 
psychology.44 Since comparative psychology, a branch of psychology, is one of the two 
dominant subdisciplines in comparative cognition, it is not surprising that the NPM is 
also the orthodoxy in comparative cognition.  The refusal to move to a Bayesian 
statistical system for devising features of experimental protocols and interpreting 
experimental results may be seen as an instance of what I have called agential parsimony.   
The NPM is a method for controlling the error-rates (long-run relative 
frequencies) of two types of errors, which are labeled Type I errors and Type II errors. 
Type I errors, in general, are defined as those that are most serious. In the Neyman-
Pearson tradition, the assumption is that the most serious type of error is the one that 
                                                          
44
 For challenges to the orthodoxy of the NPM, see Kruschke (2010), who advocates 
replacing it with Bayesian analysis, and Anderson et al. (2000), who favor a version of 
likelihoodist methods to the allegedly ―unscientific‖ null hypothesis testing methods. In 
philosophy, the NPM is taken for granted to such an extent that few philosophers outside 
of the philosophy of statistics have seen it worthwhile to defend its place as the default 
instrument of data analysis (but see Mayo 1981, 1992). 
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rejects the null hypothesis (H0) when the H0 is true. Within this paradigm, accepting the 
H0 when it is false is a Type II error, and it is treated as less serious. Type I error rates are 
denoted as α and Type II error rates as β. To modify slightly Dienes‘ (2008) 
formalization of the relationship between error types and their relative frequencies, we 
may say that 
α =def P(rejecting H0H0) 
β =def P(accepting H0 ¬H0). 
Dienes notes that α is not merely the probability of rejecting a true H0 over the course of 
all trials (including trials in which the H0 was false). Rather, α is ―the probability (long-
run relative frequency)‖ of rejecting a true H0 over the course of the subset of trials in 
which the H0 was in fact true (Dienes 2008, 63; original emphasis).   
α is also known as the significance of a test, and obtaining a statistical result, 
called a p-value,45 within the range of α means that the results of the test are statistically 
significant.46 Experimental results with p-values at or below significance allow the H0 to 
be rejected. However, controlling for α is not enough: β must also be controlled, and 
controlling for β is a separate procedure from controlling for α (Dienes 2008, 66-67). The 
―power‖ of a test is defined as ―1- β,‖ and corresponds to ―the probability of detecting an 
effect, given an effect really exists in the population‖ (ibid). This can be formalized as: 
                                                          
45
 A p-value literally means ―probability‖ value, though its actual meaning is a source of 
vigorous debate: it is not, for example, a measure of the probability of the hypothesis 
being true, or even of the  probability that the results obtained were not due to chance. 
46
 The statistical significance of a test is not an indication of the probability of the truth of 
the alternative (non-null) hypothesis, although it is often interpreted this way. 
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Power =def P(reject H0¬H0) 
The power of the test must be high before one is entitled to accept a null hypothesis when 
obtaining a null result (Dienes 2008). Dienes writes that: 
In the Neyman-Pearson approach, you set power at a high level in designing the 
experiment, before you run it. Then you are entitled to accept
47
 the null 
hypothesis when you obtain a null result. In following this procedure you will 
make errors at a small controlled rate, a rate you have decided is acceptable to 
you. (Dienes 2008, 66-7; original emphasis) 
In other words, tests may have small p-values (high significance), but these cannot allow 
one to conclude in favor of the H0 unless β is also small (i.e., the power is high).  
Although the NPM provides a means for controlling error rates in a way that 
minimizes the risk of making both types of errors, researchers have traditionally set the 
risk of a Type I errors lower than Type II errors. Typical values for α are .05, .01, and 
sometimes .001. Treating Type I errors as more serious translates into controlling for 
Type I errors by making α very small, while keeping β either large or not controlled at all.  
B. Sober (2005) and Andrews (2011) and Critiques of the NPM 
 
Sober (2005) rejects the parsimony-based interpretation of MC, and suggests that even 
the most faithful modern reinterpretation of MC does not issue in a parsimony principle. 
According to Sober, MC was not a simplicity principle, since Morgan believed that ―the 
simplest hypothesis would be that other organisms are just like us‖ (Sober 2005, 88). 
                                                          
47
 Statisticians differ about the precise meaning of ―acceptance,‖ although most note that 
frequentist methods do not permit the inference to the truth or likelihood of truth of a 
single test.    
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Instead, it was an anti-anthropomorphism principle, which Morgan tried to ground in 
evolutionary theory. However, Morgan drew on a since-discredited view of evolution – 
Herbert Spencer‘s progressivist view, on which evolution progressed toward more 
complex or ―higher‖ forms of life, with humans at the apex. In order to rescue Morgan 
while grounding the anti-anthropomorphism of MC in modern evolutionary theory Sober 
considers a new MC. The revised MC (MCSober) replaces ―higher‖ and ―lower‖ with 
―derived‖ and ―ancestral‖ as follows: 
(MCSober) In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of 
a derived feature if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise 
of an ancestral feature.  
Sober argues that this reinterpretation (1) leads to a conclusion different from Morgan‘s 
intention of providing a safeguard against the bias of anthropomorphism, (2) is in conflict 
with cladistic parsimony, and (3) finds no justification in evolutionary theory. Modern 
evolutionary theory does not license the inference in MCSober. If we wish to know 
whether an existing animal species possesses a cognitive feature that humans are known 
to possess and which we know to be derived (relative to the animal under investigation), 
or whether it merely possesses the ancestral trait, and if no additional information 
regarding common ancestry is available, then using cladistic parsimony leads to the 
conclusion that both inferences are equally parsimonious (Sober 2005). Take the example 
of planning in chimpanzees and humans: if all that is known is that humans plan through 
imagining themselves into the future, then it is as parsimonious to assume that 
chimpanzees also use prospective imagining when they as it is to assume that 
chimpanzees use some other mechanism to plan. However, if it is known that both 
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chimpanzees and humans are both capable of planning and planning is known to be 
derived from the most recent common ancestor (see Figure 2A, in appendix), then 
parsimony recommends treating  planning as homologous48 rather than as a homoplasy.49  
But, with respect to cladistic parsimony, if planning is a homology then, ceteris paribus, 
the underlying proximate mechanisms in both humans and chimpanzees should be the 
same – in this case, that mechanism is prospective imagining. Therefore, according to 
Sober, replacing ―higher‖ and ―lower‖ with ―derived‖ and ―ancestral,‖ respectively, 
would recommend attributing the same underlying mechanisms whenever two species 
both possess a behavioral trait that was derived from a recent common ancestor. This, 
however, is precisely the opposite of the conclusion Morgan intended. 50  
Nor does MCSober sanction the goal of anti-anthropomorphism. ―There is no 
evolutionary presumption,‖ writes Sober, ―in favor of assuming that nonhuman 
organisms differ from human beings, either in terms of their mental or their nonmental 
characteristics‖ (Sober 2005, 96). This conclusion – that even the most plausible modern 
version of MC fails to be justified evolutionarily – is intended as an argument against 
anti-anthropomorphism by means of something like CC.  
                                                          
48
 A homology is ―a similarity inherited from a common ancestor‖ (Sober 2005, 94). 
49
 A homoplasy is ―a similarity that is the result of two or more independent derivations 
of the trait‖ (ibid).  
50
  However, it may turn out that homologous traits may be underwritten by homoplastic 
or even divergent mechanisms. It is now clear that we cannot reliably infer common 
developmental mechanisms from the fact that a trait is taxically homologous (Wagner 
2007). Furthermore, as Powell and Shea (under review) argue, behavioral homology 
relations can be preserved notwithstanding a complete turnover in the underlying 
developmental mechanisms of a trait in one or both lineages, and despite even a shift in 
the inheritance system (genetic, cultural, etc.) through which the trait is transmitted. 
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After arguing that MC cannot be resuscitated using modern terminology, Sober 
concludes that the ―type-1 error of mistaken anthropomorphism‖ and the ―type-2 error of 
mistaken anthropodenial‖ are equally undesirable (Sober 2005, 97). He advocates ridding 
the field entirely of the error-rate asymmetry, arguing that, ―the best way to minimize the 
risk of both types of error is not to embrace an a priori prejudice. The only prophylactic 
we need is empiricism‖ (ibid; emphasis in original). Note that Sober‘s recommendation 
to embrace empiricism is, effectively, a rejection of a priori prejudices. Such prejudices 
include parsimony-grounded prejudices, such as the one embedded in CC. That Sober 
chooses to frame the issue of prejudice in terms of the error-rate asymmetry suggests that 
the prejudice is occurring at the experimental level. Moreover, the error-rate asymmetry 
is a feature of hypothesis-testing methods, most often used in statistics. I explore this 
suggestion in the remainder of the dissertation. The general point that Sober makes is that 
the error-rate asymmetry, as it cashes out in animal cognition terms, is a ―maxim of 
‗default reasoning,‘‖ and one that has no a priori justification.  
Building on Sober‘s work, Andrews (2011) also identifies the preference for 
guarding against Type I errors with an exaggerated and damaging worry over 
anthropomorphism. However, she takes the statistical language a step further, writing that 
the null hypothesis in comparative psychology is that the animals lack the cognitive 
property under investigation. Since a Type I error is the error of rejecting a true null 
hypothesis, avoiding this error means erring on the side of denying that an animal has the 
mental property under investigation when, in fact, it does. The upshot of this, argues 
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Andrews, is what she refers to as a behavioristic bias, by which she means a bias against 
imputing mental states to nonhuman animals.  
Compounding the problem of the behavioristic bias in comparative psychology, 
she argues, is psychologists‘ frequent misinterpretation of the behavioral rules of the 
NPM (Andrews 2011, 473). On her view, the NPM sanctions interpreting Type I errors as 
a rejection of H0 when the H0 is true and Type II errors as failures to reject H0 when the 
H0 is false. She argues that, contrary to this correct reading, comparative psychologists 
have taken to treating Type II errors not as failures to reject a false H0, but as acceptance 
of H0 when it is in fact false. In other words, the first formulation below is illicitly 
replaced with the second:  
Formulation 1: Type II Error =def (fail to reject H0¬H0) 
Formulation 2: Type II Error =def (accept H0¬H0) 
However, the two formulations are very different – the first suggests a suspension 
of judgment, while the second recommends a rejection of a proposition. Since the H0 in 
comparative cognition is the absence of a cognitive feature under investigation, the result, 
she concludes, is that experiments interpret negative results as proof that the animal lacks 
the cognitive feature under investigation (Andrews 2011). Although this bias is present 
on the natural reading of the NPM as well, it is magnified by the incorrect, though 
common, misinterpretation of Type II errors.  Andrews rightly notes that the correct 
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response to a negative result (i.e., a below-significance result in an experiment with high 
power) should be agnosticism about the animal‘s cognitive abilities, not atheism.51 
Andrews concludes by agreeing with Sober that the matter is an empirical one, 
but departing from his conclusion regarding the seriousness of each type of error. She 
argues that Type I errors are in fact more damaging than Type II errors because they 
foreclose the possibility of future research (Andrews 2011, 474). On her view, preferring 
to make Type I errors means preferring to wrongly conclude that animals lack cognitive 
features under investigation. Once such a judgment has been made, it no longer makes 
sense to ask further questions about that cognitive feature for that particular animal. As a 
result, a possibly fruitful research program never gets a chance to get off the ground. 
Type II errors, on the other hand, promote a further refinement of experimental questions. 
These questions may produce results that conflict with the original (mistaken) judgment, 
but science, argues Andrews, must be willing to take such risks.  
Although Andrews does not explicitly tackle the question of parsimony, her 
analysis implicitly tackles what I have been calling theoretical parsimony, with possible 
implications for ontological parsimony. In the following chapter, I will argue that Sober 
(2005) and Andrews (2011) do not go far enough in their investigations of the impact of 
the NPM. I will argue that their focus on the error-rate asymmetry obscures the real 
source of the parsimony-based bias, which they argue results in the PC or anti-
                                                          
51
 If Dienes is right that the power of a test is rarely controlled, then atheism becomes an 
even graver mistake. 
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anthropomorphism and behaviorism, and which I identify with CC. The source of this 
bias is the null hypothesis itself.  
2.2 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have shown how the concept of parsimony has developed into a range of 
arguments, most of which are used in support of CC (evolutionary parsimony is an 
exception). I have also given a rough picture of how these disparate interpretations of 
parsimony coexist in comparative cognition, and how most of them are related to one 
another. Thus, I have offered a tentative picture of the ecological niche of this concept, its 
origins, its behaviors, and the mechanisms underlying these behaviors. This has allowed 
me to isolate one class of parsimony – ontological parsimony – which has the broadest 
impact. I have shown that this impact can be felt at the level of the interpretation of 
experimental results. Next, I show that it emerges even prior to the interpretation of 
results – namely, at the level of experimental testing and the choice of statistical model 
used to interpret the data.  
In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at the ramifications of the NPM in 
comparative cognition, showing that this statistical model has a much broader influence 
on the data generated through experimental manipulation, than philosophers recognize. I 
will argue that ontological parsimony is present within the NPM, and that statistical 
models shape experimental protocols. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Parsimony in Statistical Models of Experiment: The Value of the Null 
Hypothesis 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I introduced the problem of bias that I have called Cognitive 
Conservatism (CC) and explained that this stems from an implicit commitment to an 
Occamist version of parsimony (Chapter 1). In Chapter 2, I argued that parsimony takes 
on a variety of meanings, and gave an overview of philosophical responses to parsimony 
claims in comparative cognition. I concluded the chapter by examining Sober‘s and 
Andrews‘ focus on the error-rate asymmetry in the Neyman-Pearson Method as a source 
of bias. In this chapter, I argue that Sober‘s and Andrews‘s accounts are right to focus on 
the experimental – and, specifically, statistical – aspect of comparative cognition in their 
assessments of bias, but show that their accounts do not go far enough. In § 3.1, I argue 
that, although the error-rate asymmetry can exacerbate biases, the source of those biases 
is the choice of the null hypothesis. I suggest that Sober and Andrews both neglect the 
historical context that gave rise to the version of the NPM that is used by comparative 
cognition researchers, and that emphasis on this context would have revealed that some 
of the NPM‘s shortcomings are not built into the system, but are contingent on its 
interpretation. Then, in § 3.2, I show how null hypotheses in statistics are related to null 
hypotheses at the level of experiment or theory. I suggest a hierarchical structure to the 
null hypotheses at different levels of generality, and explain how warrant for belief in one 
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hypothesis is transferred to hypotheses at other levels. These discussions serve to set up 
the conclusion in the following chapter (Chapter 4), in which I propose and advocate for 
a reformed NPM.  
3.1 Parsimony and the Neyman-Pearson Method  
Before I argue that Occamist parsimony enters into comparative cognition research 
through an idiosyncratic feature of the Neyman-Pearson Method, a quick recap is in order 
to see how this fits into my broader claims. Recall that I argued that anti- 
anthropomorphism is frequently grounded in parsimony considerations.  Parsimony, in 
turn, has a variety of meanings – from ontological parsimony to unificationist parsimony 
– and the reliance on parsimony is an unsupported, but common, move in these sciences. 
Philosophers and researchers have tackled the question of parsimony‘s meaning, role, and 
relationship to Morgan‘s Canon (MC). Broad analyses of the term in science have held 
that ―parsimony‖ is a proxy or shorthand for epistemic warrant-bearing properties of a 
theory (Sober 1998, Fitzpatrick 2009), or that MC cannot be interpreted as a parsimony 
principle (Thomas 2001). I concluded my discussion of earlier analyses of parsimony 
(§2.2) by suggesting that the most promising analyses were those that tracked 
parsimony‘s influence on experiment. Sober and Andrews both presented arguments that 
aimed to bring the discussion of the anti-anthropomorphism bias down to the level of 
experimental hypothesis-choice. Sober framed his discussion in terms of Type I and Type 
II errors, while Andrews took the statistical language further by explicitly singling out the 
NPM as a potential source of bias. Neither of them, however, considered the relationship 
between the anti-anthropomorphism bias at the level of experiment and the parsimony 
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preference. Although Sober considers how anti-anthropomorphism plays a role in 
experimental analysis (e.g., in Sober 2009, 2012), he does not interrogate the role of 
parsimony in the standard statistical system used by comparative cognition researchers. 
Instead, he proposes a role for parsimony in his preferred statistical system, the Akaike 
model-selection system. In this section, I wish to show that a parsimony preference is 
present in the NPM. Specifically, I argue that it is present at the level of null hypothesis 
choice in the standard NPM.  
3.1.1 The Null Hypothesis as a Source of Bias 
Despite discussing the biasing effects of the error-rate asymmetry, neither Sober (2001, 
2005) nor Andrews (2011) question the fact that the H0 is treated as the absence of the 
mental feature under investigation.52 However, as I will now show, the choice of the H0 is 
just as likely to be a source of bias as the error-rate asymmetry. Once the H0 is 
understood to be a source of bias, a solution to the underattribution problem will become 
clear. 
Consider Andrews‘s claim that the error-rate asymmetry results in what she calls 
a behavioristic bias, especially when Type II errors are wrongly interpreted as acceptance 
of, rather than failures to reject, a false H0. She is right as long as the H0 is defined as the 
absence of a cognitive feature. However, if the H0 were defined as the presence of rich 
cognitive abilities, the result would be the opposite of a bias toward underattribution: 
                                                          
52
 At the time of this writing, Andrews and Brian Huss have written, but, to my 
knowledge, not yet published a manuscript that includes an explicit discussion of the role 
of the null hypothesis (Andrews & Huss unpublished manuscript).  
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comparative cognition would be biased toward overattribution. Such a dramatic 
difference in the outcome of the application of our procedural rules points to the 
significance of the construction of the H0, i.e., the choice of how it is to be defined. If the 
construction of the H0 is so important to the final outcome of a given hypothesis-testing 
procedure, then we must pay more careful attention to how we come to identify 
something as the H0. 
To illustrate the importance of attending to the construction of the H0 more 
concretely, consider a case where replacing the H0 while retaining the error-rate 
asymmetry results in a bias toward sophisticated cognitive explanations. Let us take a 
closer look at an experiment mentioned in the earlier examples of the parsimony 
preference: Allison Foote and Jonathon Crystal‘s (2007) experiment designed to test for 
metacognition, or knowledge of one‘s own cognitive states, in rats. Foote and Crystal 
tested rats in a duration-discrimination test, where the animals are presented with audio 
tones of different durations and trained to classify the tones into the categories of ―short‖ 
or ―long.‖ The rats were then presented with ambiguous tones, which were not clearly 
short or long, and asked to classify these into the two available categories. Correct 
answers were rewarded with food; incorrect answers were neither punished nor rewarded. 
Foote and Crystal presented the rats with a third option – to decline a test. Declined tests 
offered a small but guaranteed reward and the opportunity to move on to more tests. 
When given the choice to decline tests, the rats consistently opted to decline the 
ambiguous (―harder‖) tests but not the unambiguous tests, even though declining a test 
resulted in a smaller food reward than answering correctly. Crystal and Foote concluded 
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that this behavior showed that the rats knew when they did not know an answer – a sign 
of metacognition.  
Let us now abstract away from the details of the experimental setup and just 
consider the hypothesis being tested. We see that their H0 was that the rats do not possess 
metacognition. The alternative hypothesis – the one they wished to demonstrate – was 
that the rats are capable of metacognition.  Given the error-rate asymmetry, the burden of 
proof falls on the metacognitive hypothesis. In fact, in a follow-up paper on 
metacognition, written in 2009, Crystal and Foote clearly state that the default hypothesis 
– the H0 – is and should be that rats lack metacognitive capacities. The reason, they 
argue, is that the behaviors they observed in the 2007 trials could be explained by 
allegedly simpler mechanisms, such as associative learning, which is presumed to be 
incompatible with metacognition. This means that the metacognitive explanations bear 
the burden of proof.  
But now consider what would happen if the H0 in Foote and Crystal‘s 
experiments were a rich cognitive explanation of the rats‘ behavior (e.g., H0 = ―rats are 
capable of metacognition‖). Then the burden of proof would be on the hypotheses 
positing less sophisticated cognition (e.g., H1 = ―rats are relying on stimulus-response 
learning‖). In this case, a preference for Type I errors over Type II errors would mean a 
preference for accepting (or failing to reject) the hypothesis that rats possess 
metacognitive abilities when, in fact, the rats do not. As a result, the CC bias would be 
inverted.  
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The metacognition example suggests that the way that the H0 is constructed is at 
least as important as the error-rate asymmetry when it comes to assessing an 
experimental methodology for built-in theoretical commitments. What attending to the 
construction of the H0 reveals is that, while the asymmetry introduces a bias, the nature of 
this bias is specified by the content of the H0. In one sense, the role of the H0 may be 
more important than the error-rate asymmetry: while the asymmetry can only be made 
more or less pronounced, the content of the H0 can embed any number of problematic 
assumptions.  
This conclusion prompts the following question: Why, if the content of H0 is so 
important, have scientists and philosophers of science assumed that the H0 is naturally 
defined as ―non-presence‖ or ―no effect‖? It is curious that a feature that carries such 
powerful implications for inference from experiment should be casually assumed to be 
globally fixed at the non-presence of the target cognitive property. In order to explain 
why the content of the H0 has been systematically overlooked, I turn to Godfrey-Smith‘s 
(1994) analysis of the NPM and the possible justifications for its use. Placing the NPM 
into its historical context will, furthermore, motivate my suggestion that the NPM can be 
modified as I suggest in Chapter 4. 
3.1.2 Parsimony and the “Natural Null”  
According to Godfrey-Smith (1994), the original justification for the NPM was 
pragmatic, but that justification was rejected shortly after its introduction while the 
method of preferentially controlling for Type I errors was retained. Contrary to 
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Andrews‘s claim, the original NPM included an accept/reject procedure. However, the 
original, pragmatic, justification of the ‗accept/reject‘ decision-procedure was intended as 
a behavioral strategy, where ―accepting‖ a hypothesis meant acting as if the hypothesis 
were true (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 280-82). This pragmatic justification meant that the 
NPM could not be used to support belief in the truth of a hypothesis or even in the 
probability of the hypothesis being true. This pragmatic justification did not sit well with 
subsequent scientists and statisticians (e.g., R.A. Fisher), who wanted a statistical system 
to provide evidence for the truth or falsity of a hypothesis – something that the original 
NPM explicitly avoided (Dienes 2008, Anderson et al., 2000). The result, according to 
Godfrey-Smith, was a proliferation of alternative justifications that have in turn altered 
the method in unexpected ways.  
One alternative justification – which Godfrey-Smith labels the ‗semantic‘ 
justification53 – includes the concept of what he calls a ‗natural null,‘ or Hn,
 54 which is 
typically defined as the hypothesis of no effect or no difference.  On the semantic 
justification, the Type I error is a wrong rejection of the hypothesis of no effect, or no 
difference. Since Type I errors are considered more serious, the semantic justification 
advises erring on the side of concluding that no effect or difference was detected. 
Moreover, the accept/reject procedure is interpreted both behaviorally and epistemically 
(Godfrey-Smith 1994, 287). I wish to focus on the ‗semantic‘ justification for the NPM, 
                                                          
53
 Although Godfrey-Smith does not explain why he chose to label this justification 
―semantic,‖ we may suppose that this is because the H0 is identified with the Hn.  
54
 This is my notation, not Godfrey-Smith‘s.  
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because this is the most popular justification in psychology and, hence, also in 
comparative psychology and comparative cognition.  
The other two justifications that Godfrey-Smith discusses, the ‗pragmatic‘ and the 
‗doxastic,‘ do not specify a value for the H0. The pragmatic justification is silent on the 
content of the H0. It holds that ―H0 is ‗true‘ if the world is in a state such that the action 
associated with H0 is better than the alternative action‖ (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 281). By 
contrast with this behavioral ―pragmatic‖ interpretation, the doxastic justification for the 
NPM is epistemic. It replaces the pragmatic component with the rule that ―when an 
observation in the critical region [the set of values that would cause us to reject the 
hypothesis] occurs the researcher rejects H0. But when an observation falls outside the 
critical region the researcher merely suspends judgment‖ (Godfrey-Smith 1994, 282; 
emphasis added).  
Crucially, Godfrey-Smith identifies a curious metaphysical principle embedded in 
the semantic NPM: When combined with the error-rate asymmetry, the Hn results in a 
preference for nothing over something – an Occamist commitment. The semantic 
justification is, according to Godfrey-Smith‘s analysis, the most common interpretation in 
the psychological sciences, which is sometimes combined with the doxastic justification. 
To the extent that these sciences employ a semantic justification, they also encode a 
commitment to Occamist metaphysics. Godfrey-Smith argues that psychology uses the 
semantic justification almost exclusively, though this is sometimes combined with a 
doxastic justification. Since comparative cognition is to a large extent constituted by 
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comparative psychology, it is no surprise that Occamism55 is present in comparative 
cognition‘s statistical methodology as well.  
Finally, if indeed the content of the H0 is at least as significant as the error rate 
asymmetry for identifying bias in comparative cognition, then Sober and Andrews have 
been focusing disproportionately on just one part of the problem. It is possible to retain 
the asymmetry found in the NPM without accepting the question-begging conservatism 
about animal minds. My analysis recommends that the justifications for the NPM be 
carefully re-examined to avoid smuggling in unexamined theoretical commitments. 
Furthermore, it opens the door to questions about how such a bias may have entered 
comparative cognition. Given that the worries over anthropomorphic bias stemmed from 
a desire for objectivity in a young discipline seeking to defend its methods and aims (Cf. 
Kimler 2000, 853), it should not be surprising that a defense against this bias should have 
been encoded into a putatively objective strategy of statistical analysis. It is thus likely 
that the acceptance of the semantic justification was influenced by the already widely 
accepted interpretation of MC as a parsimony principle for comparative cognition, as 
discussed in § 2.1. Replacing a heuristic with a statistical system would have given 
comparative cognition the appearance of scientific rigor which it had sought. The result 
would be an embedding of the parsimony interpretation of MC into an apparently value-
neutral methodology.56  
                                                          
55
 I discussed Occamism and its connection to parsimony in greater detail in Chapter 2.1. 
56
 Of course, a defense of this speculative historical explanation would require careful 
historical analysis. 
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Independently of the plausibility of this story, however, it is evident that statistical 
methods are often considered by scientists to be value-neutral and, in that respect, 
objective. I have suggested that not only are they not necessarily value-neutral, but, as a 
statistical methodology comes to be used as a standard in a given field, the values 
embedded in the method fade from scientific consciousness. The result is that, while 
researchers and philosophers appreciate the potential for a gerrymandering of data by 
cherry-picking statistical analyses, values, such as parsimony, continue to operate in the 
background methodology itself, without being subject to direct scrutiny. Analyses such as 
the one I offer here, are, therefore, crucial for uncovering and assessing the effects of 
values even in such inconspicuous places as tools for statistical analysis of experimental 
data. 
57
 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that a parsimony preference is alive and 
well in comparative cognition, and that it takes the common form of ontological 
(cognitive) parsimony, or preference for maximally simple cognitive ontologies. This 
prevalence makes Godfrey-Smith‘s suggestion that an Occamist metaphysics undergirds 
the construction of the H0 in the semantic version of the NPM highly plausible for 
comparative cognition. It follows that if we wish to keep the semantic NPM, the Hn needs 
                                                          
57
 Philosophers of statistics and statistically-minded scientists often lament the difficulty 
of properly interpreting and applying frequentist methods, such as the NPM. Some 
Bayesians even note that frequentist methods cloak aspects of their subjectivity (See 
Mayo 2004). The difficulty of interpreting the statistical methods combined with the need 
to employ some statistical model or other put researchers into the unenviable position of 
having to use and interpret models whose implications are largely opaque (Cf. Gigerenzer 
2004). This may go some way toward accounting for the invisibility of the subjectivity of 
statistical model choices.  
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to be replaced with a non-Occamist H0, unless it can be shown that Occamism in general 
is acceptable or that Occamism in the special case of comparative psychology is 
warranted. Prior to moving on to the solution, a few words on the relationship of 
statistical systems to higher level hypotheses are in order.  
 
3.2 Reconciling the Theory-Level Discussion with Statistical-Language 
Descriptions.  
Before going any further, it is important to stop to consider the following question: What 
permits me to use statistical concepts when referring to hypotheses that are not being 
directly subject to statistical analysis? In other words, when referring to the hypothesis 
that ―HA = The animals lack the cognitive ability under investigation‖ as a null 
hypothesis in comparative cognition, one might object that I am taking liberties with 
statistical concepts. HA is not, the objection may go, the sort of thing that can be directly 
subjected to statistical analysis. Only raw data acquired through a method dictated by the 
preferred statistical system is open to statistical analysis.  
The question can be restated as follows: what is the evidential relationship among 
statistical hypotheses and the theories that they are meant to test, and is the relationship 
such that we may use the term ―null hypothesis‖ and ―Type I/Type II errors‖ even when 
speaking of the hypotheses that are not directly evaluable in statistical language? There 
are two ways to address this question – a top down approach and a bottom-up approach. 
The top-down approach involves an articulation or defense of the view of the relationship 
among hypotheses, theories, data, and the methodologies in which they each play a role. 
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While a full analysis is beyond the scope of the present project, a few words may be said 
about philosophical views connecting scientific practice to scientific theories. The 
bottom-up approach, and the one I take in this section, tracks how hypotheses are in fact 
used to generate other hypotheses, how these are tested, and when they are treated as 
evidence. I focus on examples from comparative cognition, but my conclusions are not 
limited to this field.  
In what follows, I will couch my suggestion in terms of the semantic view of 
theories, which takes theories to be a family or cluster of related models, though my view 
does not depend on this account. The semantic view of theories is useful because it 
permits me to employ Elisabeth Lloyd‘s (1994) account of confirmation in order to show 
that high-level term may be used when examining specific statistical hypothesis-testing 
procedures. Lloyd proposes a hierarchy of models, on which models at a lower level 
increase in concreteness and testability and provide evidence for models at the higher 
levels. Similarly, on my view, default (or ―null‖) theories are used to produce default (or 
―null‖) hypotheses, which are in turn used to produce default statistically testable 
probability distributions. I illustrate this hierarchical, nested, relationship among null 
hypotheses at different levels of generality in the following section. The upshot of this 
account is that statistical language (e.g., ―null hypothesis‖) can be productively and non-
metaphorically applied to high-level terms.  
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3.2.1Types of Nulls 
In order to get a grip on the relationship among hypotheses at different levels of 
generality, let me examine four sample hypotheses, each of which may be referred to as a 
null hypothesis. These hypotheses are ordered by their increasing specificity: the sample 
nulls become more specific and the predictions they make become more narrowly 
circumscribed. Although null hypotheses fall on a continuous spectrum from very general 
to very specific, it is possible to pick out places on that spectrum where most hypotheses 
are clustered. The four sample hypotheses below exemplify the locations of such clusters. 
For the sake of clarity, I name these loci, corresponding to the samples, as follows: Meta-
theoretical null (Sample 1), theoretical null (Sample 2), experimental null (Sample 3), 
and statistical null (Sample 4). I will elaborate on the natures of these nulls and the 
relationships they bear to one another following the presentation of the sample 
hypotheses.  
Sample 1: Presumption in favor of the simplest cognitive ontology (SCO)  
In the most general sense, the parsimony-based presumption in favor of the simplest 
cognitive ontology (SCO), as found in Cognitive Conservatism, is a null hypothesis. But 
what kind of hypothesis is this? In one sense, it appears to be less of a hypothesis and 
more of a decision procedure for choosing among hypotheses. The decision procedure 
states that, given a choice among hypotheses, the hypothesis postulating the SCO has the 
benefit of the doubt. Framed this way, the SCO does not appear to be a hypothesis at all. 
In fact, it requires a hypothesis in order to be more than an empty strategy. Perhaps the 
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grounding hypothesis for the decision-procedure is something like the following: Almost 
all nonhuman animals possess the simplest cognitive ontology necessary to carry out 
their normal range of behaviors. If this hypothesis were true, then the probability that a 
given animal is employing a simple process or mechanism at a given time for a given task 
would be high. This high probability would then sanction the decision procedure. And the 
decision procedure, in turn, would ensure that the standard of proof for such experiments 
is high.  Any experiment that reveals the presence of previously undetected cognitive 
sophistication in nonhuman animals would contribute to the evidence against this 
hypothesis, but not against the decision procedure.  
 In what sense, then, is this decision procedure a null hypothesis? Perhaps the 
answer is that it is a null hypothesis insofar as it entails a version of the view that most 
animals lack the cognitive feature under investigation. However, this is not satisfactory, 
since a hypothesis is not the same as the thing by which it is entailed, nor is it that on 
which it relies. Another way to capture the intuition that the SCO is a hypothesis – and a 
null hypothesis, at that – is to reformulate it as a probabilistic hypothesis. Here is how 
such a reformulation might look: 
SCO =  For behavior, B, by some nonhuman animal, A, assume that A 
possesses the simplest cognitive ontology consistent with B.  
SCOP1 =  The probability that a given behavior, B, by some nonhuman 
animal, A, is the product of the simplest cognitive ontology 
consistent with B is very high. 
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Put another way,  
SCOP1* =  Most animal behaviors are the product of the simplest cognitive 
ontology consistent with those behaviors 
These reformulations preserve the intuition voiced by Andrews, that ―[in] the case of 
animal cognition, the null hypothesis is that animals lack the particular psychological 
property under investigation‖ (Andrews 2011, 473). After all, the cognitively simplest 
ontology is the one on which the animal being tested for some psychological property 
lacks that property. The SCO is just a more general formulation of Andrews‘ claim. The 
SCOP1* reformulation also has the virtue of taking the form of a substantive hypothesis. 
This virtue comes at a price, however, viz., that of accepting a substantive commitment 
about the chance of behaviors being the product of simple cognitive ontologies. To use 
the terminology presented in Chapter 2, it takes on the commitment of ontological 
parsimony. One way to shed this commitment is to use the following reformulation 
instead: 
SCOP2 =  The probability that a given behavior, B, by some nonhuman 
animal, A, can be explained by positing the simplest cognitive 
ontology consistent with B is very high. 
Unlike SCOP1 and SCOP1*, SCOP2 is about theories – specifically, explanatory theories of 
behavior – rather than about the cognitive structures that those theories suppose. But are 
either of these reformulations allowed? One might argue that while the SCO is a rule, the 
reformulations are merely reasons to adopt it, and a rule cannot be faithfully recast as the 
reason for adopting the rule. This objection is plausible. What follows if we accept this 
objection and yet wish to make sense of Andrews‘s claim that the null hypothesis is that 
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the animals lack the psychological property under investigation? Perhaps the lesson is 
that what Andrews refers to as a null hypothesis is not a single hypothesis at all, but a 
rule to privilege one type of hypothesis over another.  However, for the present purposes, 
we may take SCOP1* as one kind of null hypothesis – a very general hypothesis ranging 
over all nonhuman animals, or a meta-theoretical null.   
Sample 2: Associationism  
Next, I wish to consider a less general hypothesis – the associationism hypothesis, or the 
view that, ceteris paribus, associative hypotheses are the best. As I have shown in 
Chapter 2, associative hypotheses – hypotheses that explain behavior in terms of 
associative learning – are frequently assumed to be the best null hypotheses. 
Shettleworth, for example, writes that ―Because associative learning is phylogenetically 
so widespread, it is generally the most reasonable null hypothesis in terms of evolution‖ 
(Shettleworth 2010, 553). In other words, the most likely explanation of a given behavior, 
in terms of cognition, is associative. This likelihood, in turn, recommends that a given 
hypothesis for any experiment probing the mechanisms underlying animal behavior 
should be associative.  
It is important to note that there are two views regarding the relationship between 
associative learning and cognition. On the first, and by far the most common, view 
associative systems or processes cannot, by definition, be cognitive.58 Following Buckner 
(2011), I will call this the exclusionary associationist view, because it rules out the 
                                                          
58
 This is a consequence of the ambiguity surrounding the concept of cognition, which I 
mentioned in Chapter 2. 
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possibility of a cognitive associative system. Since most comparative cognition scientists 
assume that representational abilities are at least weakly cognitive, exclusionary 
associationism rules out the co-extension of representational and associative systems or 
processes. The second view of association, which we may call non-exclusionary 
associationism, is open to the possibility that cognitive processes may be instantiated by 
associative systems. On the exclusionary view, an animal cannot both possess 
metacognitive ability, M, and employ associative tools to perform M. By contrast, the 
non-exclusionary view allows that M may be both cognitive and a product of associative 
neural architecture.  
To say that an associative hypothesis is the null hypothesis is to say that there is a 
rule to take the associative explanation to be the default hypothesis – i.e., the hypothesis 
that one assumes to be true, barring evidence to the contrary. The sanction for this rule is 
a theory on which associative systems are presumed to be the best explanation for a given 
behavior. Associationism falls out of SCO, since most researchers assume that 
associative processes are less cognitively demanding, and function using simple cognitive 
ontologies. However, SCO tells researchers to choose the simplest cognitive ontology, 
and there are putatively simpler ontologies than the associative ones (e.g., reflexes). In 
this respect, the SCO is more general than the theoretical null of associationism.  
Sample 3: Rats lack metacognition (Hlm) 
Less general (more specific) hypotheses include what we may call experimental 
hypotheses – or the hypotheses that experiments are designed to disprove. For instance, in 
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Foote and Crystal‘s (2007) study of metacognition in rats, the H0 is set to ―rats lack 
metacognition,‖ which we may symbolize as Hlm. This null is more specific than either of 
the two before, because it (a) narrows down the focus to a single species of nonhuman 
animal (rats), and (b) concerns a specific cognitive feature of the target animal species 
(metacognition). As a function of this specificity, the Hlm is closer to the data than either 
of the other two examples above.  
According to Crystal and Foote (2009), this Hlm is accepted (or not rejected) if the 
rats‘ successful tracking of their own uncertainty can be explained using putatively 
simple explanations such as association-formation. In this respect, Hlm is shaped by the 
associationism null, which constrains the experimental setup used to probe Hlm. The 
actual probing, however, is done on a question that is one inferential step removed from 
Hlm – the hypothesis that is put to direct experimental test. The Hlm must be tested by 
identifying testable consequences of this hypothesis and then searching for their presence 
or absence, using reliable experimental tools.   
Sample 4: Rats will decline difficult tests at the same rate as easy tests 
Finally, let us consider examples of the most specific type of hypothesis: the one that can 
be directly tested by statistical analysis. Examples include the following: ―there is no 
difference between treatment group and control group,‖ or ―subject will solve the task at 
chance rate.‖ To take a specific example, let us return to Crystal and Foote‘s (2007) 
duration-discrimination task to test for metacognition in rats. Recall that Foote and 
Crystal argued that the rats‘ preferentially declining the harder tests (with sounds of 
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ambiguous duration) was evidence of the rats‘ awareness of their own epistemic states 
(their uncertainty) – i.e., evidence of metacognition. In this case, the H0 = ―Rats in the 
experimental group will decline difficult tests at the same rate as easy tests.‖ This kind of 
hypothesis just is the prediction made by Hlm, or the hypothesis that ―Rats lack 
metacognition.‖ If true, this hypothesis would be taken as corroboration of Hlm. In other 
words, failure to selectively decline the harder tests would have been corroborating 
evidence for the null hypothesis from Hlm.  
This kind of hypothesis makes the most specific – sometimes quantitative – 
predictions, which can then be measured against the resulting data or data model. 
Statistical hypotheses must, according to the NPM, jointly exhaust the parameter space. 
For example, the following pair of null and alternative hypotheses satisfy this criterion: 
H0: Rats will opt to pass on ambiguous trials at the same rate as they opt to 
pass on unambiguous trials.  
H1:  Rats will not opt to pass on ambiguous trials at the same rate as they opt to 
pass on unambiguous trials. 
Together, H0 and H1 exhaust the parameter space, allowing the rejection of H0 to permit 
the conclusion that H1 may be true. In this case, our H0 is known as a ―point hypothesis,‖ 
or a hypothesis whose satisfaction calls for a single value of the data, x0, rather than a 
range of values. For the null hypothesis to be accepted (or not rejected), x0 must show a 
difference of 0 among the rates of declining long tests and rates of declining short tests.  
We might formalize this as, H0: Δ= 0 and H1: Δ ≥ 0, where Δ refers to the change in 
decline rates.  
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Samples and Their Classifications 
The H0 in Sample 4 is directly open to statistical analysis, which is why I refer to this 
type of hypothesis as the statistical null. Only the statistical null is directly tested, in the 
sense that it is the only kind of hypothesis that is analyzable by statistical methods.59 To 
test whether the statistical null of, e.g., H0: Δ = 0, should be rejected one need only to 
compare the predicted data distribution with the experimental data. The statistical null is 
direct in the sense of being most closely related to the data. The warrant for the 
acceptance or rejection of the statistical null comes from the statistical model used to 
interpret the data. It is here that the error-rate asymmetry and the choice of H0 become 
most clearly relevant.  
The hypothesis in Sample 3 is an experimental null, which is indirectly testable. 
That is, it can be tested by devising a statistical null and comparing it with experimental 
data. It is indirect insofar as it is related to the experimental data by implication: if the 
data show that the rats decline the ambiguous tests at the same rate as unambiguous tests, 
then the hypothesis that ―rats do not possess metacognition‖ is accepted (or not rejected); 
otherwise it is rejected. The experimental null mediates between higher-level theories and 
statistical hypotheses, as can be seen in the way that researchers frame their projects.  
 Sample 2 is what I call a theoretical null because it functions as a higher-level 
theory from which specific models are developed. On its own, it does not make 
                                                          
59
 By ―direct‖ I do not suggest that the test is unmediated by theoretical concerns and 
background assumptions – only that it is the closest relationship that an hypothesis can 
bear to data.  
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predictions, but it controls which hypotheses come to count as experimental nulls. For 
example, the theoretical null of exclusionary associationism in Sample 2 calls for the 
burden of proof to be placed on any non-associative explanation of behavior. Since most 
comparative cognition researchers assume that metacognition is non-associative, the 
theoretical null of exclusionary associationism requires the adoption of the experimental 
null of H0 = ―rats lack metacognition.‖ However, the choice of experimental null 
hypothesis partially determines the structure of the experimental methodology – after all, 
a test must be sensitive to the questions it is attempting to answer if it is to be a test at all. 
Since different questions will require different methodological approaches, it follows that 
the theoretical null shapes the experimental methodology, and it does so by restricting the 
space of hypotheses that a given experiment can take as its null.   
 In Sample 1, the presumption in favor of the SCO, is more difficult to classify. On 
the one hand, it appears to act as a motivating factor behind adopting the theoretical 
null.60 In this capacity, it appears to be what we may call a meta-theoretical null. On the 
other hand, it sanctions rejecting associationism wherever an even simpler cognitive 
ontology is available. I will classify SCO as another theoretical null, which overlaps with, 
but is not identical to, the theoretical null of exclusionary associationism. 
                                                          
60
 The term ―cognitive‖ in SCO should be understood in the catholic manner of 
Shettleworth (2012) for it to motivate adopting exclusionary associationism as a 
theoretical null.  
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3.2.2 Hierarchically Structured Nulls  
It‘s now possible to show how warrant can flow between the statistical nulls to the 
theoretical nulls via the experimental nulls. One way to do this is by drawing on Lloyd‘s 
(1994) framework for the confirmation of models.  
Lloyd (1994) uses a cognate of Suppes‘s (1962) semantic view of theories. On her 
view, a theory is confirmed in a variety of ways, one of which is through the direct 
testing of the empirical content of the theory. Some of this testable empirical content 
comes in the form of explicit predictions. Other testable content is part of the background 
assumptions that inform a given theory. The content that is not directly testable – the 
purely theoretical content – can be indirectly confirmed, though this type of confirmation 
carries less weight than direct confirmation. If a theory is a family of models, then, on 
this view, any member of that family whose empirical content is confirmed, in turn, gives 
further reason to accept that the higher-level theory is true.  
 This general account can be adapted to the account of hierarchically-ordered null 
hypotheses as follows: Any statistical null, if true, gives reason to accept or fail to reject 
the experimental null, which in turn gives further reason to accept the theoretical null. 
Assuming that the experimental tests were well constructed in the sense that they were 
likely to produce reliable results, a statistical null that has not been rejected may 
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corroborate the experimental null, which may (partially) corroborate the theoretical null 
from which the experimental null followed by implication.
61
   
The reason for mapping the case of hierarchical nulls to Lloyd‘s account of theory 
confirmation, is that theoretical nulls are parts of those theories that enjoy default status. 
To put this into Lloyd‘s language of confirmation, a theoretical null is either one member 
of a family of models, which together constitute a higher-level theory, or it consists of a 
family of models. These options need not be mutually exclusive. The experimental null, 
then, is just one model that is part of a given theoretical null. Similarly, the statistical null 
is one model that is part of the particular experimental null. A graphical representation 
should help clarify this relationship further. Compare the structure in Figure 3.1 with the 
structure in Figure 3.2:  Both increase in specificity in the same way: the models at the 
lowest levels specify concrete values, and both lend support to the next level up by virtue 
of having been predicted by that level. 
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 Precisely how much confirmation is retained across levels of nested hypotheses is an 
interesting, and much larger, question. I offer the present account by way of describing 
what happens in experimental comparative cognition, which is potentially amenable to a 
variety of accounts of theory confirmation.  
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Figure 3.1 Hierarchical Nulls 
 
Figure 3.1. This diagram shows the hierarchical nesting of a sample of null hypotheses. The SCO is shown 
between levels to indicate that it can be interpreted as a meta-theoretical – perhaps functioning as a 
background assumption – or as another theoretical null.  
Figure 3.2 is a schematization of Lloyd‘s account of confirmation by direct testing, which 
shows how lower-level confirmation provides reasons to accept the higher-level model. 
Direct testing of explicit empirical content is only one kind of confirmation on Lloyd‘s 
view, so the non-empirical content in a theoretical null is not being directly confirmed by 
the confirmation of a corresponding statistical null. Exactly how much weight a given 
statistical null provides for an experimental null, and how much of that is transferred to 
the theoretical null needs further exploration. Comparing Figure 3.1 with the Lloyd‘s 
account illustrates how the nested null hypotheses can transfer warrant across levels. 
 
STATISTICAL NULL
EXPERIMENTAL 
NULL
THEORETICAL 
NULL
EXCLUSIONARY 
ASSOCIATIONISM
Rats Lack 
Metacognition
RATS WILL DECLINE  DIFFICULT TESTS 
AT THE SAME RATE AS EASY TESTS
WESTRN SCRUBJAYS DO 
NOT POSSESS EPISODIC-LIKE 
MEMORY
"SCRUBJAYS WILL RETURN TO THE 
CACHE SITES WITH QUICKLY-
DECOMPOSING FOOD AT THE 
SAME RATE AS THEY WILL RETURN 
TO THE SITES WITH SLOWLY-
DECOMPOSING FOOD"
CHIMPANZEES DO NOT 
HAVE  THEORY OF MIND
SUBORDINATE CHIMPAMZEES WILL 
NOT PREFERENTIALLY TAKE THE FOOD 
THAT IS HIDDEN FROM THE DOMINANT 
CHIMPANZEE
SCO 
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Figure 3.2 Lloyd’s account of theory confirmation  
 
Figure 2. In this figure, based on Lloyd (1994) the branches represent modes of support for the 
empirical claims made by the model. 
 
To see how warrant is preserved across different levels of hypothesis-abstraction, 
consider the sample hypotheses above, which draw on Foote and Crystal (2007). The 
presumption in favor of the SCO and exclusionary associationism are the theoretical 
nulls, which independently establish an experimental null (―Rats do not possess 
metacognition‖). Should this experimental null be accepted, exclusionary associationism 
supplies hypotheses to account for the rats‘ behavior. This experimental null predicts the 
statistical null (―Rats will decline difficult tests at the same rate as easy tests‖). The truth 
of the statistical null ramifies along this hierarchy, up to the level of the theoretical null. 
Because the theoretical null informs the creation of the experimental null, and since the 
experimental null is statistically favored because its prediction just is the statistical null, it 
is legitimate to apply statistical terminology to theory-level hypotheses as well.  
Empirical Claims About 
Model (Suppes's "Model 
of the Experiment")
Fit Between Model and 
Data (Calculated by curve-
fitting)
Independent Support for 
Empirical Claims (Direct 
Support)
Independent Support for 
Non-Empirical Claims 
(Indirect Support) 
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Conversely, suppose, as above, that SCO entails associationism for all cases 
where the associative systems are the simplest systems consistent with observed 
behaviors and that we wish to test rats for metacognition. Our experimental null will 
again be, ―rats lack metacognition‖ and our statistical null will depend on the type of trial 
we think can discriminate between our experimental null and the alternative 
(experimental) hypothesis of ―rats are capable of metacognition.‖ If our data, x0, tell us 
that we should not reject the statistical null, then we have warrant to not reject the 
experimental null of ―rats lack metacognition,‖ which in turn, gives us warrant to not 
reject the theoretical null that associative explanations for rats‘ behaviors are the best 
explanations. This may further corroborate the more general theoretical null of SCO. The 
degree to which the failure of reliable trials to dislodge the null hypothesis constitutes 
corroboration of that null hypothesis – as well as the reasons why this may count as 
corroboration – are open questions. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that a preference for simple cognitive ontologies operates in 
the Neyman-Pearson Method of hypothesis testing, and that this bias is encoded in what 
Godfrey-Smith calls a natural null.  I then defended the use of statistical language to 
describe null hypotheses at different levels of specificity. In the following chapter, I 
move on to a solution to the problem of bias in the NPM.  
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CHAPTER 4  
Reforming the NPM: Not All Values Are Equal 
 
Introduction 
Having examined the problems caused by the parsimony-based Cognitive Conservatism 
(CC) bias in experimental comparative cognition, I now turn to a solution. In the previous 
chapter I showed that the null hypothesis, in instantiating an Occamist parsimony 
principle, is at least as much to blame for CC as is the error-rate asymmetry. In this 
chapter I propose and defend a novel version of the semantic NMP for comparative 
cognition, which includes rejecting the natural null (Hn) for what I call a contextual null 
(Hc) (§4.2.1). In addition, I show how the error-rate asymmetry may be employed to 
provide a proper role for non-epistemic values, such as ethical considerations, by 
including a pragmatic weighing component into the choice of acceptable error rates 
(§4.2.2). Prior to fleshing out the Hc and defending its superiority against the status quo, I 
address objections to eliminating the Hn (§4.1).  
4.1 Eliminating the Natural Null   
To begin, recall that, in Chapter 3, I concurred with Godfrey-Smith (1994) that an 
Occamist metaphysics undergirds the construction of the null hypothesis in the so-called 
semantic version of the NPM, which is the version of the NPM contains a so-called 
natural null (Hn), or the preference for the absence of the cognitive feature under 
investigation. In the same chapter, I also explained how the statistical Hn is nested in a 
hierarchical system of null hypotheses, which are ordered by degrees of generality, and 
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which include the experimental null hypothesis and the theoretical null hypothesis. In 
comparative cognition, when the experimental null hypothesis is that some putatively 
complex cognitive trait is absent, data that substantiate this experimental null hypothesis 
corroborate the theoretical null hypothesis that the animal possesses the simplest 
cognitive ontology that is consistent with the evidence. For example, in the Foote and 
Crystal (2007) test for metacognition in rats, the experimental Hn is that the rats do not 
monitor their own uncertainty. The theoretical null hypothesis, which is potentially 
corroborated by this experimental null, is that rats lack metacognition. Thus, the Hn is a 
central component of the system through which Occamism sustains the bias of Cognitive 
Conservatism. It follows that in order to retain the standard semantic version of the NPM, 
but eschew the Occamism, the Hn must be eliminated. In the following section (§4.2), I 
propose a replacement for the Hn. In the remainder of this section, I will consider and 
reject a range of possible defenses of the Hn.  
 So, what must a defender of retaining the Hn within the semantic NPM need to 
show in order to make her case?  The most obvious strategies at her disposal are the 
following:  
(a) Show that Occamism in general is desirable, or 
(b) Show that Occamism in the special case of comparative cognition is desirable. 
However, another strategy is also available. Since a defense of the Hn need not be 
Occamist, she may choose a third strategy, showing that:   
(c) A non-Occamist alternative justification for retaining the Hn is available.  
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I focus my discussion in this section on strategy (c). I have addressed (b) in Chapter 2, 
where I suggested that ontological parsimony, which is the closest living relative to 
Occamism, does not provide guidance in choosing a null hypothesis in comparative 
cognition. With respect to (a), I take the acceptability of Occamism as a general principle 
to be less controversial: while philosophers of science largely agree that simplicity is an 
epistemic value, few would suggest that its value can be explained in terms of Occamist 
commitments to maximally simple ontologies, much less to the theological grounds for 
supposing that the world is maximally simple.  
I begin by rejecting a priori metaphysical reasons (APM) for retaining the Hn in 
§4.1.1, where I briefly recall the discussion of ontological parsimony from (§2.1.i). Next, 
I address (c) in §4.1.2 and §4.1.3, in which I consider empirically informed metaphysical 
(EIM) reasons, such as appeals to evolutionary considerations; and methodological 
reasons (ME), such as the pragmatic appeal of simpler theories and the preference for 
prediction over description. I choose these three categories of justifying reasons (APM, 
EIM, ME) not because these exhaust the scope of possible justifications, but because they 
are either the most promising (ME), the most commonly invoked by researchers (EIM), 
or the most likely to underlie the choice of Hn (APM). I conclude that each type of 
justification fails to ground a general preference for retaining the Hn. 
4.1.1 A Priori Metaphysical (APM) Reasons to Retain the Hn 
A priori metaphysical reasons for retaining the Occamist Hn, must show why a maximally 
simple cognitive ontology – i.e., one that does not multiply entities beyond necessity – is 
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more likely to be a true description of the target animal. In Chapter 2, I showed that 
cognitive entity-types span everything from kind of mechanisms to levels of 
representation to metabolic and computational parity. The natural conclusion to draw 
from the multiplicity of ways in which putatively cognitive ontologies might be carved 
up is that the wish to simplify is blocked at both the conceptual and the practical stages: 
First, without Occam‘s theological justifications for ontological parsimony, the principle 
is difficult to defend. Second, even accepting the principle of ontological simplicity, there 
is no clear procedure for determining either (a) what counts as an ―entity‖ or (b) at which 
point multiplying them is ―done beyond necessity.‖ I conclude that a priori metaphysical 
reasons – i.e., Occamism without empirical ground – is best left at the door of empirical 
research (Sober 2005, Andrews 2009, Fitzpatrick 2008).  
4.1.2 Methodological (ME) Reasons to Retain the Hn 
Suppose now that one accepts my conclusion, and that an a priori metaphysical 
justification for the Hn is not forthcoming. The defender of the Hn may choose to justify 
her preferences on methodological grounds, showing how a preference for nothing over 
something, or for maximally simple cognitive ontologies, must be required for the 
scientific process to continue, or is a necessary feature of the most desirable scientific 
activities. Since the preference for non-existence is a preference for nothing over 
something, methodological justifications must explain why simplicity is preferable. Such 
justifications shift attention from the simplicity of the world (ontological parsimony) to 
the simplicity of the scientific representation of the world (theories, hypotheses, or 
models) – that is, from ontological to theoretical parsimony. This move was already 
156 
 
 
suggested in Chapter 2, with the brief mention of instrumentalism, but more remains to 
be said about such a move. In the remainder of this section, I consider and reject three 
ME justifications for theoretical parsimony.   
Prediction and Manageability  
One ME justification for retaining the Hn is that theoretical parsimony is a virtue for one 
of two reasons: what I call ―manageability‖ and predictive value. Manageability is 
pragmatic: theoretical economy makes a theory easier to understand and manipulate 
using the limited resources of a human mind and the scaffolding of available instruments. 
(This may or may not make the theory more aesthetically pleasing to the theorist, but the 
question of aesthetics is orthogonal to its epistemic value.) On this view, the elegance of 
a theory need not have an impact on the truth of the theory‘s contents or the similarity 
between theory or model and its target system. Instead, the theory or model is preferred 
because of its manageability.  
One case in which simplicity is clearly preferred is with computer simulations of 
animal behavior. Recall the example of Bell and Pellis (2012) from Chapter 2, whose 
simulation of theft-aversion in rats has shown that a faithful replication of rats‘ theft-
avoidance behavior could be rendered by inputting one simple rule into a program: 
―maintain a constant distance between your nose and the potential thief‘s nose.‖ The 
success of this simulation was then taken as proof that the rats did not require complex 
cognitive abilities in order to perform in an apparently complex social dynamic. This 
example is especially telling because, although the preference for simplicity was 
157 
 
 
pragmatic, the conclusion was realist in nature: since the rats do not need to do more than 
what the how-possibly simulation has shown, it follows that they are less likely to 
employ a more complicated rule than was previously supposed.  I have discussed this 
case in Chapter 2, but the overlap between parsimony preferences and the justifications of 
the Hn bears repeating. 
The second reason to value theoretical parsimony in a theory or model is based on 
the view that elegant theories and models are more useful for prediction. This goes 
beyond the pragmatic need for manageability, to the claim that simpler models are more 
accurate predictors. Recall Sober‘s (2009) argument that increasing parsimony by 
decreasing the number of open parameters improves a model‘s predictive power – just as 
long as we accept the Akaike Information Criterion. However, even if we accept that 
reducing the number of open parameters increases the predictive accuracy of a model, 
this version of simplicity will not favor the Hn in comparative cognition, as Sober is quick 
to note.    
This brings up the larger problem for either pragmatic or prediction-based 
epistemic preferences for simplicity: they simply do not dictate that the sorts of things 
that ought to be simplified or reduced away are complex cognitive traits.  More 
importantly, if the aim of experimental work in comparative cognition is to provide an 
explanation of animal behavior in terms of a description of the underlying cognitive 
processes, then elegance can‘t be an overriding virtue. Descriptions of the world ought to, 
at minimum, track the actual structures found in the world. Preferring elegant theories or 
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highly idealized models may be justifiable for the purposes of prediction, but if elegance 
is privileged above accuracy, then we are likely to end up with an anti-realist view of 
comparative cognition‘s projects (but see Sober 2009). 
Godfrey-Smith’s Diachronic Reading of Popperian Simplicity  
Godfrey-Smith (2007) offers a novel, if speculative, reading of Popperian simplicity from 
a diachronic perspective: we ought to begin with the riskiest hypotheses and refine our 
models or theories as these get falsified. As Godfrey-Smith puts it, ―Simple theories are 
good places from which to initiate the dynamic process that is characteristic of theory 
development in science‖ (2007). On this view, a simpler theory is not more likely to be 
true, but is the best starting point, i.e., the one that is most likely to lead to further 
development of the theory. It is unlikely that comparative cognition researchers have this 
Popperian view of simplicity in mind when relying on Hn; however, if Godfrey-Smith is 
right, then his justification may well serve as a non-Occamist justification for an a priori 
and simplicity-based null..  
Two things may be said of this suggestion. The first is that this view would only 
justify the Hn and a preference for wrongly failing to reject it for initial stages of a 
research program. If the claim is interpreted normatively, then it would only obtain for 
new experimental research programs. Of course, determining what counts as a new 
research program is an open question. For instance, does testing for consolation behavior 
among ravens based on consolation paradigms known to obtain among monkeys, as 
Fraser and Bugnyar (2010) have done, count as an extension of the research program or 
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as a novel research program? If it is a novel research program, then there may be more 
instances in which the diachronic suggestion would apply. However, even if this were the 
case, it is not clear what a simple starting point would look like in cases such as Fraser 
and Bugnyar‘s study. Is it simpler to hypothesize that all animals who inhabit complex 
social networks will exhibit consolation behavior, or is it simpler to suppose that, for any 
new species studied, the animals will not exhibit consolation behavior? To begin to 
address this question, we must know what counts as the relevant hypothesis in this case: 
the hypothesis predicting more consolation behavior among members of more social 
species than less social species, or the hypothesis that a given animal population will 
exhibit consolation behavior given the first hypothesis. This ambiguity is a specific case 
of a more general problem, to which the diachronic Popperian view does not supply an 
answer.  
The second point is that it is unclear why simple theories should also be the 
riskiest, or most likely to get falsified. One of the reasons that this is unclear is that 
simplicity is a vexed concept, and what was ―simple‖ in Popper‘s sense is not the same 
thing as what is ―simple‖ in the sense of the natural null. For Popper (and any neo-
Popperian), the answer to the above question is just that simple theories are riskiest by 
definition: the greater the number of falsifiable claims, the simpler the theory (Popper 
2009 [1959/1936], 126-128).62 This is because Popperian ―simplicity‖ is a function of the 
                                                          
62
 The very first sentence of Popper‘s section, title, ―Simplicity and Degree of 
Falsifiability‖ reads: ―The epistemological questions which arise in connection with the 
concept of simplicity can all be answered if we equate this concept with degree of 
falsifiability‖ (Popper 2009 [1935/1969], 126). The section concludes with, ―Simple 
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amount of empirical content in a theory, and the amount of empirical content is directly 
proportional to the theory‘s falsifiability. However, for the Hn as it is applied to 
comparative cognition, simplicity is a function of the ontological parsimony of a theory. 
And the burden of proof is on those who wish to show that falsifiability is the most 
desirable starting point for a research program, and that the most falsifiable theories in 
comparative cognition are the ones that presuppose ontological cognitive parsimony.   
Fully Specified Models (FSM) 
The final ME justification of the Hn is what I call the Fully Specified Models (FSM)
63 
argument. The FSM advises that, when a fully, or mostly, specified model of cognition is 
available, it makes sense to prefer that model over the promise of a future model. By 
―fully specified model‖ I mean one that is quantitative rather than qualitative, and is 
therefore capable of making fine-grained predictions. The family of associative models, 
taken as a unit, presents an example of a fully-specified model set. Not only is each 
member of the set fully specified, but, taken as a group, they range over a wide set of 
behavioral phenomena. To see what I mean by specified, consider one associative model 
for apparent uncertainty-monitoring in rats: the ―response-strength model‖ of the 
behavioral data from Foote and Crystal‘s 2007 experiment on uncertainty monitoring in 
rats. Smith et al. (2008) offer this model as an associative alternative to the metacognition 
explanation of the rats‘ performance on the duration-discrimination tests, mentioned 
                                                                                                                                                                             
statements, f knowledge is our object are to be prized more highly than less simple ones 
because they tell us more; because their empirical content is greater; and because they 
are better testable‖ (Popper 2009 [1935/1959], 128).  
63
 This FSM is not to be confused with the Flying Spaghetti Monster. 
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above. This model ―uses associative, habit-formation, and generalization principles to 
predict which response is selected under varying experimental conditions‖ (Foote and 
Crystal 2012, 188). The Smith et al. (2008) model maps response strengths as exponential 
curves declining from their thresholds, and crossing in the middle, where both strengths 
are low. The Smith et al. model introduces a ―low level, flat threshold for the decline 
response‖ (ibid), which activates whenever the response strengths for either ―short‖ or 
―long‖ are lower than the threshold. On the response-strength model, the rats‘ consistent 
preferences for the decline option during the most difficult trials is explained as follows: 
the rats were conditioned to respond to short tones by nosing the ―short‖ button, and to 
long tones by nosing the ―long‖ button, and were substantially rewarded. The ―decline‖ 
option offered a small but guaranteed reward and the option to try again for a big reward. 
When the tones were of ambiguous duration, the rats‘ associations with long-―long‖ and 
short-―short‖ were weakly activated. However, their motivation to nose the ―decline‖ 
button was always weakly activated. Thus, in the absence of a strong motivation for 
either ―long‖ or ―short,‖ the rats chose ―guaranteed food.‖ This associative model is fully 
specified in the sense that it offers a means to quantify the precise juncture at which the 
strength of the ―decline‖ option will supersede the strength of the ―long‖ or ―short‖ 
options, as well as the rates at which associative strengths decline as the lengths of the 
tone shade closer toward the ambiguous middle range. The metacognitive model, on the 
other hand, only offers a correlation between performance and the availability of the 
decline option and the correlation between the ambiguity of tests and their average rates 
of decline. In general, metacognitive models are not fully specified models at this time. 
162 
 
 
Because they are merely qualitative, they can make only coarse-grained predictions and 
are currently treated as what we might call the hypotheses of exclusion – i.e., the 
hypotheses one accepts by ruling out all alternatives. 
This line of argument is persuasive because it accurately tracks the way scientists 
conceive of their projects (SPACKLED meetings 2012). For instance, some researchers 
argue that a fully specified model allows for the construction of simulations, which can 
then serve as further proof of the accuracy of the model (Crystal 2012, personal 
correspondence). Although the question of the epistemic role of such simulations is 
philosophically open, it is at least prima facie plausible that the ability to run simulations 
based on a cognitive model provides that model with additional means for exploring 
cognitive systems. The resulting simulations can then test parts of the model under 
different simulated environmental conditions.  
However, it remains to be seen whether the simulations provide evidence that the 
how-possibly model in question actually describes the target system of the organism in 
question. Some comparative cognition scientists consider the challenge to the non-
associative hypotheses to lie precisely with identifying a quantitative version of the 
alternative model (such as a model of metacognition) (Crystal personal communication 
2012). This challenge is, indeed, likely to produce interesting findings, if taken up by the 
larger community. However, in the meantime, the argument for associationism appears to 
rest on a historical contingency: associative models are fully specified because 
associationism has been presumed to be the method by which learning and, perhaps, all 
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cognitive tasks happen. Scientists have had a lot of time to think about and modify these 
models. The same is not true of alternatives. While the family of associative models is the 
most useful one at present, this is only contingently the case, as no competing models are 
currently as well specified. This is important because relying on associative models as a 
default closes off competing avenues of research, inhibiting progress in a self-reinforcing 
pattern.  
Moreover, it may turn out that ―cognitive capacities may be ‗implemented by‘ or 
‗emerge from‘ associative ones of a certain level of complexity‖ (Buckner 2011, 321), in 
which case ruling out complex cognition on the grounds that association can account for 
the observed behavior would be question-begging. Recall that the psychological models 
of associationism are typically identified with neurobiological models of connectionism: 
psychological associations are formed by strengthening physical connections among 
neurons. It is commonly assumed that connectionist theories are incapable of producing 
very complex phenomena, suggesting that associative neural nets can only produce 
simple associative psychological behaviors. However, although sophisticated computers 
can implement relatively simple connectionist models of neural networks, it is 
conceivable that with greater computing power, the connectionist networks could 
produce metacognitive psychological phenomena using associative rules. Conversely, 
psychological associative models may not have to be realized by a connectionist network.  
The FSM does not support retaining the Hn within the semantic NPM. At best, it 
may ground a preference for associative models over metacognitive models. However, 
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the supporter of associative models over the metacognitive model must explain why the 
historical contingency of associative models‘ success does not undermine her claim to 
default status. That is, given that they have been taken to be the default for a long time, 
and have, therefore, had the benefit of being refined through competition with alternative 
models on multiple occasions, should this competitive advantage be factored in when 
deciding whether they ought to remain the default models?  
4.1.3 Empirically Informed Metaphysical Reasons to Retain the Hn 
Even if we reject the a priori metaphysical arguments and the methodological arguments, 
there may be a more empirically-driven reason to retain a general preference for the 
natural null as our null hypothesis. In fact, the most frequently offered reasons are of just 
this variety. In this section, I consider three such arguments, which I call: (1) The 
Taxonomic Ubiquity Argument (TUA); (2) The Systems Argument (SA); and (3) The 
Energetic Cost Argument (ECA). Each one appeals to evolutionary theory, and all are 
problematically speculative insofar as they make unsupported appeals to phylogeny or 
the nature of information-processing systems.  
Since the following arguments are each intended to support the blanket preference 
for setting the null to the Hn, or the hypothesis positing the simplest cognitive ontology, a 
few words about the nature of cognitive simplicity are in order. Recall from Chapter 2 
that parsimony is a capacious concept, with a variety of ways to simplify and a variety of 
entities to be simplified. As I noted in that chapter, the notion of a scale of cognitive 
complexity guides scientific decisions in comparative cognition despite the fact that 
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concepts like complexity and cognition are often left vague or ambiguous. For instance, 
some researchers take a catholic view of cognition, on which any information-processing 
activity that mediates between an environmental or internal input and a behavioral output 
is cognitive (Shettleworth 2012, Heyes 2012). Others prefer a more restricted view, on 
which only those systems that produce behaviors consistent with a particular view of 
rationality are meaningfully cognitive (Dickinson 2012). Adding to the confusion, the 
concepts of rationality and other supporting concepts, such as representation and 
intentionality, are themselves often vague or ambiguous. Although it is commonly 
assumed that a representational system is more complex than a nonrepresentational 
system, very few researchers see it fit to back up this assumption with an argument.  
Comparative cognition researchers cope with the conceptual confusion by just 
labeling some kinds of cognition as simpler than others. For instance, putatively simpler 
processes include associative processes, while most allegedly representational activities, 
such as reasoning and certain kinds of memory, are treated as complex, as noted in §2.1.1 
i.  In fairness to the researchers, many research projects do not require an explicit 
commitment to a single definition of, e.g., cognition. For example, in narrowly scoped 
experiments, such as asking whether a Western scrub jay appears to possess episodic-like 
memory, it is not necessary to specify whether episodic-like memory is meaningfully 
cognitive (Clayton et al. 2001). What is required is not a general definition of cognition, 
but a clearly articulated strategy for identifying the behavioral markers of episodic-like 
memory. To put this point more generally, whether the hypothesized trait counts as 
cognitive is presumed to be a separate question from how to set up and evaluate 
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experimental tests of that trait. As I have argued, however, the question is not entirely 
separate, as it plays a role in establishing what comes to count as the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, while the science ―works‖ just fine without broad agreement regarding 
concepts central to its inquiry – just as biology works without a philosophically 
unassailable definition of life –the experimental programs in comparative cognition are 
shaped by Cognitive Conservatism. 
To sum up, experimental comparative cognition proceeds without broad 
agreement about what counts as a cognitive entity, or how such entities might be 
simplified. This ambiguity is important, since the three EIM arguments below must be 
clear on which version of ontological parsimony to favor before offering reasons to favor 
it. The three arguments below fall short on this count. With this discussion in mind, I will 
now proceed to offer and dismiss the three empirically-informed metaphysical arguments 
in favor of retaining the Hn. 
The Taxonomic Ubiquity Argument (TUA) 
The Taxonomic Ubiquity Argument holds that putatively simple cognitive systems, such 
as associative systems, are the most likely to underlie behavior because they are the most 
taxonomically widespread. Their ubiquity suggests that they are ancient and that 
cognitive simplicity is evolutionarily conserved. This view is so pervasive that it can be 
found in textbooks introducing comparative cognition. For example in her 2009 textbook, 
Shettleworth writes:  
A reasonable modern interpretation of the Canon … is that a bias in favor 
of simple associative explanations is justified because basic conditioning 
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mechanisms are widespread in the animal kingdom (Shettleworth, 2009, 
18; emphasis added) 
In other words, since earlier studies have explained a wide range of behaviors in a wide 
range of organisms in terms of associative mechanisms, we may conclude that associative 
mechanisms are responsible for whatever new behavior we encounter in the future. Note 
that Shettleworth takes associative systems to be among the simplest cognitive systems – 
an assumption that, although common, is growing more controversial.  
However, the apparent ubiquity of associative systems cannot ground the blanket 
presumption in favor of simple cognitive ontologies. First of all, even if associative 
systems are more widespread than other cognitive systems, this fact would not ground a 
general preference for simple cognitive ontologies64. This is because the conclusion that 
associative systems are widespread is itself built on a mass of data from experiments that 
have taken association as the default hypothesis. While it is infelicitous to imagine that 
all the experiments that Shettleworth has in mind were biased, it is at least likely that 
their results are open to precisely the kind of alternative interpretations that 
Shettleworth‘s suggestion aims to forestall. Furthermore, this line is question-begging if 
what we wish to know is whether behaviors that can be explained using, e.g., associative 
concepts, are in fact produced by, e.g., associative systems. Lastly, while it is true that 
associative systems are very common, they are also varied, and many are not simple in 
any straight-forward way. Moreover, as Buckner (2011) argues, it remains to be seen 
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 Shettleworth is not, I should note, suggesting that her argument is grounds for a general 
simplicity preference.  
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whether associative systems are incompatible with complex cognition. So, the ubiquity of 
associative systems does not support the preference for the Hn.  
The Systems Argument (SA) 
Another argument, which I call the Systems Argument (SA), offers a reason for the 
supposed taxonomic ubiquity of putatively simple cognitive systems and the relative 
taxonomic rarity of more complex systems. The SA holds that animal behavior is 
controlled by multiple cognitive systems, and that systems producing complex cognition, 
such as reasoning and representing, are relatively recent – and thus rare – evolutionary 
developments (Carruthers 2006, M. Karin-D‘Arcy 2005, Shettleworth 2012). To see why 
recent origins suggest rarity, consider the following simple example. Imagine a very 
simple tree with one ancestral node representing the ancestral species, A, and ten 
branches representing ten new species, S1 – S10. If a trait, T, is ancient, then it will be 
found in A and is, therefore, more likely to be found in S1 – S10 as well (depending on 
how conserved T happens to be). However, if T is a recent development, i.e., if it arose in 
S7, then it would have to have been recreated in the other nine branches as well, which is 
an unlikely 65scenario. Therefore, the recent origins of T strongly suggest its relative 
rarity. 
The SA relies on a story about the evolution of cognitive systems, best illustrated 
by M. Karin-D‘Arcy (2005). On her view, complex biological systems evolve by means 
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 Although it is unlikely, it is possible, if T were easy to evolve and S1 - S10 each lived 
under environmental conditions that prompted T‘s development. (I owe this point to 
Colin Allen).  
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of adding new systems on top of older systems in a hierarchical yet integrated fashion. To 
use one of her examples, the marine mammal‘s respiratory system includes both the 
ancient air-breathing system and a new and specialized system for maintaining oxygen 
levels under water (2005, 189). The older systems do not get replaced as newer systems 
are added, but are, instead, integrated into the new ―hierarchically structured integrated 
system‖ (ibid). Cognitive systems, being biological systems like any other, are, on her 
view, likely to follow the same evolutionary trajectory. If this story is true, then some 
ancient components of cognitive systems should be shared across a wide range of taxa, 
with each taxon containing additional, derived specializations. Elaborating on her earlier 
comment (above), Shettleworth (2013) recommends modifying Morgan‘s Canon (MC) to 
fit this conclusion, writing:  
A reasonable modern interpretation of Morgan's Canon is that 
explanations in terms of general processes of learning along with species-
typical perceptual and response biases should always be sought before 
invoking more complex or specialized cognitive processes. This stance is 
justified by the fact that the simple forms of learning such as habituation 
and classical conditioning...are very widespread in the animal kingdom. 
(Shettleworth 2013, 12; emphasis added).  
She concludes that, ―the burden of proof is on anyone proposing that some novel, 
additional, cognitive mechanism has arisen on a particular branch of the evolutionary 
tree" (Shettleworth 2013, 12-13). Note that Shettleworth is assuming that cognitive 
sophistication must require some addition to existing mechanisms.  
Similarly, Karin-D‘Arcy (2005) suggests her own modernization of MC, which 
aims to bring it up to date with contemporary biology by ―replace[ing] the notion of a 
psychological scale with the concepts of ancestral and derived psychological processes‖ 
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(Karin-D‘Arcy 2005, 196). So far, this is a move in the right direction, since Morgan was 
committed to grounding his view in evolutionary thinking. The problem, as Sober 
explains, is that Morgan was relying on the wrong view of evolutionary progress, namely, 
the ―Spencerian doctrine that evolution always marches from simple to complex‖ – a 
view that Darwin did not endorse (Sober 2005, 91).66  
It should be noted that the concepts of derived and ancestral are independent of 
the notion of complexity. However, Karin-D‘Arcy seems to suggest that her revised MC 
would issue in the same complexity-reducing result as the original parsimony-based 
reading of the MC. Although she disavows the parsimony-based reading of MC as well 
as the cognitive hierarchy implicit in the original MC, she nevertheless concludes that the 
revised ―canon serves to balance the natural human tendency to interpret observed 
behavior in terms of complex psychological processes‖ (Karin-D‘Arcy 2005, 190; 
emphasis added).67  
On her view, the revised MC combines with her view of hierarchical cognitive 
evolution to explain Daniel Povinelli‘s Reinterpretation Hypothesis (RH), on which both 
humans and other primates use the same (homologous) systems to produce most 
behaviors, but humans use a specialized, derived, module to reinterpret the behaviors of 
other humans in intentional terms. Povinelli and Barth (2005) characterize RH as follows: 
The reinterpretation hypothesis posits that the ancestor of the ape/human 
group possessed a suite of systems dedicated to representing and reasoning 
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 Morgan held to the ―ladder‖ rather than the ―tree‖ view of evolution.  
67
 Also of note is Karin-D‘Arcy‘s implication that MC is an anti-anthropomorphism 
principle. 
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about behavior (detailed in Povinelli &Vonk 2004), but not intentions or 
other mental states. Further the model posits that, at some point in the 
evolution of the human lineage (probably coincident with evolution of 
natural language), a new system for encoding the behavior of self and 
other in terms of mental states was grafted into these ancestral systems for 
representing and reasoning about behavior. (Povinelli & Barth 2005, 713) 
On the RH view, humans are unique among primates (and all other animals) because they 
utilize a special language-based module for decoding the behaviors of others in terms of 
mental states. Karin-D‘Arcy builds her revised MC on this view, writing that, 
Where the ancestral systems evolve and develop in the absence of systems 
derived in related species, a functional representation may produce 
behavior outwardly indistinguishable from behavior based on a 
representation built with more contributing systems […] In the case of 
social cognition, it is likely that the same ancestral system produces social 
behavior in humans and other primate species, but observed behaviors are 
interpreted by different systems, with humans primarily using the 
specialized intention attribution system to make these interpretations. 
(Karin-D‘Arcy 2005, 189; original emphasis)  
 
Based on the RH, Karin-D‘Arcy argues that the human ability to impute beliefs and 
desires to others is a derived human specialization, not shared with other primates. In 
other words, according to Karin-D‘Arcy, the human ability to impute beliefs and desires 
to others, or Theory of Mind (TOM), is an independently derived human specialization. 
TOM is presumed to require significant cognitive complexity. Thus, the human behavior-
analysis system is, on her view, more complex than the nonhuman behavior-analysis 
system.  It is worth pausing here for a moment to note how stipulating that a vague ability 
or faculty such as TOM is complex contributes to presumption against this ability in 
nonhuman animals.  
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 As I argued in Chapter 2, Sober challenges the idea that MC may be modified as 
Karin-D‘Arcy suggests without violating current evolutionary understanding. Recall that 
Sober‘s claim is that, given a shared derived behavioral trait, B, which is common to 
species X and species Y, treating B as a homology recommends assuming that the 
underlying (proximate) mechanism, M, is also homologous in X and Y. Sober‘s 
conclusion, though not intended as a rebuttal of Karin-D‘Arcy, directly contradicts her 
revised MC. Sober writes that ―[nothing] like the reformulation of Morgan‘s canon that I 
have discussed will find justification in evolutionary theory‖ (Sober 2005, 96). In the 
same section, I noted that cladistic parsimony is a relatively weak justificatory ground. 
For instance, it may turn out that homologous traits are be underwritten by homoplastic 
or even divergent mechanisms. Fortunately, other objections to the SA are available.  
 A further objection to Karin-D‘Arcy‘s modified MC and the SA is that it appears 
to neglect the role of convergence in the evolution of complex cognitive systems. She 
would be right if the derived system in, e.g., humans, is unlikely to have been duplicated 
(through convergent evolution) in other animals. This would suggest that elements of 
complex human cognition may be unique. There is no reason to suppose that, even under 
similar environmental constraints, two distantly related species cannot develop 
functionally homoplastic cognitive systems – both in terms of behavioral traits and in 
terms of the underlying cognitive process that produces the behavioral trait. In fact, 
functional homoplasies are exceedingly common (Conway-Morris 2003) – bat wings and 
butterfly wings being only one (popular) example. Why, then, should cognitive function 
be exempted? By Karin-D‘Arcy‘s own logic, it cannot: she argues that cognitive systems 
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should develop just as any other complex system. With respect to convergence of 
cognition, there is strong behavioral evidence of convergence between the mammalian 
and avian cognitive mechanisms (i.e., the underlying processes that produce similar 
behaviors), despite vastly different brain tissue organization (Emery and Clayton 2004).  
Related to the SA‘s problematic neglect of convergence is its glossing over 
important complexities in the relationship among homologies and homoplasies. These 
complexities undermine the SA defense of Hn by illustrating the limits of the concept of a 
derived trait. For instance, one complication to the derived/ancestral divide is the fact that 
one and the same system can be homologous with another system along one dimension 
(e.g., function) but homoplastic with respect to a different dimension (e.g., mechanism). 
With respect to cognition, de Waal and Ferrari (2010) write that ―The … distinction 
[between homology and homoplasy] is much harder to apply to traits that escape precise 
definition and measurement, such as cognitive capacities. Moreover, analogous traits 
often contain homologous elements in the same way that the wings of birds and bats are 
products of convergent evolution yet contain homologous bones‖ (de Waal & Ferrari 
2010, 202). 
To illustrate how two cognitive systems can be described as simultaneously 
homologous and homoplastic, consider the case of homologous and homoplastic features 
in two very distant taxa: birds and mammals, which diverged between 312.3 million and 
330.4 million years ago. As these taxa diverged, the structural organization of their 
neuroanatomy diverged as well. Despite these differences, however, behavioral evidence 
174 
 
 
from multiple species of corvids, such as the crows and jays, and parrots, such as African 
Grey parrots, suggests that some birds are capable of remarkable cognitive sophistication. 
As Nathan J. Emery and Nicola S. Clayton (2004) write, ―cognition in corvids and apes 
must have evolved through a process of divergent brain evolution with convergent mental 
evolution‖ (Emery & Clayton 2004, 1907). That is, while the neuroanatomies of birds 
and mammals evolved separately, the cognitive abilities, and the mechanisms 
underpinning those abilities, converged. 
Neuroscientists believe this cognitive sophistication to be the product of the brain 
regions called the nidopallium and mesopallium, comprising the dorsal ventricular ridge 
(DVR). The DVR is colloquially referred to as the ―avian prefrontal cortex,‖ indicating 
its functional analogy with the mammalian prefrontal cortex. This functional analogy, 
combined with the structural divergence, suggests that the DVR and the mammalian 
prefrontal cortex are homoplasies (Güntürkün 2012). However, the full story is more 
complicated. Recent research has shown that cells in the DVR are homologues of the 
cells in the mammalian neocortex – that is, that the cells in avian DVRs and mammalian 
neocortices share a common ancestor (Dugas-Ford et al. 2012).  Although the cells are 
organized into very different structures in the two taxa, they appear to carry out similar 
functions – that of supporting complex cognition. This raises the question of whether the 
DVR is a homologue or analogue (homoplasy) of the mammalian prefrontal cortex. It is 
also possible that while the overall structure is homoplastic, some of the active 
components of the two structures are homologous.  
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Returning to Karin-D‘Arcy‘s Systems Argument, we can see that the advice of 
the revised MC would be misleading: Given similar behaviors by, e.g., humans and 
crows when it comes to puzzle solving, the revised MC recommends erring on the side of 
explaining the crows‘ behavior in terms of ancestral features common to humans and 
crows – i.e., homologous features. Therefore, not only does the Systems Argument ignore 
homoplasies, but it glosses over the fact that the same structure or ability can be 
homoplastic in one respect and homologous in another. As we saw, for example, the 
DVR is homologous with the mammalian neocortex at the cellular level, but homoplastic 
at the functional level. In summary, the SA for the natural null relies on an oversimplified 
view of the evolution of complex systems, neglecting both convergence and the variety of 
ways that systems can be homologous or homoplastic. It is no wonder that, as de Waal 
and Ferrari write, ―Scala Naturae assumptions remain prevalent enough [in comparative 
cognition] that cognitive similarities between distant taxa, such as birds and primates, are 
sometimes viewed as antithetical to evolutionary theory‖ (de Waal & Ferrari 2010, 201). 
Energetic Cost Argument (ECA) 
The final EIM argument for retaining the preference for the Hn is what I call the 
Energetic Cost Argument (ECA). On the ECA, fitness tradeoffs between metabolically 
expensive cognitive machinery and the benefits that accrue to clever organisms are – all 
else being equal – expected to favor the selection of cognitive simplicity. Most organisms 
are, on this view, expected to use simple, metabolically inexpensive, cognitive 
machinery. Because ―natural selection often results in the evolution of less complex 
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cognitive structures,‖ it is rational to expect that the cognitive systems responsible for the 
observed behaviors are simple (Mameli & Bortolotti 2006, 87).   
This argument proceeds as follows: Sophisticated cognitive abilities require 
sophisticated cognitive machinery, i.e., brain structures.68 However, increases in brain 
sophistication – understood as increases in size, density, connectivity, or activation – 
require increases in energy consumption. More sophisticated brains are not only more 
metabolically expensive than less sophisticated brains, but pound-for-pound more 
expensive than other organs. Any increase in brain size will therefore be, ceteris paribus, 
the most metabolically costly evolutionary option. Since increases in metabolic needs 
under conditions of competition for limited resources, and barring compensating benefits, 
tend to reduce fitness, an increase in brain sophistication must be compensated for with 
some fitness-increasing ability.  However, there are many less energetically costly means 
of increasing fitness, such as modifications made to more energy-efficient organs, or the 
development of less costly cognitive mechanisms capable of generating fitness-enhancing 
behaviors. Therefore, increases in brain sophistication will tend to be the least likely 
adaptive strategy. We should therefore expect very few instances of extant organisms 
with highly developed brains and, by extension, with highly developed cognitive 
functions.  
                                                          
68
 To control for difference in size among organisms, scientists typically take the size of 
brains relative to body size, known as the encephalization quotient, as the relevant 
measurement.  
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The ECA runs into conceptual problems at nearly every step. First, it 
problematically assumes that cognitive sophistication correlates positively with increased 
energetic (metabolic) costs. Certainly, larger, denser, and more active brains carry larger 
metabolic costs. However, not all evolutionary increases in behavioral sophistication may 
require changes to the physical structure of the brain. Some increases in behavioral 
flexibility, for example, may be exaptations in which already existing neural machinery is 
co-opted for a new function; others may be evolutionary by-products. For example, the 
human ability to drive did not require the development of new brain regions; instead, it 
required the repurposing of parts of an existing system. The same may be true of, e.g., 
metacognition in rats or planning in crows. Similarly, it is far from clear that the 
distinction between, e.g., first-order and second-order intentionality corresponds to an 
increase in the sophistication of cognitive machinery, much less to increased energy 
expenditure. The burden of proof is on those wishing to establish this correspondence. 
Second, the argument fails to consider the possibility of developmental 
constraints on the kinds of cognitive architecture that is allowed to develop. The Hn calls 
for the simplest cognitive system, but even if selection favored cognitive simplicity, 
extant cognitive systems may not be the simplest possible systems, but merely the 
simplest among those available to selection. Further, although one may object that the 
associative system was clearly available to selection, there is reason to doubt that 
associative cognitive architecture has lower built-in energetic costs. The view that 
associative systems are metabolically inexpensive has been challenged by a number of 
recent thinkers. For example, Gallistel (2008) argues that associative mechanisms would 
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require far greater energy expenditures than alternative mechanisms. Gallistel uses the 
honeybee navigation system to argue that the honeybee brain does not have enough 
computing power to process information through associations alone, and must require a 
representational system of mental maps (ibid).  
Finally, this argument fails to justify the preference for the Hn in the case of the 
many animals whose neuroanatomy satisfies the conditions for complex cognition, unless 
it can be shown that the same brain uses less energy to perform, e.g., associative 
functions than it does to perform representational functions. 
 In summary, the argument from metabolic cost is heavily flawed. As a 
mechanistic story about selection favoring cognitive simplicity across taxa, it is a 
nonstarter. Furthermore, the attempt to reduce cognitive simplicity to computational 
simplicity, and to attach the latter to metabolic costliness run into conceptual problems 
that make any strong claims premature, at best. 
In fact, all three EIM arguments for retaining the natural null as the default are 
inadequate. The Taxonomic Ubiquity Argument begs the question by assuming that, 
since many organisms have been shown to employ associative processes, their behavior 
cannot also be driven by alternative cognitive processes. The Systems Argument takes a 
controversial position regarding the evolution of complex systems, giving too little 
weight to convergence of function. In addition, it appears to conflict with cladistic 
parsimony. Finally, the Energetic Cost Argument takes a simplistic view of cognitive 
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function by presuming that metabolic rates track cognitive complexity, and that metabolic 
rates are visible to selection. 
4.1.4 Summary 
I have shown that a general preference for the natural null has been justified on neither a 
priori metaphysical grounds, methodological grounds, nor on empirically informed 
metaphysical grounds.69 I should note here that I believe that theoretical justifications 
from the empirical sciences, such as arguments appealing to the evolution of cognitive 
modularity or metabolic demand, are good examples of the types of justification that 
should enter into debate about the construction of the null hypothesis. The arguments I 
have outlined above fail to support a blanket preference for the natural null, but it is 
possible that a better argument may come along. These types of considerations are 
appropriate because, as I will argue below, they should inform the construction of a null 
hypothesis. I turn now to my suggested modification to the NPM, which includes a 
change in how one chooses the null hypothesis if the natural null is abandoned.  
4.2 Modified Semantic NPM  
Thus far I have argued that in order to rid itself of the parsimony-based bias of Cognitive 
Conservatism, comparative cognition must rid itself of the Hn. Since no blanket 
justification for retaining the Hn is forthcoming, as I argued in §4.1, the only remaining 
move for those wishing to retain the semantic NPM is to replace the Hn. 
                                                          
69
 A final strategy remains for the supporter of the Hn, viz., a justification on anti-realist 
methodological grounds. However, since most comparative cognition researchers wish to 
produce cognitive models that describe actual systems, I will not pursue an anti-realist 
justification of the Hn. 
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In this section, I wish to propose an alternative solution to the problem of biasing 
values, such as parsimony, in comparative cognition. I will show how comparative 
cognition researchers can retain the dominant statistical framework within which they 
have been operating – and continue to operate – while eliminating the problematic biases. 
Although the problem of biases infiltrating statistical systems may have alternative 
solutions, my solution aims at reformation rather than revolution: I propose modifying 
the semantic NPM. The first step in this reform is replacing the natural null with what I 
call the contextual null. The second step in the reform makes room for appropriate value 
judgments by interpreting the error-rate asymmetry pragmatically. I address these in 
§4.2.1 and §4.2.2, respectively.  
4.2.1 Replacing the Natural Null with a Contextual Null within the NPM 
Since the Hn is a feature of an idiosyncratic interpretation of the NPM, as Godfrey-Smith 
suggests, and because justifications for this feature don‘t stand up under scrutiny, I 
conclude that the Hn needs to be eliminated or replaced. If the semantic NPM is to be 
retained, then, by definition, the Hn must be replaced rather than eliminated. In this 
section I recommend replacing the Hn with the Hc.  
The Contextual Null 
What is the contextual null? In brief, it is a null hypothesis that is chosen based on a 
variety of contextual information. A null hypothesis is contextual if the following are 
true:  
A. It respects the differences among experimental settings and among the organisms 
being studied, and  
181 
 
 
B.  It does not presuppose either cognitive complexity or cognitive simplicity.  
 
Within comparative cognition, the Hc is defined against a suite of background 
information about the research subjects, such as ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
information against the background of developmental and evolutionary theories, 
information about species-typical and individual behavioral profiles, neuroanatomical 
homologies and homoplasies, ecological context, and information from earlier studies 
and observational data.70 This is diagrammed in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1: Elements of a Contextual Null (Hc) 
 
Figure 4.1: This diagram shows the kinds of information that ought to inform the construction of a 
contextual null hypothesis.  
 
Evolutionary considerations include the species‘ phylogenetic proximity to 
species about whom more is known in order to gauge the likelihood of homologous 
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 Fitzpatrick (2008) draws a very similar conclusion about the need for background 
information in hypothesis testing. However, he does not frame his case in statistical 
terms. His account is intended to displace the parsimony-based reading of MC, 
understood as a heuristic, with a principle he calls ―Evidentialism.‖ 
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cognitive structures and abilities. These considerations already enter into decisions about 
which species to study when searching for a given ability, but not into the decision to cast 
a given hypothesis as the presumptive null. For example, chimpanzees‘ close 
phylogenetic proximity to humans is a frequently cited reason to test them for the 
presence of human-like abilities, such as tool use and metacognition.  
 Developmental considerations include, inter alia, hypotheses regarding 
developmental constraints on the evolution of the relevant cognitive and behavioral traits 
and the effects of the environment on gene expression. Ecological context would include 
information about the test subjects‘ behavior in its natural habitat, such as whether it is a 
social or solitary animal, whether it hunts or stores its food, whether it uses tools, and so 
on.71 Consider the following example of research that has been guided by both ecological 
and developmental considerations. Furlong et al. (2008) tested chimpanzees for their 
ability to use tools based on the knowledge that chimpanzees use tools under natural 
conditions (e.g., dipping sticks into ant mounds to catch ants; using leaves to scoop up 
water). Based on the negative results obtained by a previous study by Povinelli (2000), 
which concluded that chimpanzees lack the competency for flexible use of implements, 
Furlong et al. hypothesized that Povinelli‘s chimps were developmentally stunted as a 
result of being brought up under socially impoverished conditions. Furlong et al. tested 
chimpanzees with different socialization backgrounds, and found that the ability to 
manipulate tools in a flexible manner (i.e., one suggestive of causal understanding) was 
                                                          
71
 Once again, these considerations already drive the research projects, suggesting that 
researchers consider such information to be probability-conferring. 
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positively correlated with social histories. This example shows the value of social 
ecology and its effects on chimpanzee intellectual development. Building such 
considerations into the null hypothesis would ensure that crucial information is not left 
out of the experimental design.  
The Hc should also include information from previous studies and observational 
data. If my suggestion is adopted, including the work of earlier experimental studies 
would require re-evaluating earlier studies for the presence of bias. This can be achieved 
by analyzing the choice of null hypothesis to ensure that unwarranted metaphysical 
preferences had not been smuggled in, and that relevant empirical and theoretical 
information was included. In order to limit introducing subjective biases at this step, the 
researchers should make their re-evaluation results public by including these reasons in 
their published research.  
This brings me to the final condition of the Hc approach, viz., that the 
aforementioned reasons for opting for a particular contextually-driven null hypothesis 
should be clearly articulated in the published research articles. Once the assumptions 
grounding a given H0 are clearly articulated, these can begin to be interrogated by the 
scientific community. Toward this end, the Hc approach demands that, e.g., comparative 
psychologists have working knowledge of the basics of related subfields, such as 
neuroanatomy, at least with respect to the species of animals they study. This is not a 
small demand, but one that many comparative cognition researchers recognize as part of 
their domain.  
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The upshot is that my proposed Hc ensures that Type I errors will always be more 
epistemically significant because probability-conferring evidence is built into the H0. 
Sometimes this method will produce an associationist H0, but this will no longer be based 
on a blanket Occamist preference for simple ontologies, but on an empirically-informed 
expectation. This suggestion respects the intuition that default hypotheses ought to be 
those that we have the best reason to adopt. In the end, my account preserves the risk-
controlling structure of the semantic account of the NPM while eliminating the 
questionable metaphysics and replacing it with empirical information. Now that I have 
explained what the Hc does, I will show how my proposed Hc might avoid the Cognitive 
Conservatism bias, using some of the case studies from earlier in the dissertation. The 
following discussion will explain how the contextual null is more sensitive to the 
hierarchy of nulls (Theoretical, Experimental, and Statistical Nulls), as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
Contextual Null: Case Study 
To illustrate how the contextual null helps to guard against CC, I now return to the case 
study mentioned in (3.2.1), viz., Foote and Crystal‘s (2007) test and their 2009 rejection 
of the metacognitive explanation of rats‘ performance on a duration-discrimination task.   
To recap, Foote and Crystal (2007) tested rats on a series of duration-
discrimination tasks in order to test for the presumptively metacognitive ability of 
uncertainty-monitoring. The rats consistently performed better on trials in which they 
were given the option to decline tests than on trials in which they were forced to answer. 
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Furthermore, the rats ―declined difficult tests more often than easy tests‖ (Foote and 
Crystal 2012, 188). The results suggested that rats monitored their uncertainty, accurately 
predicting how well they would perform on a given test.  
How did Foote and Crystal arrive at their null hypothesis, and was it chosen in the 
contextual manner I propose, or on the basis of being the simplest? While I cannot opine 
about the psychological motivations of these researchers, looking at their published 
explanations is suggestive. Crystal and Foote‘s research program on rat metacognition 
provides an interesting case for the present purposes because these researchers bring 
significant contextual knowledge to bear on their experimental research, and yet accede 
to the constraints of a CC, on which the theoretical null hypothesis should be that rats 
lack metacognition. This constraint is clearly visible in their explicit writing and in the 
direction of their research program. Recall that Crystal and Foote (2009) withdrew their 
support for their earlier conclusion, on the grounds that a new associative explanation 
became available in the form of the Smith et al. (2008) model mentioned above. In a 
more recent publication, Foote and Crystal (2012) admit that the availability of the 
associative model defeats their metacognitive hypothesis, and attempt to structure future 
research to rule out associative explanations. They write, 
Importantly, Smith et al., (2008) subsequently constructed a model … that 
showed that a non-metacognition model could produce the same pattern of 
behavior that we observed in rats [in the 2007 experiment]. Clearly, 
putative evidence for metacognition in rats is critically undermined when a 
non-metacognition model can produce the observed pattern of behavior. 
(Foote and Crystal 2012, 188) 
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This final sentence is telling: when two competing explanations – the metacognitive 
explanation and any non-metacognitive explanation – are underdetermined by the 
behavioral evidence, the metacognitive explanation has the burden of proof. Since 
associative explanations are considered incompatible with metacognitive explanations, 
any associative model that makes the same predictions as the metacognitive model will 
be preferred. The 2009 retraction and the 2012 reiteration of the reasons for the retraction 
clearly demonstrate that Crystal and Foote take the theoretical null to be that rats lack 
metacognition.  
This theoretical null translates into the experimental null that “Rats do not 
monitor their own uncertainty‖ and the statistical null that ―Rats will opt to pass 
ambiguous tests in an open-choice condition at the same rate with which they pass 
unambiguous tests.‖ This can be symbolized as, ―H0: Δ = 0,‖ where ―Δ‖ stands for the 
difference between the two test conditions. A Δ of 0 means that no difference was 
detected between the two conditions.  But note that this is just the result one would 
expect if a preference for a natural null of no difference were used in setting up the above 
hypotheses.  Over the long run, the error-rate asymmetry would favor wrongly accepting 
―Δ = 0‖ over the null that would suggest metacognition. Moreover, the theoretical null 
determines the course of the research programs on metacognition: if metacognition were 
the theoretical null, then the burden of proof would require Smith et al. to produce a 
model that made more correct predictions than the metacognitive model. In order to test 
these predictions, researchers who wished to defeat the metacognitive explanation would 
187 
 
 
need to devise experimental protocols that differentiated between a specific associative 
model and the metacognitive model.  
I have suggested that the null hypothesis in the rat metacognition case appears to 
have been chosen based largely on a priori assumptions, rather than contextual evidence. 
However, contextual evidence did factor into the decision to assume a null hypothesis of 
―no metacognition.‖ Foote and Crystal (2007) note that, if independent evidence 
suggesting that rats were capable of metacognition in a condition different from the 
uncertainty-monitoring paradigm had been available, the burden of proof would be on the 
no-metacognition hypothesis. This is precisely the sort of information that my contextual 
null recommends be taken into account when devising a null, and this makes their case 
significantly stronger. Note, however, that the availability of such information is itself 
contingent on earlier trials having been performed using the contextual approach. If 
earlier trials had been conducted against the background assumption that ―association 
trumps metacognition,‖ then these earlier experiments may have produced biased results.  
Moreover, if Foote and Crystal agree that information from earlier trials is 
relevant to determining the burden of proof, and, hence, the null hypothesis, then why 
would they not similarly include information from other domains? In the broadest terms, 
if we wish to use a contextual null, then we will need to assess the following cluster of 
issues: the rats‘ ecological context, relevant features of their neuroanatomy, their 
phylogenetic proximity to other animals who exhibit uncertainty monitoring or related 
cognitive abilities, and information from earlier trials, if any, on rats‘ cognitive abilities. 
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We would then choose as our experimental null hypothesis whichever option seemed 
more likely, between ―rats monitor their uncertainty‖ and ―rats fail to monitor their 
uncertainty.‖ It is certainly possible that a contextual approach may instantiate a null of 
―no uncertainty monitoring,‖ but my point is that this question ought to be determined 
empirically, not by employing an a priori metaphysical rule.   
As a matter of fact, researchers generally, and Crystal and Foote in particular, 
already draw on this kind of information in setting about to test for, e.g., metacognition in 
rats. My suggestion makes use of this fact and recommends that researchers draw on 
what they know – and what they know to be relevant – in setting up the experimental 
protocols. Foote and Crystal, for example, knew that rats have previously exhibited 
elements of episodic-like memory (Babbs & Crystal 2006). This evidence is relevant 
because, as they write in the results and discussion section of their 2007 report, 
―knowledge about temporal information may play a central role in the organization of 
behavior…, and consequently, detailed knowledge about when events occur … may have 
contributed to our experimental evidence for metacognition‖ (Foote and Crystal 2007, 
552). While clearly speculative, (―information may play a central role‖ ―may have 
contributed to‖) this information is pertinent for the question they wished to answer about 
uncertainty monitoring. If researchers have good reason (based on the criteria above) to 
believe that rats monitor their uncertainty, then these reasons should inform their choice 
of the null hypothesis.  
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Addressing Remaining Concerns About the Contextual Null  
So far, I have shown that the Hc is preferable to the Hn because it eliminates an 
unwarranted metaphysical bias and replaces it with an evidence-driven strategy. What 
remains now is to show that the Hc survives possible objections, three of which I shall 
now consider.  
First Objection to the Hc: Is the Hc overly demanding? 
First, one might object that the demands placed on researchers by the list of desiderata for 
the Hc is simply too high because no single comparative psychologist is likely to have the 
training in evolutionary biology or neuroscience to make a fully informed specification of 
the Hc. In response, it should be noted that complete background information is not – and 
cannot – be required. The first step is to limit the scope of the Hc to the information 
pertinent to the question addressed by the experiment. For example, if an experimenter 
wants to test for pain perception in squid, knowing whether squid possess the neural 
substrates of nociception (perception of noxious stimuli) is pertinent to the question, 
while knowing, e.g., whether squid form pair-bonds is not. Minimally, the scope of 
pertinent questions will be limited to the classes of questions I listed above, which 
exclude a tremendous amount of information. Of course, even this is too broad, since no 
single researcher or reasonably sized team of researchers can hope to know all there is to 
know about, e.g., the ecology, neurobiology, phylogeny and ontogeny of squids and other 
cephalopods, much less to have expert knowledge in the theories in which some of the 
discoveries were based. Requiring that a researcher know both all there is to know about 
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the subject of scientific study, and the probability of this information yielding the most 
likely null hypothesis, is obviously too much to ask.  
Instead of complete knowledge of the background information, I suggest that 
information should be limited to what is likely to be relevant, for the minimal goal of 
arriving at a null hypothesis that the researcher is justified in believing to be the most 
plausible. Current practices provide the template for relevance:  
Relevance (Minimal Criterion): Information is relevant for the contextual null if it is 
the sort that is typically used by a researcher when deciding how to allocate her time and 
energy among possible research projects. This includes decision about which questions 
are worth asking. Thus, complete information about the subject of study is not required.   
 
This means of addressing the relevance question draws on standard practice, focusing on 
what scientists already take to be relevant in deciding when and how to invest their 
intellectual and personal resources.  
Beyond this starting point, the concept of relevance can be refined further. First, 
my account of relevance ought to exclude some the clearly non-epistemic reasons that 
scientists have for pursuing a line of research from affecting the choice of a contextual 
null hypothesis. For instance, a researcher may decide to invest her resources into a 
project because her research institution will not support the research she would like to 
pursue. My relevance criterion should be capable of excluding information of this kind. 
Second, my relevance criterion should offer a means of focusing the search for 
information by offering what might be called a stopping rule. This ―rule‖ should be 
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flexible: it should offer the researcher a means of ending her quest for information at a 
reasonable point, while allowing her the option to continue her search.  
In order to meet the first goal of excluding non-epistemic information, the 
relevance condition should include the following refinement: 
Refinement 1 (Exclusion Rule): Relevance must be indexed to the question being posed 
by means of the predictive utility of the information.  
 
Here is how the first refinement works. Suppose that the question is whether rats possess 
metacognition. The researcher‘s goal in constructing a contextual null hypothesis is to 
use information that will make her hypothesis the most plausible of all the alternatives 
she has considered. What makes it the case that, e.g., the rats‘ neurobiology is the right 
sort of information to use when constructing a contextual null, but, e.g., the average body 
temperature of rats is the wrong sort of information for this task? One answer is that 
knowing about general rat neurobiology can help predict a specific rat‘s cognitive 
capabilities, while knowing about the average body temperature of rats does not help to 
reliably predict rats‘ cognitive capabilities. What makes neurobiological information a 
superior predictor, in this case, is the presence of a causal relationship between rat 
neurobiology and rat cognition. Such a relationship is absent between average body 
temperature of rat on the one hand and rat cognition on the other. Similarly, evolutionary 
histories and ecologically stable behavioral tendencies are all predictors of rat cognition, 
because the relationships between phylogeny and cognition and environment and 
cognition are also causal. This commonality is important even though the nature of the 
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causal relationships just mentioned are different from the case of neurobiology: what it 
means for an ecological niche to cause rats to obtain certain cognitive abilities is clearly 
different from what it means for a rat‘s brain to cause the rat‘s cognitive abilities. The 
same can be said of the means by which evolutionary mechanisms cause a rat to have the 
cognitive abilities that it has (Cf. Godfrey-Smith 2010). My account can accept this sort 
of causal pluralism
72
 since I don‘t stake anything on the nature of causation.  
However, even with this account of relevance, the suggestion may appear overly 
demanding. After all, one might object, there is more relevant information than one might 
know what to do with. How does a researcher decide when to stop gathering the 
potentially relevant facts and formulate a contextual null? In other words, what stopping 
rule might be used? My suggestion is simple: 
Refinement 2 (Stopping Rule): After formulating a research question and a range of 
possible null hypotheses that address your question, search for some manageable number 
of items that fall into the categories I listed, and stop when your credence in one of these 
hypotheses is higher than it is for the others by a good margin.  
 
How a researcher determines a good margin is a matter of personal judgment, although 
she must, minimally, be able to defend her choice to an audience of peers. What my 
suggestion loses in precision, as compared with the natural null approach, it gains in 
                                                          
72
 By ―causal pluralism‖ I mean a pluralist view of causation, on which the phrase, ―A 
caused B‖ may pick out any of a number of mutually irreducible relationship between A 
and B. The question of whether causal pluralism is right is beyond the scope of this 
project.  
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being significantly more informed by expert reasoning.
 73
 Moreover, since my approach 
calls for bringing the implicit reasons for pursing an experimental paradigm into the light 
of publishable discussion, it offers the added benefit of making the reasons that go into 
choosing a null hypothesis transparent and therefore open to a deeper level of peer 
review. 
Second Objection to the Hc: Why Not Move to Bayesian Analysis? 
A second objection concerns alternative means of eliminating bias – either by modifying 
the NPM in a different way than I propose, or by moving to an alternative statistical 
framework, such as Bayesian statistics. I will address the Bayesian point first. This 
objection proceeds as follows: even if the demands of the Hc were possible to meet, 
advocating for an empirically informed starting point (the Hc) is a step in the Bayesian 
direction and should either be made fully by replacing the NPM with Bayesian analysis 
or not made at all. I concede that the intuitions behind a Hc are similar to those behind 
building a strong prior. Both the Hc and Bayesian updating suffer from the same 
weaknesses, as illustrated by the first concern, viz., how exactly to arrive at a value for 
the prior probability or to specify the precise Hc. That is, for both the revised NPM and 
the Bayesian alternative, the advantages of increased epistemic content comes at the price 
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 One way of refining my account of relevance further may be by drawing on what 
Michael Strevens (2004) calls a ―difference maker‖ in scientific explanation. On 
Strevens‘ account, ―difference makers‖ are explanatorily relevant causes. Relevant causes 
can be conceptually separated from all other causes in a web of causal events in virtue, 
roughly, of their crucial contribution to the explanandum‘s having obtained. Making use 
of the notion of a difference-maker for prediction would allow me to offer a more precise 
stopping rule for sifting through an overwhelming amount of causally related 
information. However, this project is beyond the scope of the present project. Moreover, 
this level of precision may not be necessary for guiding research practices. 
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of translating empirical and theoretical information into default hypotheses prior to 
testing novel hypotheses. One advantage of the Hc is that it typically does not require a 
numerical value or range in the case of comparative cognition, whereas the prior 
probability does. As I wrote above, the contextual approach to devising a null requires 
only that the expert consider the relevant pre-experimental evidence and determine which 
of the possible relevant hypotheses is more likely to be correct than the others. This is 
significantly less demanding than identifying a precise value for the prior probability of a 
hypothesis. As a more general point, my account is neutral on the question of whether the 
NPM should be retained or replaced by Bayesianism. It merely recommends, given the 
overwhelming popularity of the NPM, that current practices be modified to remove 
unwarranted assumptions about simplicity.74 In other words, I am not looking for a 
revolution, but merely a reformation.  
However, one may further object that my solution to the problem of bias does not 
go far enough even within the framework of the NPM. Alternatives reformations include 
Deborah Mayo‘s (2004) and Mayo and Aris Spanos‘s (2006, 2011) severity analysis 
approach, which offers a means of probing the reliability of the testing procedure. Why 
would I not opt to reform the NPM using Mayo‘s and Spanos‘s approach instead? The 
short answer to this question is that such a reformation, though a significant improvement 
over current methods for a variety of reasons, would be incomplete with respect to 
eliminating the bias without the addition of the contextual information I propose.  The 
slightly longer answer is found below.  
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 If this move is a step in the Bayesian direction, so much the better for the Bayesians. 
195 
 
 
Third Objection to the Hc: Why Not Adopt Deborah Mayo’s Severity Analysis 
Approach to the NPM? 
Suppose that comparative cognition researchers wish to eliminate the pre-empirical bias 
of Cognitive Conservatism but prefer to retain the NPM. Is it possible for them to achieve 
this goal without replacing the natural null with the contextual null, as I have suggested? 
In this section I consider an alternative bias-reducing emendation to the NPM, as 
proposed by Deborah Mayo (2004) and Mayo and Spanos (2006, 2011), called the 
severity analysis approach within an error-statistical philosophy of scientific evidence.75 
In order to appreciate the force of the objection, let me briefly summarize the error-
statistical strategy and the severity-analysis approach within which it is situated. 
Mayo and Spanos take the goal of science to be learning, and aim to provide an 
account of statistical methodology that would permit learning from experiment. In order 
to achieve this goal, they offer an account of how experimental data can come to count as 
evidence for or against the test hypothesis. On their view, the NPM can be used for this 
purpose, but only if its products can be interpreted inferentially, rather than behaviorally. 
Toward this goal, they offer a means of supplementing the purely behavioral 
interpretation of the accept/reject procedure with an inferential interpretation.  
Recall that, on the behavioral interpretation of the NPM, ―the goal is to adjust our 
behavior so that in the long-run we will not act erroneously too often‖ (Mayo and Spanos 
                                                          
75
 I owe the suggestion that a severity-analysis approach may do a better job of reducing 
bias than my contextual null approach to Kent Staley‘s commentary on my symposium 
presentation at the Pacific Division meeting of the APA, 2013. 
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2011, 158). The inferential interpretation, like the semantic interpretation of the NPM, 
offers a strategy for learning from experiments in ―contexts of scientific inference‖ where 
―the goal is an inference about what is the case regarding a particular phenomenon‖ 
(ibid). This interpretive shift allows Mayo and Spanos to formulate an account of what 
makes data (x0) good evidence for a hypothesis.  They refer to this account as the 
―Severity Principle,‖ and define it as follows:  
Severity Principle Data x0 (produced by process G) provides good evidence for 
hypothesis H (just) to the extent that test T severely passes H with 
x0. (Mayo & Spanos 2011, 162) 
The severity principle captures a triadic relationship among the test (T), the hypothesis 
under test (H), and the data (x0). The intuition behind it is that the more reliable our 
methods of probing the world, and the more appropriate those methods are to the 
question we seek, the more reason we have to treat the results of such probes as evidence-
providing. With this account of evidence in hand, Mayo and Spanos expand on what this 
reliability entails – that is, what it means for a hypothesis to pass a severe test with some 
data. They write: 
A hypothesis H passes a severe test T with data x0 if, 
(S-1) x0 accords with H, (for a suitable notion of accordance) and 
(S-2) with very high probability, test T would have produced a result that accords 
less well with H than x0 does, if H  were false or incorrect (Mayo and Spanos 
2011, 164) 
To put it simply, what it means for a hypothesis to pass a severe test is that the hypothesis 
was corroborated by data and that the means of producing that data were unlikely to 
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produce different results. Note that S-2 draws on the notion of long-run error rates to 
come to a conclusion about a particular case. In other words, the severity-testing method 
shifts the focus from the probability of errors over many repeated trials to the reliability 
of specific tests with respect to a given question. Again, the intuition driving this 
approach is straight-forward: if an experimental method is reliable over the long term, 
then we have good reason to trust its results in a particular case. Mayo and Spanos 
explain this ―severity rationale‖ as follows: ―The long run properties … utilize error 
probabilities to characterize the capacity of our inferential tools for finding things out in 
the particular case‖ (Mayo and Spanos 2011, 163).   
 More concretely, Mayo and Spanos reinterpret the NPM in two ways – first, by 
re-interpreting the error-rates as signs of reliability, and, second, by conducting a ―post-
data‖ analysis to test for the sensitivity of the method. A sensitive method can tell the 
researcher not only that, e.g., a null should be rejected, but also how severely alternatives, 
defined as different values discrepant from the null, are accepted. For example, suppose a 
test severely rejects the H0: Δ = 0. According to Mayo and Spanos, the test‘s sensitivity is 
a measure of whether it could severely rule in favor of any of the alternatives hypotheses 
of the form ―Δ = 0 + t‖, for different values of ―t.‖ In this way, Mayo and Spanos hope to 
make the NPM not only an inferential program, but one with the resources to calibrate the 
sensitivity of its own inferential instruments, allowing them to differentiate among fine-
grained hypotheses. As a consequence of this post-data analysis, the value of the 
(statistical) null hypothesis is less relevant than it is on the traditional approach to the 
NPM. For this reason, one may suppose that the severity analysis undermines the 
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importance of the null hypothesis, and, hence, undercuts the force of my contextual 
proposal.  
The discussion has now brought us back to the original objection: why not 
consider moving to a different version of the NPM, such as the severity analysis method, 
rather than alter the semantic NPM? The answer is that this move would not eliminate 
Cognitive Conservatism. The severity analysis approach is surely an advantage over the 
orthodox Neyman-Pearson Methodology, insofar as it provides a means of testing a range 
of hypotheses using the resources of the NPM. However, even though it makes the 
precise value of the statistical null hypothesis less important, it does not avoid the 
problematic bias against imputing sophisticated cognition to nonhuman animals. Instead, 
it (explicitly) aims to remove contextual information from the hypothesis under test, 
while making the testing procedure more sensitive to errors. Contrary to my suggestion of 
including contextual information into the choice of a null hypothesis, Mayo and Spanos 
write that, ―Far from wishing to inject our background opinions in the hypotheses being 
studied, we seek designs that help us avoid being misled or biased by initial beliefs‖ 
(Mayo and Spanos 2011, 160). However, this choice neglects the importance of the 
inferential gap between the statistical hypotheses and the experimental hypotheses. To 
illustrate this point, consider again the rat metacognition example from Foote and Crystal 
(2007). Recall that the statistical null hypothesis that is subject to direct test is that ―rats 
will decline the hard tests under the forced-choice condition at the same rate as they will 
under the open-choice condition‖ or Δ= 0. This statistical null is chosen because it is 
presumed to be one plausible consequence of the experimental null – in this case, the 
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experimental null is ―rats are unaware of their own uncertainty.‖ However, even if the 
data showed that Δ> 0, the experimental null that ―rats are unaware of their own 
uncertainty‖ need not be rejected. In fact, this is precisely what Crystal and Foote (2009) 
as well as Foote and Crystal (2012) argue about their own earlier experiment: yes, the rats 
preferentially declined ―harder‖ tests, but, the claim goes, this may be accounted for by 
an associative mechanism rather than the (metacognitive) awareness of uncertainty. Such 
shifting of standards should continue until the experimental null hypothesis – which 
determines which statistical nulls we choose – is carefully considered against the weight 
of evidence, rather than by convention. As long as researchers continue to choose 
experimental nulls that correspond to the animal lacking the putatively sophisticated 
cognitive ability or system, the statistical nulls will reflect this choice even with the 
added sensitivity of the severity-analysis approach.  
But, there is good news as well. Even if the statistical null is shaped by the 
experimental null, moving to the error-statistical approach may allow us to assess the 
severity with which each statistical null passed or failed. Suppose that the statistical null 
that Δ= 0 passes a test, T(α), but only with low severity. In this case, unlike in the case of 
the orthodox NP method, the researchers would not be permitted to conclude that the null 
should be accepted, even though the null passed. The severity analysis would effectively 
remove the arbitrariness of the error-rate asymmetry, making the preferred (null) 
hypothesis simply the one that we wish to explore. However, exploration of a set of 
wrong questions will still yield biased results. For this reason, my proposal recommends 
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changing the statistical null hypothesis by changing the experimental null hypothesis, and 
doing so in an empirically and theoretically informed manner.  
Mayo and Spanos write that ―[in] the ‗severe testing‘ philosophy of induction, the 
quantitative assessment offered by error probabilities tells us not ‗how probable,‘ but 
rather, ‗how well probed‘ hypotheses are‖ (2009, 328). I agree, but maintain that these 
well-probed hypotheses should, in order to avoid bias, also exhibit a high degree of 
probity. Thus, while the severity analysis approach is, arguably, an improvement over 
traditional interpretations of the NPM, the contextual null suggestion is still preferable for 
eliminating the bias of Cognitive Conservatism.  
Summary 
At this stage, I have made the case for modifying the NPM by replacing the natural null 
with what I have called the contextual null. This move eliminates the dubious value of 
parsimony from the statistical methods in comparative cognition. However, I do not wish 
to advocate eliminating all non-epistemic values from the experimental setting of 
comparative cognition. For example, ethical considerations have a role to play in the 
design of experiments, as I will argue in the following section. These values are 
appropriate because comparative cognition research does not take place in a moral 
vacuum: the results of the research are commonly used to inform policy decisions about 
the treatment of nonhuman animals. Where comparative cognition science plays the role 
of affecting policy, the researchers acquire additional ethical responsibilities. These 
responsibilities include, inter alia, the responsibility to communicate the results clearly 
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and without distortion, and the responsibility of setting up their research strategies in a 
way that is the least likely to cause harm to those who can be harmed. The following 
section (§4.2.2) offers a means for incorporating this ethical responsibility into the 
weighing of competing experimental hypotheses. In so doing, I make room once again 
for the error-rate asymmetry, assigning it a more productive role. I draw on the inductive 
risk literature, especially as this has been applied to cases in toxicology, to show that 
allowing ethical values to guide portions of the research, when done properly, does not 
undermine the objectivity of the research. This amendment, however, is conceptually 
separate from my treatment of the null hypothesis.  
 
4.2.2 Introducing a Pragmatic Error-Controlling Strategy into the NPM 
 
[An] ungenerous interpretation of one‟s neighbor‟s actions may lead one to 
express an unjust estimate of his moral character and thus do him grave social 
wrong; but an ungenerous interpretation of the faculties of animals can hardly be 
said to be open to like practical consequences –C. Lloyd Morgan 1894,54 
I disagree with Morgan: unjust estimates of animal mental faculties can and do have 
practical consequences – even unjust consequences. One simple example comes from the 
history of attributing pain-perception to farm animals. Veterinarians routinely performed 
invasive procedures on farm animals without anesthesia because they were skeptical that 
animals consciously felt pain. Although pain skepticism appears to be retreating, some 
doubt remains regarding animals‘ ability to suffer. Thus, because scientific conclusions 
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are used to shape policies, such ―ungenerous interpretations‖ can indeed have practical 
consequences. With this in mind, I propose that, in addition to including a Hc, the NPM 
should be augmented by allowing non-epistemic values to enter into the weighting-
process of error rates. In Godfrey-Smith‘s terms, I suggest that the modified semantic 
NPM should be combined with the pragmatic reading of the NPM. 
Although this suggestion may prima facie seem like a radical proposal, one must 
remember that the values chosen for the error-rates are already conventional – scientists 
choose a 5% rate or a 1% rate for α because that is the rate of long-term error with which 
they are comfortable. Given that the error rates, α and β, are flexible, including pragmatic 
considerations should not be difficult. While it is true that a smaller α is associated with a 
more demanding test over repeated trials, no theorem specifies just how small α has to be 
in a given test. Currently, the value of α is typically set to .05 or, in some cases, .01, and 
the value of β is sometimes not set at all. Since it is already convention strengthened by 
tradition that sets the values, there is no reason why these values cannot be open to 
further tuning.  
To see how this might work, consider the hypothetical case of a study that aims to 
prove that a simple invertebrate such as a sea cucumber (member of the class of 
Holothuroidea), experiences pain. Suppose that pain is a morally salient feature and that 
comparative cognition had the means to test with adequate reliability for its presence or 
absence. Although everything we know about pain would likely result in a Hc = ―sea 
cucumbers do not experience pain,‖ we would want this test to be more stringent than one 
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that measured a less morally salient feature, such as its ability to locomote. Since we 
believe that the sea cucumber probably lacks the ability to experience pain, and since we 
know that the ethical consequences of committing a Type I error are ethically 
problematic, we would want to decrease the chance of committing a Type I error for this 
test. Translating the ethical concern into a numerical value may be difficult, but not 
impossible: after all, the same challenges face researchers who must translate qualitative 
information into quantitative values for α and β according to the traditional NPM. 
In the case of comparative cognition, pragmatic considerations would include the 
ethical repercussions for failures to impute a potentially morally salient ability, such as 
pain perception, to an animal species. This way, although Type I errors will continue to 
be more epistemically serious, the chance of making them will be determined in part by 
the practical consequences of making such errors.   
However, even if one accepts that translating ethical and other pragmatic concerns 
into numerical values is implementable, it is possible that some will have more general 
concerns over importing non-epistemic or contextual (Longino 1990) values into 
scientific methodology. The notion that we should include something as unstable as 
ethical values into our experimental instrumentation may appear to undermine the 
objectivity and impartiality of the epistemic dimension of science.  This concern has 
merit insofar as ethical values are indeed not fixed. However, in practice, science is 
guided by ethical codes that do not strictly adhere to any single ethical theory and is 
arguably better for it, despite being pulled in different directions by utilitarian and 
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deontological demands. The fact that ethical prescriptions and proscriptions function 
despite drawing on competing moral frameworks suggests that implemented ethical 
considerations are more robust than the critic gives them credit for. This may be because 
the implemented ethical concerns are relatively simple, such as ―avoid harm‖ and ―do not 
limit the autonomy of agents.‖ 
But perhaps the best proof that ethical values can be incorporated into epistemic 
pursuits is that some areas of science, notably those that overlap with technological 
development, already have such a built-in safety mechanism. For many philosophers of 
science, toxicology has served as the paradigmatic example of a values-guided scientific 
activity, since it offers an example where Type II errors are treated as more serious 
because of the high risk of false negatives to public health. In fact, the conventional 
nature of the error-rates was evident to philosophers of science around the middle of the 
twentieth century. Carl Hempel, for example, introduced the concept of ―inductive risk‖ – 
or the risk of choosing to accept or reject a hypothesis under incomplete evidence – by 
way of illustrating that the goals of a given pursuit determine which valuation strategy to 
use in deciding which kinds of errors to favor (Hempel 1965, 92). He writes: 
[The] problem of formulating adequate rules of acceptance and rejection 
has no clear meaning unless standards of adequacy have been provided by 
assigning definitive values or disvalues to those different possible 
―outcomes‖ of acceptance and rejection. It is in this sense that the method 
of establishing scientific hypotheses ―presupposes‖ valuation: the 
justification of the rules of acceptance and rejection requires reference to 
the value judgments. (Hempel 1965, 92) 
 For Hempel, these goals, and hence the values, were epistemic, including the ―attainment 
of an increasingly reliable extensive, and theoretically systematized body of information 
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about the world‖ (Hempel 1965, 93).  Later philosophers have extended the notion of 
inductive risk to cover a broader range of goals than those Hempel was willing to grant to 
scientific activity. Kristin Shrader-Frechette (1998) and Heather Douglas (2000), for 
example, have argued that public safety is and ought to be one such goal. Douglas (2000) 
takes the case of studies into the toxicity of dioxin to illustrate that public health 
considerations can and do enter the scientific practice. If the objectivity of toxicology is 
not threatened by introducing public safety restrictions into the acceptance of the 
hypothesis of safety, then animal cognition research may use this approach as a model for 
building a more ethically, as well as epistemically, responsive NPM. 
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have shown that there are no viable non-Occamist justifications for a 
general preference for the Hn – whether the Hn is defined negatively as the absence of a 
feature under investigation or positively as the presence of the cognitive feature of least 
complexity.  Having dispensed with the Hn, I went on to make the case for the Hc, on 
which the null hypothesis for any given experiment in comparative cognition would be 
informed by a range of empirical information. 
On my view, the bias of Cognitive Conservatism can be traced to an overreliance 
on Occamist notions of parsimony. This overreliance is expressed at all levels of 
scientific pursuit (see Chapters 2 and 3), but can be partially remedied by excavating the 
Occamist components from the experimental paradigm, thereby replacing a priori 
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metaphysics with empirical information and empirically-based metaphysical 
considerations. One way to effect this change is by modifying the semantic version of the 
NPM in comparative cognition by removing the natural null and replacing it with the 
contextual null. This move blocks CC without altering the error-rate asymmetry (the 
differential rates of Type I and Type II errors). I then argued that a role for non-epistemic 
considerations can nevertheless be found, and argued that the error-rate asymmetry is one 
place where non-epistemic values, such as moral considerations, can rightly guide 
scientific decision-making. I call this the pragmatic error-rate, and argue that it does not 
compromise the objectivity of science, because (a) the error-rates are presently chosen 
based on the arbitrary criterion of experimenters‘ sense of comfort, and (b) the cases from 
toxicology set a precedent where a similar strategy successfully guarded against the 
consequences of inductive risk (Douglas 2000, 2009). The pragmatic error-rate 
asymmetry is responsive to the ethical demands placed on a science that, whether it 
wishes to admit it, has a substantial impact on the welfare of nonhuman animals.  
 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This project began as an investigation of what I have called Cognitive Conservatism 
(CC), which is the preference for hypotheses that explain an organism‘s behavior in terms 
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of the simplest cognitive ontology. It concluded with a critique of covert biases 
embedded in statistical paradigms, and a proposal to fix them. Along the way, my 
discussion uncovered the grounding relationship between and the excessive worry over 
anthropomorphism and appeals to parsimony. I showed that both a preference for 
parsimony and the worry over anthropomorphism stem from interpretations of a single 
passage, known as Morgan‘s Canon (MC), which advises that ―[in] no case may we 
interpret an action as the outcome of the exercise of a higher psychical faculty if it can be 
interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the psychological 
scale‖ (Morgan 1894). Although both interpretations appeal to Morgan‘s authority, the 
parsimony interpretation of MC is often taken to have independent epistemic weight, 
typically by interpreting it as a special case of Occam‘s razor. An investigation of how 
parsimony is understood in comparative cognition revealed the conceptual profligacy of 
the term. Deprived of the metaphysical moorings of Occamism, the concept of parsimony 
in comparative cognition is multiply ambiguous, both in terms of what is to be simplified 
and in terms of how to simplify. In the course of this investigation, I identified the most 
common interpretation of parsimony, which I labeled ontological parsimony, or the 
preference for the simplest cognitive ontology. I argued that a preference for ontological 
parsimony results in CC. I argued that this occurs in experimental comparative cognition, 
through the embedding of an Occamist preference within the choice of the null 
hypothesis. I concluded with a proposed modification to the Neyman-Pearson Method of 
hypothesis testing, which, I argued, reduces the impact of the CC bias in comparative 
cognition.  
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 So, what lessons can be drawn from this discussion? One way to answer this 
question is in terms of the needs of the three audiences to whom my dissertation is 
addressed: philosophers of animal cognition science, comparative cognition researchers, 
and philosophers of science. I turn to these now. 
Lessons for Philosophy of Animal Cognition 
The lessons for the philosophy of animal cognition can be stated simply: First, biases like 
CC can be the products of deeply embedded methodological choices, such as the choice 
of a null hypothesis and the decision to prefer one type of error over another type. 
Second, eliminating the CC bias requires changing not only what we take to be the null 
hypothesis at the level of theory, but also what a null hypothesis must look like at the 
level of statistical analysis, as I argued with the Contextual Null.  
These lessons give rise to a future research project that picks up the case against 
the notion of cognitive complexity where the dissertation left off. In the dissertation, I 
argued that an ambiguous notion of cognitive complexity covertly operates in the 
statistical model used to interpret data and to shape experimental protocols. The future 
project would argue that cognition cannot be easily carved up at the joints (as my 
discussion began to show) and, similarly, the notion of complexity cannot meaningfully 
inform debates about the structures underpinning, mechanisms producing, or fitness 
considerations driving the evolution of cognition. This is because, while the notion of 
cognition is ambiguous, the means of simplifying cognitive ontologies are inextricably 
bound up with the ontology being simplified. Due to these conceptual problems, 
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cognitive complexity cannot function as an evaluative concept, either in science or in the 
philosophy of animal cognition, and must be replaced with more domain-specific 
projects.  
Lessons for Comparative Cognition Researchers 
Comparative cognition would benefit from a deeper awareness of how vague or 
ambiguous notions help structure research programs all the way down to statistical model 
choice. The focus on the choice of statistical model is essential to this awareness: 
statistics are interpretive tools, and using them requires knowing which tool is 
appropriate for a particular job, as well as how to judge whether a tool has been damaged. 
My arguments contribute to the chorus of voices recommending a more careful treatment 
of statistical tools in the psychological sciences. Gerd Gigerenzer (2004), for instance, 
has identified what he calls the ―null ritual‖ in psychology, which he somewhat glibly 
characterizes as follows: 
The null ritual: 
1. Set up a statistical null hypothesis of ―no mean difference‖ or ―zero 
correlation.‖ Don‘t specify the predictions of your research hypothesis or of any 
alternative substantive hypotheses. 
2. Use 5% as a convention for rejecting the null. If significant, accept your 
research hypothesis. Report the result as p< 0.05, p< 0.01, or p< 0.001 (whichever 
comes next to the obtained p-value). 
3. Always perform this procedure (Gigerenzer 2004, 588) 
 
The null ritual, according to Gigerenzer, elides incompatible statistical methodologies, 
and recommends using statistical tools without reflecting on their meaning. Such 
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reflection, Gigerenzer argues, would reveal that the null is more a reflexive habit than a 
reasoned method in many cases. Research in comparative cognition would benefit an 
increased focus on the meanings of its interpretive tools, as Gigerenzer recommends.76 
Furthermore, my dissertation suggests that some conceptual cleanup is in order. It 
recommends that researchers recognize of the disutility of appealing to parsimony. 
Researchers, in my view, ought to either specify which version of simplicity or parsimony 
they have in mind, or avoid this particular rhetorical shortcut altogether. To the extent 
that scientists wish to retain the a priori preference for ―parsimonious‖ or austere 
cognitive ontologies in their accounts of animal behavior, they ought to accept the 
implications of adopting a prediction-driven, non-explanatory approach. This will usually 
mean adopting an instrumentalist posture, pending the introduction of a novel, 
empirically-grounded, explanation of the conservation of simple cognitive traits. A 
related lesson is that the concept of representation and its relationship to associative 
mechanisms and processes needs further conceptual unpacking in order to substantiate 
the pervasive assumption that representation and association are incompatible.  
Lessons for Philosophy of Science  
The most general lesson for philosophers of science is this: Look more to closely at 
statistical and experimental methods. This lesson holds across the board, but is especially 
                                                          
76
 For an example of attention to this problem among comparative cognition researchers, 
see Barrett et al (2007). Interestingly, Barrett et al., caution against what they call 
―anthropocentrism‖ but which I may call ―anthropomorphism‖ and connect it with a 
tendency to overattribute complex cognition. This is expected, as the CC bias cannot be 
eliminated by merely changing the statistical approaches.   
 
211 
 
 
salient for those interested in how values operate in science.  My dissertation offers a case 
study of how one kind of value of questionable epistemic repute (i.e., parsimony) 
permeates the scientific activities at multiple stages in the experimental process. I have 
suggested that philosophers of science with an interest in epistemic and non-epistemic 
values ought to shift their focus away from a piecemeal analysis of theories and models, 
and toward a broader understanding of how scientific practice, as an interconnected 
system, embeds and reinforces pre-empirical assumptions. A starting point for this 
project involves taking a closer look at how scientific methodologies lead to knowledge-
claims by way of statistical tools. Taken as a case study, my discussion also carries 
broader implications for debates about the role of values in science – both with respect to 
experimentation and to the nature of scientific evidence, to which I now turn. 
Experiment and Values  
One lesson from my discussion of hierarchical nulls and the relationship of statistical 
hypotheses to experimental hypotheses is that experiment does not have a life of its own77. 
Here is why: 
I have shown how at least one kind of bias – CC – may enter into scientific 
experiment not just through value-laden theory, but through the back-channels of 
ostensibly value-neutral features of scientific activity, such as statistical models. These 
models shape experimental protocols. They are also liable to contain values, such as 
                                                          
77
 Ian Hacking (1983) is responsible for coining the phrase ―experiment has a life of its 
own.‖ My project considers experimentation to be substantially less free than his account 
implies. 
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Occamist parsimony, as is the case in the original semantic NPM. My model of 
hierarchical nulls shows how assumptions from the theoretical level reinforce 
assumptions made at the experimental and statistical-evaluative levels, such that the bi-
directional influence between protocol choice and statistical model choice is further 
mediated by theory. This suggests that the relationship between the experimental 
protocols and the statistical methods used to evaluate the data generated by those 
protocols are intimately linked: statistical models do not merely evaluate data, but also 
determine the scope of the questions a given experiment is permitted to ask. More work 
must be done to bring this conclusion into greater focus. My dissertation serves as a point 
of departure for this future project. 
This project will concern the epistemology of physical experiments, which 
includes both observational and interventionist experiments, and the statistical methods 
used in experimentation. Statistical methods play a central role in many areas of science, 
and yet this fact has received comparatively little attention from philosophers of science. 
This neglect can be remedied through a closer analysis of physical experiment. Toward 
this end, my dissertation discusses the impact that choosing an idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the NPM has had on methodological and inferential decisions in 
comparative cognition. This project would extend the discussion beyond frequentist 
statistical models. It would draw out the constraints placed on experimental methodology 
by the choice of statistical model, and suggest that analyses of experiment should treat 
statistics and methodology as a single dynamic system. In treating the experimental 
protocols and statistical models as a single dynamic system, it would offer a novel tool 
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for assessing the theory-(in)dependence of experimentation.  One consequence of this 
interpretation is that, if biases are embedded in statistics, and mirrored in theory, then 
some experimental data is not screened off from theoretical commitments and can 
therefore fail to be confirmatory of the theory that the experiment is purportedly testing. 
Thus far, this project brackets the role of simulation experiments and cognitive 
models from physical experiments. However, the rapid introduction of these methods of 
investigation calls for an examination of the conditions under which simulations of 
animal behavior and cognitive models of animal mental processes can provide evidence 
of the underlying cognitive processes. A complete epistemology of experiment would 
require an account of the relationship between these simulations and models and 
traditional experimentation. Such an account may begin by defending a view on which 
both simulations of behavior and cognitive models are construed as experiments, on the 
grounds that the value of intervention in scientific investigation has been overstated. This 
broadens the traditional definition of experimentation and calls for an explanation of how 
simulations of animal behavior and mathematical models of animal cognition can both 
generate evidence for an hypothesis about actual animals. Building on Wendy Parker‘s 
(2009) account of ―relevant similarity,‖ this related project would flesh out an account of 
similarity for simulations and cognitive models in the cognitive sciences. 
Evidence and Values 
The lesson for philosophers interested in the relationship that evidence bears to values 
begins by accepting the following claim, as expressed by Mayo and Spanos (2011): 
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An adequate philosophy of evidence would have to engage statistical 
methods for obtaining, debating, rejecting, and affirming data. From this 
perspective, an account of scientific method that begins its work only once 
well-defined evidence claims are available forfeits the ability to be 
relevant to understanding the actual processes behind the success of 
science. (Mayo and Spanos 2011, 161) 
Accepting the centrality of data-generating mechanisms to an account of evidence serves 
as a starting point for the next lesson: What counts as evidence depends, in part, on the 
goals we adopt. Some goals are appropriately shaped by epistemic and non-epistemic 
values. Therefore, some accounts of evidence may be partially determined by values.  
My discussion of the importance of the null hypothesis adds support to the notion 
that (statistical) data-interpretation instruments are not value-free. The value-free ideal, 
moreover, may be neither realizable nor even desirable. This suggests that the evaluation 
of evidence requires a deeper appreciation for how data is generated as well as how the 
data is interpreted by statistical analysis (Cf. Mayo 2004, Mayo and Spanos 2011). A 
quick look into the philosophy of statistics reveals deep divisions across different camps, 
with frequentists decrying the subjectivity of Bayesian analysis and Bayesians insisting 
that statistical analysis be capable of generating evidence for rational belief, not merely 
evidence that the protocols are reliable at some arbitrarily acceptable rate. At the heart of 
these divisions is a disagreement about what statistical systems are for. Are they 
instruments for converting data about some parts of the world into evidence of the 
underlying mechanisms, or causal regularities of that part of the world? Or are they 
instruments for testing our data-generating approaches for long-term reliability? To the 
extent that frequentist and Bayesian statistics offer two distinct approaches, we may 
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conclude that evidence is goal-relative. Put another way, the answer to the question, 
―What must be true of X in order for X to count as evidence of Y?‖ has more than a 
single true answer.  
Malcolm Forster and Sober (2004) stress the importance of separating the 
following questions for ―evaluating the testimony of the observations‖ into four separate 
questions: 
1. What should you do? 
2. What should you believe? 
3. What do the observations tell you about the truth of the hypothesis you‘re 
considering? 
4. What do the observations tell you about the predictive accuracy of the hypothesis 
you‘re considering?78 
 
The first question is meant for the frequentist, whose accept/reject (or ―fail to 
reject/reject‖) decision-procedure, as Forster and Sober rightly point out, ―falls in the 
domain of decision theory, in which case utilities as well as probabilities need to be 
considered‖ (Forster & Sober 2004, 157). The NPM, as a frequentist paradigm, must 
answer this question when evaluating the testimony of the data. Since even Hempel 
(1965) admitted that calculating utilities involves values, the frequentist methodology 
appears to be open to providing a productive and legitimate role for values in 
methodology of experiment. So far, this suggestion is neutral on which kinds of values 
should play this role. For Hempel, these were purely epistemic values. However, as 
Douglas (2009) and Schrader-Freschette (1998) have argued, inductive risk analyses need 
                                                          
78
 This list is taken from Royall‘s original list of three questions, in which Forster & 
Sober‘s 3rd and 4th questions were initially just the single question, ―What do the 
observations tell you about the truth of the hypothesis you‘re considering?‖ 
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not be restricted to epistemic values alone, and it is here that a natural entry-point for 
non-epistemic values may be located. Such a move would bring animal cognition 
research in line with the discussion of inductive risk, which has heretofore focused almost 
exclusively on the risks of biotechnology for the human population.  
 This lesson, like the lesson for philosophy of experiment, also opens up new 
research projects. One such project would ask whether different statistical paradigms (or 
statistical-methodological dyads) are more open to non-epistemic and quasi-epistemic 
values than others. Bayesians have long been criticized for their purported subjectivity, 
but the idea that frequentist methods are objective is, as I have illustrated, also misguided. 
A better question is not whether a method is objective, but in what way a method is 
subjective (i.e., guided by extra-epistemic considerations) and whether such subjectivity 
is incompatible with the specific goals of a given research program.  
My dissertation serves as a springboard for each of these projects by offering the 
insight that statistical models are deeply embedded in experimental practice, and are, not 
value-free. Statistical models provide an often overlooked door through which values, 
epistemic and non-epistemic, can enter scientific research. This door allowed parsimony 
to enter the statistical methods of comparative cognition, reinforcing the bias of 
Cognitive Conservatism. However, there is no reason to believe that comparative 
cognition is uniquely vulnerable among the sciences, and my dissertation serves to 
underscore this point.  
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Table 1A. Results from the Textbook Search, Index Search 
Measuring Behavior: An introductory 
Guide 
 Anthropomorphism, 18-20 
 Clever Hans 18, 87 
 No Entry on Morgan‟s Canon 
 No entry on Parsimony  
 
Contrast with the first edition, where:  
 Anthropomorphism, 10-11 
 Clever Hans, 20 
 Lloyd Morgan‘s Canon, 10 
 No entry on Parsimony  
 
Comparative Psychology: Evolution and 
Development of Behavior, Second 
Edition.  
 No section on “anthropomorphism” 
under “A” 
 Behaviorism 17,22,27 
 Clever Hans 15, 425, 434, 442, 445 
 Complexity 2, 56, 94-95, 188-190, 
275 [Not directly relevant. Passages 
only argue that ―multicausality [of a 
given behavior type] invites 
interdisciplinary interaction.‖] 
 No “law of parsimony” under “L” 
despite two entries on “Laws”: (Law 
of effect and Law of Segregation”) 
 Morgan‘s canon of parsimony 15, 29 
 Parsimony 125-128, 638-639, 656, 
666-669 
 (under ―Parsimony‖) Morgan‘s 
Canon of 15,  
 (under ―Parsimony‖) simple 125, 132  
 
Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior, 
Second Edition Shettleworth 2010 
 Next to ―Animal Behavior.‖ See also 
Anthropocentrism; 
 (Under ―Animal Behavior, etc.) 
anthropomorphism, 4, 8, 10, 17-19 
 Anthropocentrism, 10, 15-19, 16f-
17f, 22, 24 [not all instances of term 
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mentioned in this entry; e.g., on pg. 
413] 
 Anthropomorphism, 4,8,10,17-
19,210,553-554 
 (Under ―Associative learning‖) 
anthropocentric approach, 15, 17-18 
 Under ―Behavior causal learning‖ 
killjoy explanations and, 413  
 Under ―Causation/causal inferences‖ 
killjoy explanations and, 413 [repeat] 
 Clever Hans (horse), 340, 370, 495, 
542 
 (Under ―Comparative cognition‖) 
―simple‖ mechanisms of, 18 
  (Under ―Comparative cognition  
theory/method‖) anthropomorphism, 
553-554  
 Killjoy explanations of causal 
learning, 413 [repeat again] 
 Morgan‘s Canon, 17-19, 24, 243, 
454, 553 
 no entry on parsimony 
 
Fundamentals of Comparative Cognition 
(2013) Shettleworth 
 Anthropomorphic interpretations of 
behavior,  
o animal intelligence, 10 
o cognitive ethology, 6 
o cognitive maps, 50, 57 
o numerical cognition, 66 
o overview, 3-4 
o tool use, 73, 79 
 ―Clever Hans effect,‖ 60, 109 
 (Under ―Cognitive maps‖) as 
anthropomorphic concept, 50, 57 
 (Under ―Comparative Cognition, 
general) human uniqueness, 112-24 
 (Under ―Comparative Cognition, 
general) traditional psychological or 
anthropocentric approach, 14 
 (Under ―Honeybees‖) 
anthropomorphic interpretations of 
behavior, 6 
 Human Uniqueness has 20 separate 
subheadings 
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 (Under ―Imitation‖) anthropomorphic 
interpretation, 3 
 Morgan‘s Canon, 12-13, 17, 34, 73 
 (Under ―numerical cognition‖) 
―Clever Hans effect,‖ 60 
 (Under ―Tool Use:‖) 
anthropomorphism, 73, 79 
 
Principles of Comparative Psychology, 
Greenberg and Haraway 2002 
 Anthropomorphism, 5 
 Morgan‘s canon, 5, 8, 257, 269 
 Parsimony, 13 
 
Determinants of Animal Behavior, 2002 
 
Jo-Anne Cartwright.  
New York: Routledge 
 Anthropomorphism: 6-10, 106, 125-6 
 Law of parsimony, 6, 9-10 
 Lloyd Morgan‘s canon, 6, 9 
 Mentalistic Approaches to Research 110, 
115 
 Non-mentalistic approaches to research, 
92, 101-3, 10-10, 115-6 
 no entry on “parsimony” 
 
Perspectives on Animal Behavior, 2010 
 
Goodenough, Judith & Betty McGuire & 
Elizabeth Jacob, Ed  
NJ: Wiley & Sons Inc. 
 No entry on 
Anthropomorphism 
 Clever Hans, 95-96 
 Morgan‘s Canon, 17-18 
 No entry on Parsimony 
 
Animal Behavior, Ed 9 
John Alcock 
 
 No entry on anthropomorphism 
 No entry on Morgan‟s canon 
 Parsimony 191-192 
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Table 2A: Consolidated textbook search results.  
Title Author(s)/ 
Editor(s) 
Year Description/ 
Notes 
Fundamentals of Comparative Cognition 
(Fundamentals in Cognition) 
Sara J. Shettleworth, Paul 
Bloom and Lynn Nadel 
2012  
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Cognition 
(Oxford Library of Psychology) 
Thomas R. Zentall and 
Edward A. Wasserman  
2012  
Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior, Second Ed. Sara J. Shettleworth 2010  
Perspectives on Animal Behavior Judith Goodenough 2009  
Measuring Behaviour: An Introductory Guide, 
Third Edition  
Paul Martin, Patrick Bateson 2007  
Principle of Animal Behavior, Second Edition  Lee Dugatkin 2008  
Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research 
and Everyday Experience (with Coglab Manual)  
E. Bruce Goldstein 2010  
Evolutionary Behavior and Ecology David Westneat and Charles 
Fox 
2010  
Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach, 
Ninth Edition  
John Alcock  2009 author recommended by Marc 
Bekoff 
Cognition: Exploring the Science of the Mind 
(Fourth Edition) 
Daniel Reisberg 2009  
Biological Psychology: An Introduction to 
Behavioral, Cognitive, and Clinical Neuroscience, 
Sixth Edition 
S. Marc Breedlove,  Neil V. 
Watson, Mark R. 
Rosenzweig  
2010 billed as introductory textbook 
An Introduction to Brain and Behavior, Third 
Edition  
Bryan Kolb and Ian Q. 
Whishaw 
  
Methods in Behavioral Research (Tenth Edition)   Paul Cozby  2009 aimed at human psychology  
Comparative Psychology: The Evolution and 
Development of Behavior, Second Edition  
Mauricio R. Papini 2008  
Comparative Psychology: A Handbook  Edited by Gary Greenberg 
and Maury M. Haraway.  
1998 appears to have no subsequent 
editions 
Principles of Comparative Psychology (2001) Gary Greenberg and Maury 
M. Haraway 
2001  
An Introduction to Behavioural Ecology (4th 
Edition)  
Nicholas B. Davies, John R. 
Krebs, and Stuart A. West  
  
Determinants of Animal Behaviour (Routledge 
Modular Psychology) 
Jo-Anne Cartwright  2002 billed as introductory textbook 
for comparative psychology 
students 
Comparative Psychology Alan Camp and Julia 
Russell 
1998 billed as introductory guide 
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Textbook search raw data  
(1) Best-seller searches; free search 
(a) From top 100 results from “comparative psychology” search in “books.” 
1. Comparative Psychology: The Evolution and Development of Behavior, Second Edition 
(2008) by Mauricio R. Papini. (unrated – author from Texas Christian University) 
2. Comparative Psychology: A Handbook (1998) Edited by Gary Greenberg and Maury M. 
Haraway. (appears to have no subsequent editions and has no reviews BUT see next) 
3. Principles of Comparative Psychology (2001) by Gary Greenberg and Maury M. 
Haraway  
4. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Cognition (Oxford Library of Psychology) 
Wasserman and Zentall (2012) – not listed as a textbook, but appears to be aimed at 
specialized audiences. 
5. Determinants of Animal Behaviour (Routledge Modular Psychology)(2002) By Jo-Anne 
Cartwright; billed as introductory textbook for comparative psychology students  
6. Comparative Psychology  (1998) by Alan Clamp and Julia Russell; billed as introductory 
guide. 
7. Principles Of Comparative Psychology (Principles of Psychology) (1994) by Nicky 
Hayes 
8. Animal Cognition: An Introduction to Modern Comparative Psychology (1996) by 
Jacques Vauclair  
9. Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach, Ninth Edition (2009) by John Alcock  
10.  Principles of Animal Behavior (Second Edition) (2009) by Lee Dugatkin (biologist). 
Textbook takes evolutionary perspective. 
(b) “comparative cognition” free search 
1. Animal Thinking: Contemporary Issues in Comparative Cognition (Strüngmann Forum 
Reports) by Randolf Menzel and Julia Fischer (Nov 4, 2011) 
2. The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Cognition (Oxford Library of Psychology) by 
Thomas R. Zentall and Edward A. Wasserman (Mar 20, 2012) 
3. Animal Cognition: An Introduction to Modern Comparative Psychology by Jacques 
Vauclair (Aug 15, 1996) 
4. Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior Second Edition by Sara J. Shettleworth (Dec 30, 
2009) 
5. Fundamentals of Comparative Cognition (Fundamentals in Cognition) by Sara J. 
Shettleworth, Paul Bloom and Lynn Nadel (Mar 15, 2012) 
6. Essentials Of Learning And Cognition (2002) by David L Morgan; billed as textbook 
 
(2) Best-Seller searches by category 
(a) The following were gathered from the top 100 search in Biological Sciences: Zoology: Animal 
Behavior and Communication. 
1. Perspectives on Animal Behavior (2009) Judith Goodenough (Author), Betty McGuire 
(Author), Elizabeth Jakob (Author) – first relevant result at #24 in this category.  
2. Principle of Animal Behavior by Lee Alan Dugatkin 
3. Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach, Ninth Edition (2009) by John Alcock  
4. An Introduction to Behavioural Ecology (4th Edition) by Nicholas B. Davies, John R. 
Krebs, and Stuart A. West  
5. Measuring Behaviour: An Introductory Guide by Paul Martin, Patrick Bateson  
6. Principles of Animal Behavior (Second Edition) by Lee Alan Dugatkin  
7. Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior [FIRST EDITION]by Sara J. Shettleworth 
 
(b) The following information was gathered from the top 100 search in Biological Sciences: 
Zoology: Animal Psychology 
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1. Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior FIRST EDITION by Sara J. Shettleworth- 
Perspectives on Animal Behavior (2000) by Judith Goodenough (Author), Betty McGuire 
(Author), Robert A. Wallace (Author) 
 
(c) The following was gathered from the top 100 search in Behavioral Sciences: Behavioral 
Psychology 
1. Methods in Behavioral Research (Tenth Edition) 2009. Paul Cozby (Author) – aimed at 
human psychology research, but this was the most relevant textbook in this section.  
 
(d) The following was gathered from the top 100 search in Behavioral Sciences: Cognitive 
Psychology 
1. Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience (with 
Coglab Manual) (2010) by E. Bruce Goldstein (Author)  ranked #73 
(e) The search in “Animals” produced no relevant results.  
(f) The search in “Evolution” produced no relevant results.  
(g) The supracategory of “Biology” had no relevant subcategories, and no search was 
conducted.  
 
(3) Related-item search 
Beginning with Sara J. Shettleworth‘s Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior: Second Edition, which 
produced the following relevant recommendations: 
1. Measuring Behaviour: An Introductory Guide, Edition 3. Edited by Paul Martin and 
Patrick Bateson 
2. Evolutionary Behavior and Ecology (2010), edited by David Westneat and Charles Fox 
3. Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach by John Alcock 
4. [and more] 
Beginning with Comparative Psychology: Evolution and Development of Behavior, 2nd Edition by 
Mauricio R. Papini (May 30, 2008); billed as the ―definitive textbook‖: 
1. The Principles of Learning and Behavior: Active Learning Edition (Sixth Edition) (2009) by 
Michael P. Domjan (Author) 
2. Cognition: Exploring the Science of the Mind (Fourth Edition) (2009) by Daniel Reisberg; also 
billed as textbook 
This led to, among others: 
a. Biological Psychology: An Introduction to Behavioral, Cognitive, and Clinical 
Neuroscience, Sixth Edition (2010) S. Marc Breedlove (Author), Neil V. Watson 
(Author), Mark R. Rosenzweig (Author); billed as introductory textbook 
b. An Introduction to Brain and Behavior, Third Edition by Bryan Kolb and Ian Q. 
Whishaw 
Sara J. Shettleworth‘s Cognition, Evolution, and Behavior: Second Edition 
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Figure 1A. The diagram is a replication of the diagram in Sober (2005). 
 
Sober explains this diagram as follows: 
If human beings and dogs both exhibit a derived behavior B, then it is more 
parsimonious (a) to view the shared behavior as a homology than (b) to 
hypothesize that it evolved independently in the two lineages. In addition, it I 
more parsimonious (c) to conjecture that human beings and dogs produce the 
behavior by using the same proximate mechanisms M than (d) to claim that 
human beings and dogs deploy different proximate mechanisms. (Sober 2005, 95) 
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